Ingles v. People

• Docket Number: 13135.
• Decision Date: 12 June 1933
• Citation: 22 P.2d 1109,92 Colo. 518
• Parties: INGLES v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

22 P.2d 1109

92 Colo. 518

INGLES v. PEOPLE.

No. 13135.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 12, 1933

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge.

Alexander Ingles, alias Alex English was convicted of murder of the first degree, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

ADAMS C.J., dissenting.

S. Harrison White and William O. Perry, both of Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Clarence L. Ireland, Atty. Gen., and Wallace S. Porth, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.

BUTLER Justice.

Alexander Ingles, alias Alexander English, hereinafter called the defendant, was charged with murder, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, was convicted of murder of the first degree, and was sentenced to death. On writ of error, we reversed the judgment, and remanded the cause for a new trial. Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 6 P.2d 455. Thereupon, by leave of the trial court, the defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, was rearraigned, entered a general plea of not guilty, was convicted again of murder of the first degree, and again sentenced to death.

At the trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence tending to show that at the time of the homicide he was insane or otherwise mentally deranged. The court sustained the district attorney's objection to the offer holding that, under the act of 1927, concerning pleas of insanity in criminal cases (Sess. Laws 1927, c. 90, p. 296, et seq.), such evidence was not admissible, the defendant having withdrawn his former plea and having entered, in lieu thereof, a general plea of not guilty.

That act provides as follows:

'Section 1. If one of the defenses of the defendant be insanity, said defense must be pleaded orally, eiter by defendant or by counsel for defendant as a specification to the plea of 'not guilty' in the form 'Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime', or 'Not guilty by reason of insanity since the time of the alleged commission of the crime', or 'Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime and since.'

'Section 2. Upon the making of any such plea of insanity, the judge shall forthwith commit the defendant to the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital at Denver or to the State Hospital at Pueblo where the defendant shall remain under observation for such time as the court may direct, not exceeding one month. The judge may also appoint a commission of one or more physicians, specialists in mental diseases, to examine the defendant during said period, and the court may call and examine said physicians as witnesses at the trial. Either the state or the defendant or both may call said physician or physicians as witnesses but this shall not preclude the state or defendant from using other physicians.

'Section 3. If the plea is 'Not guilty by reason of insanity since the time of the alleged commission of the crime', the case shall be set down for trial on the issue of insanity alone, with no reference to the crime. If the plea be 'Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime', or 'Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime and since', after the period of observation, the case, in the discretion of the Court, may be either set for trial on the insanity issue alone and the defendant committed to the Colorado State Hospital at Pueblo or held for trial, dependent on the verdict of the jury, or be tried on the main case.

'Section 4. If the plea is 'Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime', or 'Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime and since', in addition to the other forms of verdict, the jury shall be given a form with the words 'Not guilty by reason of insanity'. If said verdict is rendered, the defendant shall be confined in the Colorado State Hospital at Pueblo under the laws governing that institution.'

1. It is said that the act in question violates three sections of article 2 of the State Constitution, namely, section 23, which provides that 'the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases'; section 25, which provides 'that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law'; and section 18, which provides 'that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case.'

One who is insane when he commits an act prohibited by law cannot be held guilty of a crime. A statute providing that insanity shall be no defense to a criminal charge would be unconstitutional. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020, 32 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1216, Ann.Cas. 1912B, 917. One accused of crime is entitled to raise and have a jury pass upon the question of whether he was sane or insane when he committed the act with which he is charged. At some stage of the proceeding he must be given an opportunity to raise that question. Before the act of 1927, the question could be raised under a general plea of not guilty. In order to avoid or lessen certain abuses that were believed to exist under that practice, the Legislature, by the act in question, changed the method of raising the question of insanity, but left to the defendant all the substantial rights he formerly enjoyed. Now, as formerly, he can raise the question of insanity, and have that question passed upon by a jury of twelve men. Now, as formerly, when the question is properly raised, the burden is upon the people to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, when he committed the act charged, was sane. Now, as formerly, if the evidence raises in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity at that time, they must find the defendant not guilty of the crime charged. The substance of the defendant's right to a jury trial on the question of insanity has been preserved; the procedure only has been changed. The constitutional provision concerning the inviolability of jury trials does not prohibit the Legislature from changing the method of raising the question of insanity. Nor does the requirement that, in order to raise the question of insanity, the defendant must plead it in the specified manner, offend against the due process clause of the Constitution. People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117; People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 278 P. 767; People v. Davis, 94 Cal.App. 192, 270 P. 715; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N.W. 912, 46 Am.Rep. 26; State v. Toon, 172 La. 631, 135 So. 7; Perry v. State, 87 Ala. 30, 6 So. 425, 427.

'The purpose of the act is plainly to require the defense of insanity to be tried only under a special plea, to require this plea to be interposed at the time of arraignment, and to require a special verdict on this issue. This defense cannot now be introduced under the plea of 'not guilty,' as it formerly could be.' Perry v. State, supra. And see the other cases cited above.

2. It is said that the act of 1927 deprived the defendant of due process of law, for the reason that it denied him the right to raise the issue of insanity at the time of the homicide, except upon condition that he first subject himself, even though sane at the time of entering his plea, to incarceration for a prescribed period of time in a hospital Before trial, there to be observed and examined for the purpose of getting evidence either for or against himself; and that the act thus compelled the defendant to furnish evidence tending to incriminate himself.

(a) A person not accused of a crime, but alleged to be insane, may be taken into custody and temporarily restrained of his liberty and subjected to professional observation pending a judicial determination of his mental condition. C. L. § 550, et seq. Even under the old law, one accused of crime and whose sanity was questioned was subject to confinement and observation.

(b) But it is said that a person who is insane at the time of the homicide may recover his sanity and be sane at the time of pleading. It is suggested that such was the situation in the case at bar, and that in such a case the right to confine a person temporarily in a hospital for observation and examination to ascertain his mental condition does not exist. A person accused of crime may be confined in jail pending his trial, and while there he may be observed and examined to ascertain his mental condition. Where he claims that he was insane at the time he committed the act with which he is charged, temporarily transferring him to a hospital, where he can be observed and examined under conditions more favorable than those existing in jail, does not deprive him of due process of law.

(c) Such incarceration and examination does not offend against section 18, article 2, of the State Constitution, providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case. Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634, 71 A.L.R. 1005.

(d) It is said that during such confinement in the hospital, under the act of 1927, a person accused of crime would be denied the right to consult counsel, and that to require him to place himself in such a situation as a condition to pleading not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the homicide would deprive him of due process of law. But that act contains no such provision; and the right of any person restrained of his liberty, for any cause whatever, to consult counsel, except where there is imminent danger of escape, is amply secured by section 7162, Compiled Laws.

3. Where a defendant is afforded the opportunity, as he...