The State v. Loomis

• Decision Date: 25 March 1893
• Parties: The State v. Loomis et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

22 S.W. 350

115 Mo. 307

The State v. Loomis et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 25, 1893

Appeal from Macon Circuit Court. -- Hon. Andrew Ellison, Judge.

Reversed.

Dysart & Mitchell and Lee, McKeighan, Ellis & Priest for appellants.

(1) Sections 7058 and 7060 must be construed together as referable to the same subject-matter and as parts of the same act (Acts, 1885, pp. 83-84), and, being so construed, they are in violation of section 16, article 2 of the constitution of Missouri, which provides: "That imprisonment for debt shall not be allowed except for the non-payment of fines and penalties imposed for violation of law." The act in question is in substance an act authorizing imprisonment for non-payment of debt. State v. Coal & Coke Co., 20 S.W. 499. (2) The act in question transcends the due and proper bounds of legislative power without regard to specific, federal or state constitutional provision. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [4 Ed.] pp. 492-3, sec. 393; Budd v. N. Y., 143 U.S. 517. (3) First. The act in question is unconstitutional, null and void, in that it violates the following provisions of the constitution of the United States: "Section 10, article 1. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility." Second. It violates the following portion of article 5 of the amendments of the federal constitution, viz: "No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Third. It also violates the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, which prohibits the states of the union from depriving "any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law," and also from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (See cases cited in subdiv. 5.) (4) First. The act in question violates the following provision of the constitution of the state of Missouri, sec. 15, art. 2, "That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be passed by the general assembly." Second. It violates section 30 article 2, of the constitution of Missouri, which provides "that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Third. It violates section 53, article 4, of the constitution of Missouri, which provides that no law shall be passed "granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity." (5) The act in question grants to employes of mining companies the exclusive right, privilege and immunity of violating their contracts justifies their refusal to be bound by them, and punishes by fine the party whose only offense is in insisting on the contract being performed. First. It grants to the employes of mining and manufacturing companies the special and exclusive right, privilege and immunity, which is denied employes of all other companies, of being relieved from the provisions of section 8161, relating to the set-off of mutual debts, and section 2050, Revised Statutes of Missouri, which gives to every defendant the right of counter-claim for any cause of action arising on contract. Second. It also grants to employes of mining and manufacturing companies the special and exclusive right and privilege of turning a non-negotiable order or contract into an absolute and unconditional negotiable instrument, which the parties by contract have declared shall be non-negotiable and shall be paid only in goods or merchandise. Third. It deprives mining and manufacturing employers of the right to make contracts which persons and corporations in all other lines of business have the right to make. It is, therefore, void, as being class legislation and as denying to persons engaged in the mining and manufacturing business the equal protection of the law. People v. Otis, 90 N.Y. 48; State v Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179; State v. Coal & Coke Co., 33 W.Va. 188; West Virginia v. Fire Creek Co., 6 L. R. A. 359; Commonwealth v. Perry, 34 Cent. L. J. (1891) 78, (28 N.E. 1126); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, (6 A. 354); Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294 (7 N.E. 631); Frorer v. People, 31 N.E. (Ill. Sup.) 395; Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 272 (6 S.W. 401); Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [4 Ed.] sec. 393, p. 492, et seq.; Budd v. N. Y., 143 U.S. 517.

Black, J. Barclay, J., dissenting.

OPINION

In Banc.

Black J. --

This is an information in two counts, filed by the prosecuting attorney of Macon county against the three defendants engaged in carrying on the business of mining coal in that county. The first count avers that the defendants did unlawfully issue and circulate in payment of wages a certain order, check, etc., payable to P. Daniels otherwise than in money, without being payable at the option of the holder in merchandise or money. The second count states in substance that defendants unlawfully failed to redeem a certain order, check, etc., issued to P. Daniels in payment for wages, the same having been presented for payment thirty days from the date of the delivery thereof.

The information is based upon sections 7058 and 7060 of the Revised Statutes of 1889. The first of these sections provides:

"It shall not be lawful for any corporation, person or firm engaged in manufacturing or mining in this state to issue, pay out or circulate for payment of the wages of labor, any order, check, memorandum, token or evidence of indebtedness, payable in whole or in part otherwise than in lawful money of the United States, unless the same is negotiable and redeemable at its face value, without discount, in cash or in goods, wares or merchandise or supplies, at the option of the holder at the store or other place of business of such firm, person or corporation; * * * and the person who, or corporation, firm or company, which, may issue any such order, check, memorandum, token or other evidence of indebtedness, shall, upon presentation and demand within thirty days from date or delivery thereof, redeem the same in goods, wares, merchandise or supplies at the current cash market price for like goods, wares, merchandise or supplies, or in lawful money of the United States, as may be demanded by the holder of any such order, memorandum, token or other evidence of indebtedness; provided," etc.

Section 7060 makes it a misdemeanor for any person, firm or company engaged in mining or manufacturing to issue or circulate in payment of wages any order, check, etc., payable otherwise than as provided in section 7058, or to fail to redeem any such order, check, etc., in money when presented for payment.

The circuit court, sitting as a jury, found the defendants guilty as charged in the first count of the information and assessed their punishment at a fine of $ 10, and they appealed.

The evidence discloses the following facts: The defendants, composing the firm of Loomis & Snively, were the owners of coal mines, and in connection with that business carried on a store. Peter Daniels worked for them as a miner. At the end of January, 1891, he owed them $ 43.20. On the eighteenth of the following February he had earned as wages during that month $ 5.50, and on that day he requested and the defendants' clerk gave him a "credit coupon check book" upon their store. The coupons were in sums of five, ten and twenty-five cents, and aggregated $ 5. It is stated on the back of the book that "the coupons in this book are not good if detached, and are payable only in merchandise when presented by P. Daniels." Each coupon says, "good for merchandise at our store, not transferable. Loomis & Snively."

Daniels assigned this check book to Burge, who assigned it to Hughes and he transferred it to Mr. Williams. The latter presented it to the defendants for payment on the second of April, 1891, and they then refused payment. The proof shows that defendants had monthly pay-days. On these days they gave out no orders or checks but paid the miners what was due them in cash. At the close of the evidence the defendants asked the court to discharge them, because the statute upon which the information was founded was unconstitutional and therefore void, which request the court refused.

The contention is, that the two sections of the statute before mentioned are in conflict with several clauses of the constitution of this state, and especially the following:

"1. That all persons have a natural right to life, liberty and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry."

"2. That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

"3. And that they violate that part of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, which declares 'nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.'"

The words, "due process of law," as used in these clauses of both constitutions mean the same as "the law of the land." 2 Story on the Constitution [5 Ed.] sec. 1943; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [6 Ed.] 430.

It was said in Railroad v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 29 L.Ed 463, 6 S.Ct. 110: "In England the requirement of due process of law, in cases where life, liberty and property were affected, was originally designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the...