22 U.S. 241 (1824), Kirk v. Smith Ex Dem Penn

Citation:22 U.S. 241, 6 L.Ed. 81
Party Name:KIRK and others, Plaintiffs in Error, v. SMITH, ex. dem. PENN, Defendant in Error.
Case Date:February 16, 1824
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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22 U.S. 241 (1824)

6 L.Ed. 81

KIRK and others, Plaintiffs in Error,

v.

SMITH, ex. dem. PENN, Defendant in Error.

United States Supreme Court.

February 16, 1824

[LOCAL LAW.]

ERROR to the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania. This was an ejectment, brought by the defendant in error, in the Court below, to recover the possession of certain lands in York county, in the State of Pennsylvania. On the 4th of March, 1681, Charles II. granted to William Penn, the ancestor of the lessor of the plaintiff below, that tract of country which now constitutes the State of Pennsylvania. The grant contains special powers to erect manors and to alien the lands, with liberty to the alienees to hold immediately of the proprietor and his heirs, notwithstanding the statute of quia emptores. On the 11th of July, in the same year, William Penn, having interested many persons in his grant, agreed with 'the adventurers

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and purchasers' in England, on 'certain conditions and concessions,' which, being for their mutual advantage, were to be obligatory in the future management of the property and settlement of the province. The 9th of these conditions is, that 'in every 100,000 acres, the Governor and proprietary, by lot, reserveth ten to himself, which shall lie but in one place.' In the year 1762, a warrant was issued for the survey of the manor of Springetsbury. This warrant recites a former survey of the same land, in 1722, as a manor; states the general outlines of such former survey, and directs a resurvey. This resurveying was made, and returned into the land office in 1768, where it has remained ever since. This resurvey included the lands claimed by the plaintiffs in error, which were held under warrants, of which the following is a specimen:

'Pennsylvania, ss: BY THE PROPRIETARIES.

'Whereas, Partholomew Sesrang, of the county of Lancaster, hath requested that we would grant him to take up two hundred acres of land, situate between Codorus creek and Little Conewaga creek, adjoining the lands of Killian Smith and Philip Heintz, on the west side of the Susquehannah river, in the said county of Lancaster, for which he agrees to pay to our use the sum of fifteen pounds ten shillings, current money of this province, for each hundred acres; and the yearly quit-rent of one halfpenny sterling for every acre thereof. 'These are, therefore, to authorize and require you to survey, or cause to be surveyed, unto the

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said Bartholomew, at the place aforesaid, according to the method of townships appointed, the said quantity of 200 acres, if not already surveyed or appropriated; and make return thereof into the secretary's office, in order for further confirmation; for which this shall be your sufficient warrant: which survey, in case the said Bartholomew fulfil the above agreement within six months from the date hereof, shall be valid; otherwise void.

'Given under my hand and seal of the land office, by virtue of certain powers from the said Proprietaries, at Philadelphia, this eighth day of January, Anno Domini one thousand seven hundred and forty-two.

GEORGE THOMAS.'

[L. S.]

'TO WM. PARSONS, Surveyor General.'

'In virtue of this warrant, a survey of the land claimed by Caleb Kirk, one of the plaintiffs in error, was made on the 12th of October, 1747, in favour of Jacob Wagner, the then holder of the warrant, by various mesne transfers. The title was regularly deduced by various conveyances, from Wagner to Kirk, accompanied with possession. No grant was ever issued for the land. Ten pounds, a part of the consideration, were paid about the date of the warrant, and there was no proof of the payment of the residue. It appeared to have been the usage of the proprietaries, not to insist upon the terms of the contract, by which the survey was declared to be void, unless the agreement was fulfilled within six months from the date of the warrant, and large arrearages of purchase money remained due after the surveys were made

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both within and without the manors. The only distinction appears to have been, that the reserved lands were sold by special contract; and the lands not reserved, were sold at stated prices.

At the commencement of the war of the American revolution, the proprietary went to Great Britain, where he remained; and in the year 1779, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act, entitled 'an act for vesting the estates of the late proprietaries of Pennsylvania, in this commonwealth.' The ejectment was brought in the year 1819, and on the trial of the cause, the question whether the land in controversy was included within the lines of the manor of Springetsbury, as surveyed under the warrant of 1762, was left to the jury, who found that it was included within those lines. The opinion of the Court below, was, that if the land was within those lines, the right of the plaintiff below was excepted out of the general operation of the act of 1779, and was not vested in the commonwealth. The court also instructed the jury, that the statute of limitations of 1705, commonly called the 'seven years law,' was inapplicable to the case. To these instructions, the defendant's counsel excepted, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff having been rendered in the Court below, the cause was brought by writ of error to this Court.

March 14th, 1823.

COUNSEL

The cause was argued by Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster for the plaintiffs in error, and by the Attorney General and Mr. Sergeant for the defendants in error.

On the part of the plaintiffs in error, it was contended, 1. That the rights derived to the plaintiffs below, were proprietary, and not manorial. Being in their origin proprietary, they were not, and could not be, affected by the survey of a manor in 1768, subsequent to their commencement.

2. That the rights, being proprietary, and not manorial, vested in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by the right of conquest, and the act of confiscation of 1779. The 7th section confirms all persons, and, consequently, the plaintiffs below, in their rights, derived from the proprietaries. The act must be construed according to its intention, ascertained by a comparison of all its parts. The intention was to confiscate the proprietary rights, wherever situated; and to reserve the private or manorial rights, wherever located. If a proprietary right was situated within a manor, it was to be confiscated. If it were part of the manor, that is, of the right springing out of the manor, it was reserved. There is no reservation to the proprietaries of the arrears of purchase money due within manors. There is only an exception from the operation of the abolition of quitrents and arrears of purchase money, within manors; and this exception must be construed to mean the case of lands bought as part of the manor. It would be to contradict the whole scope and meaning of the act, to construe it as abolishing proprietary rights every where but in manors, and to leave them there in full vigour. According to this view of the act, we shall have a consistent and congruous interpretation. The public

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rights of the proprietaries, wherever situated, will have been confiscated; and the private rights, wherever situated, will have been preserved. The Court will look to the nature of the thing, and not to the accident. If a proprietary right be situated within a manor, it will be abolished, because it is proprietary. Such is the construction which the local Legislature itself has put upon this statute, by the act of 1781, for establishing the land office,(1 Smith's Laws 529),and by the act of 1784. 2 These acts are contemporaneous, and in pari materia. If, then, the rights of the proprietors were vested in the State, there remained nothing in them; the legal title passed to the Commonwealth, and, consequently, they could not maintain this action of ejectment. But if any was reserved, it was only the arrears of the purchase money, and not the title, which they might sue for in any manner.

3. That whatever might be the nature of the claim, (manorial or proprietary,) it was barred by the statute called the seven years law, passed in 1705, whether the consideration money is paid or not. 3 This limitation of seven years, appears to have been a favourite period of protection in Pennsylvania. William Penn enacted a law to that effect, in England, the year after he obtained his charter; 4 and again, in 1700, the same period is provided. 5 And a short period of limitation to

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protect possessions, is believed to have been the favourite policy of all the colonies. The act of 1705, to afford the protection which it intends to give, requires two circumstances: 1. That the entry should be under an equitable estate. 2. That there should have been seven years quiet possession. The intention of the act was to protect the property. The vendor was at liberty to enforce payment of the consideration money, by all legal means. Even the land itself was not withdrawn from the operation of a judgment. After seven years, the title was complete, but it was still liable to execution. If the plaintiffs in ejectment can recover, it is because they have a lien. Now, if the lien were express, it would have been barred by the lapse of twenty years; and no lien, created by operation of law, can be more durable, than one created by express act of the party. 6 To support this right of recovery, would be to uphold a remedy after the right is gone, and to make the remedy immortal, whilst the right is temporary.

4. That the payment of the purchase money ought to have been presumed; and, consequently, a perfect equitable title in the defendants, barring the action of ejectment. The length of time elapsed, would have authorized a jury to...

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