State v. Alterio
| Decision Date | 08 June 1966 |
| Citation | 154 Conn. 23,220 A.2d 451 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Leonard ALTERIO, Jr. STATE of Connecticut v. Howard DeLOMA. |
Philip Baroff, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Sigmund L. Miller, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant Alterio).
Edward G. Burstein, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Jerome Goldman, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant DeLoma).
John F. Mc.Gowan, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Otto J. Saur, State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before KING, C.J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, SHANNON and HOUSE, JJ.
On the evening of April 4, 1964, Leonard Alterio, Jr., age seventeen, and Howard DeLoma, age twenty, engaged in an automobile race on a public street in a sparsely populated section of the city of Bridgeport. During the race, DeLoma's car collided at an intersection with an automobile driven by Harold DeSanty, Jr., as a result of which Harold DeSanty, Sr., who was a passenger in that automobile, was killed. Alterio and DeLoma were charged in separate informations with a felony in having violated § 53-17 of the General Statutes. After pleas of not guilty by the defendants, the cases were tried together. Both defendants were found guilty by a jury, and both appeal from the judgment rendered on the verdict. The appeals were argued together in this court on separate records.
Section 53-17 provides, so far as material, that 'any person operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state who, in consequence * * * of any gross or wilful misconduct or of gross negligence, causes any loss of life' shall be subject to the penalty provided. The language of the statute is in the alternative. State v. Carty, 120 Conn. 231, 234, 180 A. 287. The general verdict, of course, does not disclose whether the jury concluded that the defendants were guilty of gross misconduct, wilful misconduct or gross negligence. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, 139 A. 698, 699. The jury could reasonably have concluded that the act of racing two automobiles, in itself a crime under General Statutes § 14-224(b), on a city street in the night season amounted to gross or wilful misconduct. The assignments of error, however, are not concerned with these elements of the statute.
DeLoma assigns error in the court's failure to charge in terms applicable to civil negligence concerning the right of way at an intersection and the standard of care required of a minor. These assignments assert that the court refused DeLoma's request to charge on these subjects. In fact, however, no such requests were made. The claimed error rests solely on matters raised in exceptions taken following the charge. To raise the right-of-way statute, General Statutes § 14-245, as an issue, DeLoma was required to file a written request to charge on the legal principle involved. Practice Book § 250; Gigliotti v. United Illuminating Co., 151 Conn. 114, 117, 193 A.2d 718; see Vecchiarelli v. Weiss, 137 Conn. 660, 662, 81 A.2d 123. This assignment of error, as well as the one commingled with it concerning the standard of care applicable to a minor, lacks merit for reasons which will appear in the following discussion of Alterio's appeal.
Alterio makes numerous assignments of error, three of which are not briefed and therefore are treated as abandoned. In those which are pursued, error is assigned in the court's refusal to charge as requested. One of them purports to attack the court's refusal to charge as requested but again is actually founded on exceptions taken following the charge. The exceptions are so incoherent as to require no consideration.
The court is not required to charge in the exact language of a request. Instructions are adequate if they give the jury a clear understanding of the issues and proper guidance in determining those issues. Lucier v. Meriden-Wallingford Sand & Stone Co., 153 Conn. 422, 425, 216 A.2d 818; Giambartolomei v. Rocky DeCarlo & Sons, Inc., 143 Conn. 468, 472, 123 A.2d 760; State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 594, 18 A.2d 895. Guided by these principles, we examine the charge in the light of the claims of proof.
Alterio and DeLoma met about 9 p.m., on April 4, 1964, and drove, each with a companion, to Folino Drive in Bridgeport for the express purpose of having a race. Folino Drive is a public highway twenty-three feet wide and is intersected at one point by Kevin Road. The posted speed limit is twenty-five miles per hour. The weather was clear, the evening was dark, and the pavement was dry. The race started, headed north towrd Kevin Road, which was two-tenths of a mile away. The DeLoma car was on the right. The state claimed that the cars traveled at speeds of about seventy-five to eighty miles per hour. Harold DeSanty, Jr., age sixteen, was driving a car easterly along Kevin Road at a speed of about twenty-five miles per hour, with his father, Harold DeSanty, Sr., as a passenger in the front seat. As Alterio and DeLoma approached the intersection, Alterio applied his brakes, swerved off the road and stopped. The DeLoma car collided with the DeSanty car at the Kevin Road intersection and, as a result of the collision, Harold DeSanty, Sr., was killed.
DeLoma claimed to have proved that the race was held at his suggestion; that he may have reached a top speed of fifty miles per hour; that he saw the DeSanty car coming from his left when both cars were about equidistant from the intersection; that he slowed down to a speed of about twenty miles per hour but collided with the DeSanty car in the southeast quadrant of the intersection.
Alterio claimed to have proved that he first saw a car coming from his left when he was approximately 350 feet from the intersection; that he tried unsuccessfully to signal DeLoma; and that he applied his brakes, turned left and came to a stop in a lot on the left side of Folino Drive about sixty feet south of the intersection.
Both defendants claimed that the driver of the DeSanty car saw one pair of headlights to his right when he was forty feet from the intersection; that he had been driving approximately four months and was familiar with the intersection, which had no traffic controls; that he did not apply his brakes; and that he was warned by his father to 'watch out for that car' before the impact took place.
Alterio requested the court to charge that General Statutes § 53-17 is not violated unless actual contact is proved to have occurred between the accused's motor vehicle and the deceased or the vehicle in which the deceased was riding. The court not only refused the request but charged that contact was not necessary. This charge was correct. The statute requires only that the gross or wilful misconduct or gross negligence of the operator caused the death.
Alterio requested the court...
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