Hood v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County

Decision Date16 September 1963
Citation220 Cal.App.2d 242,33 Cal.Rptr. 782
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesDelores Rhea HOOD and Robert Lucia Hood, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 27533.

Shafer & Seymour, and Harry T. Shafer, Compton, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

William B. McKesson, Dist. Atty. of Los Angeles County, Robert J. Lord, Deputy Dist. Atty., for real party in interest.

HERNDON, Justice.

By information, petitioners were charged with possession of marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code, section 11530. Their motion to set aside the information on the ground that the evidence against them was obtained by an illegal search and seizure was denied, and they now seek prohibition to prevent their trial. (See Castaneda v. Superior Court, 59 A.C. 456, 458, 30 Cal.Rptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641; and Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 269, 271, 294 P.2d 23.)

Evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing tending to prove the following facts: Approximately three weeks prior to April 15, 1963, Officer Leavey, a narcotic agent employed by the State of California, received some unspecified information from confidential informants that petitioner Robert Hood was engaged in the sale of barbiturates and marijuana. On April 12, 1963, Officer Leavey saw a report from the Los Angeles Police Department stating that said petitioner had been arrested on April 9, 1963, for possession of marijuana and other dangerous drugs. On the same day he checked the filed of the California Narcotics Bureau and learned that petitioner Robert Hood had been arrested in 1954 for possession of marijuana.

On April 15, 1963, Officer Leavey was again advised by certain informations that petitioner Robert Hood had marijuana and other dangerous drugs in his possession. No attempt was made at the preliminary hearing to establish the reliability of these informations, and a prosecution objection to a question by petitioners' counsel seeking to learn their identity was sustained on the ground that it was 'immaterial'. It appears to have been the theory of the prosecution that the reliability of the information received from these unspecified sources was 'immaterial' for the reason that the propriety of the subsequent conduct of the officers was not to be justified or supported by the information previously received but rather by the matters disclosed to them by their subsequent independent investigations.

Officer Leavey testified that no effort was made to obtain either a search warrant or a warrant for Robert Hood's arrest, but that on the basis of the information they had received, he and two other officers placed the Hood residence under surveillance at 8:00 p. m. on April 15, 1963. At approximately 8:25 p. m. on that evening, a car driven by an unknown third person parked if front of the residence. This person, who subsequently was identified as one George Geyer, so far as is revealed by the evidence, had no record of narcotic activities and was a complete stranger to the officers. The officers saw him enter the residence and leave it five minutes later in the company of Robert Hood. Although Officer Leavery testified that he never had met Robert Hood before, the record is not clear as to whether or not the other officers were able to recognize him by sight.

In any event, the two men were permitted to enter the Geyer automobile and drive away from the house. Notwithstanding that the officer expressly testified that there was nothing whatsoever unusual about the manner in which Geyer parked the car, entered the house or left it with Robert Hood, as soon as the car pulled away the officers turned their unmarked blue sedan behind his car and attempted to stop it by means of blowing their horn and waving a portable red light out the window.

The California rule, that merely stopping a car in the course of a criminal investigation does not require that there be reasonable grounds for the arrest of the occupants, was recently reaffirmed in People v. Mickelson, 59 A.C. 465, 466-469, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658. It was there held that the contrary federal rule enunciated in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, was not based upon constitutional grounds and hence did not prohibit the states from adhering to other reasonable rules previously developed. However, even though the circumstances authorizing such 'temporary detentions' may be 'short of probable cause to make an arrest' (People v. Mickelson, supra, 59 A.C. p. 467 et seq., 30 Cal.Rptr. p. 20, 380 P.2d p. 660), nevertheless there must exist some suspicious or unusual circumstance to authorize even his limited invasion of citizen's privacy. Since the prosecution here chose not to rely upon the information they claim to have received from certain unknown parties prior to the surveillance, it is difficult to perceive on what basis they determined to stop a third person's vehicle that was being driven in a completely normal fashion.

The record does not reveal the distances separating the cars or whether Geyer or Hood should have heard the sound of the officer's horn, or, assuming they did hear it, whether or not they should have realized that they were being commanded to stop by officers of the law. The record does indicate, however, that the Geyer car proceeded ahead at the legal rate of speed, neither accelerating nor taking any evasive action, for approximately one half a mile. There is no evidence that the occupants of the car were actually aware that they were about to be halted by the police or that they made any suspicious movements that might have indicated that they were hiding or attempting to dispose of any contraband.

Officer Leavey did testified that shortly before they decided to utilize their siren, 'I observed Robert Hood turn around once and then turn toward the front of the vehicle.' While this statement actually does not indicate that when Robert Hood 'turn[ed] around' he saw either the blue sedan following or the red light being waved from its window, it might be argued that these facts could be inferred from the statement; and that the further inference might be drawn that Geyer and Hood knew, or should have known, that the vehicle following them was occupied by police officers in civilian clothes and that the officers were ordering them to halt. We need not speculate on this, however, for after Robert Hood 'turn[ed] around', the officers determined to utilize their siren, whereupon Geyer immediately brought the vehicle to a stop.

The officers then advanced toward the Geyer vehicle with their guns drawn. Officer Leavey testified that at this time he 'observed Robert Hood reach with his right hand toward his left shirt pocket. I was not able to observe him put anything in there or take anything out.'

Both men were then removed from the car which was searched, but nothing of a narcotic nature was discovered. Both men also were searched and some cigarette papers were found in Robert Hood's shirt pocket. Geyer was asked why he had not stopped his car earlier, and he explained that he had not seen the officer's car. When Robert Hood was asked about his previous narcotic activities, he stated that, while he had used narcotics in the past, he no longer did so. He stated that he sometimes used Benzedrine when competing in motorcycle racing, but apparently he was not questioned as to whether or not this use was upon a legal prescription.

The testimony then continues: 'Q After the car was searched, what was the next thing that occurred? A After we searched the car, then we all...

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26 cases
  • People v. Machel
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • April 29, 1965
    ...some suspicious or unusual circumstance to authorize even this limited invasion of a citizen's privacy.' (Hood v. Superior Court (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 242, 245, 33 Cal.Rptr. 782, 784; People v. Cowman (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 109, 116, 35 Cal.Rptr. However the above rule by its terms and in it......
  • People v. Marshall
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    ...32 Cal.Rptr. 825, 384 P.2d 153; People v. Henry (1967) 65 Cal.2d 842, 845, 56 Cal.Rptr. 485, 423 P.2d 557; Hood v. Superior Court (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 242, 247, 33 Cal.Rptr. 782; People v. Garcia (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 345, 38 Cal.Rptr. 670; People v. Cruz (1964) 61 Cal.2d 861, 866, 40 Cal.......
  • People v. Hanamoto
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    ...59 Cal.2d 448, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658; People v. Hilliard (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 719, 34 Cal.Rptr. 809; Hood v. Superior Court (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 242, 33 Cal.Rptr. 782; People v. Gibson (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 15, 33 Cal.Rptr. 775; People v. Zabala (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 550, 31 Cal.R......
  • People v. Anthony
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    ...that criminal activity is afoot. (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911; Hood v. Superior Court, 220 Cal.App.2d 242, 245, 33 Cal.Rptr. 782.) The circumstances which will justify a temporary detention, however, are 'bewilderingly diverse' (People v. Manis, S......
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