Birmingham v. Omaha School District

• Citation: 220 F.3d 850
• Decision Date: 10 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-3590,99-3590
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) BRENDA DEANN BIRMINGHAM, PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT, v. OMAHA SCHOOL DISTRICT; DAVID LAND, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL DISTRICT; RANDY J. CENTERS, PRINCIPAL OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL DISTRICT; LARRY GILBERT, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; LARRY MATLOCK, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; LANNY, FUEFETT, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; PAM GASS, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; DAVID ARNOLD, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; BILL CURTIS; MIKE FULTON, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; JAMES STRAIN, OMAHA HIGH SCHOOL SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHER; BILL GREGG, DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES, BOONE COUNTY INDEPENDENT LIVING CENTER, INC., DEFENDANT. LEE FRAISER, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; SUE HABERMEHL, DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AMICUS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT. Submitted:
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 850

220 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000)

BRENDA DEANN BIRMINGHAM, PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT, v. OMAHA SCHOOL DISTRICT; DAVID LAND, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL DISTRICT; RANDY J. CENTERS, PRINCIPAL OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL DISTRICT; LARRY GILBERT, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; LARRY MATLOCK, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; LANNY, FUEFETT, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; PAM GASS, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; DAVID ARNOLD, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; BILL CURTIS; MIKE FULTON, AS A CURRENT OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE OMAHA SCHOOL BOARD; JAMES STRAIN, OMAHA HIGH SCHOOL SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHER; BILL GREGG, DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES, BOONE COUNTY INDEPENDENT LIVING CENTER, INC., DEFENDANT.

LEE FRAISER, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; SUE HABERMEHL, DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AMICUS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT.

No. 99-3590

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: May 10, 2000

Filed: August 7, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Richard S. Arnold and Heaney, Circuit Judges, and Sippel¹ , District Judge.

Heaney, Circuit Judge.

Brenda Birmingham, through her mother Rose, ("Birmingham") appeals the district court's dismissal of her claims brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1415 (2000); 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 (2000); Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132 (2000); and 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2000). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

Brenda Birmingham is mentally handicapped and suffers from cerebral palsy. Prior to May 25, 1995, she attended school in the Omaha School District. In April 1995, at the age of eighteen, Brenda complained to school officials that her mother, Rose, was abusing her. They reported the matter to the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS), and Brenda was placed in ADHS protective custody.

Brenda wanted to remain in protective custody, and on May 15, 1995, the Boone County Probate Court held a hearing to determine whether Brenda was competent to choose where to reside. The Probate Court concluded that she was, and Brenda remained in protective custody until July 4, 1995, when she returned home to live with Rose.

Meanwhile, school officials scheduled an Individual Education Program (IEP) meeting for May 10, 1995 to consider Brenda's educational plan for the upcoming year. Rose was not notified in writing of the meeting, but upon learning of it, requested to attend. The school denied her request on the grounds that Brenda was eighteen years-old, was in protective custody, and did not want Rose present.

Soon thereafter, school officials consulted Brenda's ADHS social worker and determined that it was in Brenda's best interest to graduate with the current class so that she could focus on learning independent living skills in a community independent living program. School officials asked Brenda if she wanted to graduate early. She responded affirmatively, and was graduated on May 25, 1995. Rose was not given prior written notice of the school's decision to graduate Brenda.

Rose filed a complaint regarding Brenda's graduation with the Arkansas Department of Education (ADOE). ADOE investigated and issued a report on November 15, 1995, denying Rose's complaint on the basis that the school district had not rushed to graduate Brenda. Rose appealed to the United States Department of Education on February 28, 1997.

On April 27, 1998, Birmingham sued the Omaha School District, the District's Superintendent, a principal, a teacher, current and former members of the Omaha School Board, the former ADHS Director, and an ADHS employee. Birmingham alleged that by graduating Brenda early without prior written notice to Rose, the defendants violated the IDEA, 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA, and 1983. Birmingham sought damages, attorneys' fees and "any further relief that the court deems just and proper." (Compl. at 9.)

The district court decided the case in two separate opinions, both based on the written stipulations of the parties. In the first, the district court dismissed Birmingham's IDEA claim as time-barred. In the second, it dismissed her 1983 claim for failure to state a claim, and her ADA and 504 claims for failure to prove that the defendants acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment.

DISCUSSION

I. IDEA Violation

As stated above, the district court decided this case on stipulated facts. It is clear from those facts that the IDEA was violated. The IDEA requires that school districts educate disabled students to twenty-one years of age, unless doing so is inconsistent with state law. See 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(B)(i). Arkansas law mandates that school districts educate persons either to the age of twenty-one or until they complete the secondary education program. See Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-202(b)(1) (LEXIS 1999). Thus, under the IDEA, a disabled student in Arkansas must be educated to the age of twenty-one or until he/she completes the state's secondary education program.

The IDEA provides, however, that a disabled student may graduate before one of these requirements is met if procedural safeguards are followed. See generally 20 U.S.C. 1415(b). Foremost among these are prior written notice to the parent whenever school officials propose a change in the "educational placement of the child," id. at 1415 (b)(3), and the opportunity for the parent to "present complaints" regarding the proposed change, id. at 1415(b)(6).

Neither party disputes that Brenda Birmingham is disabled as defined by the IDEA, nor that her graduation constituted a change in placement. Nonetheless, at the time of her graduation, Brenda was eighteen and had not completed Arkansas's secondary education program, nor had Rose been given prior written notice of the graduation decision or an opportunity challenge it.

The school district contends that notice to Rose was not required . It cites 20 U.S.C. 1415(m), which provides that parental rights may be transferred to the disabled student upon the student's eighteenth birthday unless the student is adjudicated incompetent. The district argues that because Brenda was eighteen and adjudicated competent by the Probate Court, Rose no longer had parental rights, and written notice to her was unnecessary. This argument is unpersuasive.

Section 1415(m) was not amended to the IDEA until 1997. However, Brenda was graduated on May 25, 1995. Thus, at the time the school district proposed graduating Brenda, the IDEA did not provide for the transfer of parental rights to the disabled child. Rose then retained her parental rights under the IDEA, and written notice to her was required. Failure to provide such notice violated the IDEA.

II. Statute of Limitations

The question remains whether the district court erred by dismissing Birmingham's claim as time-barred. The IDEA does not contain a statute of limitations. When a federal law has no statute of limitations, courts may borrow the most closely analogous state statute of limitations, unless doing so would frustrate the policy embodied in the federal law. See Aaron v. Brown Group, Inc., 80 F.3d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir. 1996).

The district court in this case borrowed the thirty-day limitations period of the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (AAPA), Ark. Code Ann. 25-15-212(b)(1) (Michie 1987). The district court considered the AAPA and IDEA analogous because both permit challenges to administrative decisions. The district court also concluded that the thirty-day limitations period comported with IDEA policies because notice of educational decisions is required; parents need only decide during the limitations period whether to sue; and parents are encouraged to act promptly. We review de novo the district court's decision to borrow a particular state statute of limitations. See Vrban v. Deere & Co., 129 F.3d 1008, 1009 (8th Cir. 1997).

Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the AAPA is not closely analogous to the IDEA. Rather, the two statutes differ significantly. Under the AAPA, a person aggrieved by a state agency decision may seek judicial review of the decision within thirty days. See Ark. Code Ann. 25-15-212(b)(1). The reviewing state court considers the agency's action and either affirms, reverses or modifies the decision. See id. at 25-15-212(h). The IDEA, on the other hand, requires a parent, dissatisfied with an educational decision regarding his/her child, to exhaust state administrative remedies before proceeding to federal court. ² See 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2). Once state remedies are exhausted, the federal court reviews the issues de novo and renders a judgment on the merits. See id. It does not merely affirm, reverse, or modify the agency decision.

Moreover, the scope of review is narrower under the AAPA than the IDEA. A state court reviewing an AAPA decision can reverse only if the agency's decision violated the law, exceeded statutory authority, was made using an unlawful procedure, was not supported by substantial evidence, or was "[a]rbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion." Ark. Code Ann. 25-12-212(h)(1)-(5). Under the IDEA, the district court "make[s] an independent decision of the issues based on a preponderance of the evidence. . . ." Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1997).

The evidence also differs under the two statutes. AAPA judicial review is limited solely to the administrative record. See Ark. Code. Ann. 25-15-212(g). The reviewing court cannot hear testimony, receive additional evidence or hold an evidentiary hearing. Contrarily, in an IDEA case, the record is but one piece of evidence the district court considers. See 20 U.S.C. 1415(h).

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