Williams v. Pryor

• Decision Date: 10 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.98-S-1938-NE.,CIV.A.98-S-1938-NE.
• Citation: 220 F.Supp.2d 1257
• Parties: Sherri WILLIAMS; B.J. Bailey; et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bill PRYOR, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

220 F.Supp.2d 1257

Sherri WILLIAMS; B.J. Bailey; et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bill PRYOR, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Defendant.

No. CIV.A.98-S-1938-NE.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division.

October 10, 2002.

Amy L Herring, Amy L Herring, PC, Huntsville, AL, Mark J Lopez, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, Michael L Fees, Fees & Burgess PC, Huntsville, AL, for Sherri Williams, B J Bailey, Betty Faye Haggermaker, Sherry Taylor-Williams, Alice Jean Cope, Jane Doe, plaintiffs.

William H Pryor, Jr, Charles B Campbell, Scott L Rouse, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, Courtney W Tarver, Alabama Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, Legal Division, Montgomery, AL, for Bill Pryor, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SMITH, District Judge.

This case is before the court on remand from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration of plaintiffs' as-applied constitutional challenge to an Alabama statute prohibiting the distribution of "any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs." Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (1975) (Supp.2001). See Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 955-56 (11th Cir.2001), rev'g Williams v. Pryor, 41 F.Supp.2d 1257 (N.D.Ala.1999). For convenience, the prohibited appliances will be referred to in this opinion as "sexual devices."¹ Plaintiffs are either vendors or users of such sexual devices. Defendant is William H. Pryor, Jr., the Attorney General for the State of Alabama.

"Vendor" plaintiffs B.J. Bailey and Sherri Williams, and "user" plaintiffs Alice Jean Cope, Jane Doe, Deborah L. Cooper Benny G. Cooper, Dan Bailey, Jane Poe, and Jane Roe, have moved for summary judgment, and seek a declaration that Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) is unconstitutional. Defendant also has filed a motion for summary judgment. He argues that plaintiffs lack standing to assert a constitutional challenge and, further, that plaintiffs seek recognition of a right not protected by the Constitution.

When confronted with cross motions for summary judgment, "[t]he court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2720, at 335-36 (1998) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Arnold v. United States Postal Service, 649 F.Supp. 676, 678 (D.D.C.1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in part, that summary judgment not only is proper, but "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995)); United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc). The motion pierces the pleadings, and "strikes at the heart of the claim. In effect it argues that as a matter of law upon admitted or established facts the moving party is entitled to prevail." Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 99, at 705 (5th ed.1994).

I. SUMMARY OF DECISION

When a state statute is alleged to burden a fundamental constitutional right, the district court's review of the challenged provision must be strict and exacting. Plaintiffs have submitted a great deal of unrefuted evidence to demonstrate that the Alabama statute at issue contravenes the "user" plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional right to privacy. That evidence has convinced this court that there exists a substantial history, legal tradition, and contemporary practice of deliberate state non-interference in the private, consensual, sexual relationships of married persons and unmarried adults. The ultimate result is that plaintiffs have shown that the fundamental right of privacy, long-recognized by the Supreme Court as inherent among our constitutional protections, incorporates a right to sexual privacy. Plaintiffs also have shown that this Nation's history, tradition, and contemporary treatment of sexual devices themselves evidences that this right of sexual privacy, even in its narrowest form, protects plaintiffs' use of sexual devices like those targeted by Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). Accordingly, plaintiffs assert that the challenged statute impermissibly infringes their right to sexual privacy, insofar as the statute burdens the user plaintiffs' right to employ sexual devices within their private, adult, consensual, sexual relationships.

The constitutional guarantees that accompany plaintiffs' fundamental right to privacy will not permit the State of Alabama to prohibit plaintiffs from purchasing sexual devices for use within the confines of their private, adult, consensual, sexual relationships, unless the State can demonstrate that it has a compelling interest to do so, and, that the challenged statutory provision is narrowly tailored to accomplish that objective. Given plaintiffs' overwhelming evidence that the State of Alabama cannot make that showing, the Attorney General's failure to attempt an argument to the contrary, and this court's conclusion that Alabama has not narrowly constructed Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) to accomplish its objectives, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is due to be granted and defendant's denied.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The original plaintiffs in this action — Sherri Williams, B.J. Bailey, Betty Faye Haggermaker, Sherry Taylor-Williams, Alice Jean Cope, and Jane Doe — filed their complaint on July 29, 1998, following the Alabama Legislature's enactment of amendments to the "Alabama Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act" on April 29, 1998. See Act No. 98-467, 1998 Acts of Alabama (subsequently codified as Alabama Code §§ 13A-12-200.1 through 13A-12-200.12 (1975) (Supp.2001)). Those amendments became effective on July 1, 1998, and made it unlawful to sell or otherwise distribute "any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs . . . ." Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). The original plaintiffs were users or vendors of such sexual devices and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sought injunctive relief from this court, arguing that § 13A-12-200.2 — facially and as-applied — burdened and violated their right to privacy and personal autonomy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

Plaintiffs initially sought a temporary restraining order to preclude defendant from enforcing the amendments to the State's obscenity statute. The parties subsequently stipulated that "the status quo would be maintained and the amendments not enforced with respect to plaintiffs[], pending the Court's determination following a hearing on plaintiffs' claims for preliminary injunctive relief."² In an order entered on December 9, 1998, however, this court advanced plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to a final hearing on the merits of their application for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. This court thus solely considered plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunctive relief, and granted that motion on March 29, 1999, thereby enjoining the Attorney General from enforcing Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). See Williams v. Pryor, 41 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1293 (N.D.Ala.1999). The Attorney General appealed and the Eleventh Circuit reversed, remanding the action for further consideration of plaintiffs' as-applied constitutional challenges to the statute. See Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 955-56 (11th Cir.2001). These as-applied challenges are the subject of this court's consideration, infra, at Part V.

Following remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add five plaintiffs — Deborah L. Cooper, Benny G. Cooper, Dan Bailey, Jane Poe, and Jane Roe — who appear in this action as users of sexual devices proscribed by the challenged statutory provision.

All plaintiffs again request that this court declare Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) to be unconstitutional, as it is applied to these plaintiffs, and to the extent that it restricts the sale and purchase of sexual devices. Plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief barring the Attorney General from enforcing the statute. As grounds for this demand, plaintiffs argue that, by prohibiting the distribution and sale of sexual devices designed to stimulate orgasm, the State of Alabama has

intruded into the most intimate of places — the bedrooms of its citizens — and the lawful sexual conduct that occurs therein. While the statute's reach does not directly proscribe the sexual conduct in question, it places — without justification — a substantial and undue burden on the ability of the plaintiffs to obtain devices regulated by the statute. By restricting sales of these devices to plaintiffs, Alabama has acted in violation of the fundamental rights of privacy and personal autonomy that protect an individual's lawful sexual practices guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.³

Plaintiffs also claim that similar constitutional...