People v. Bloom

• Decision Date: 23 September 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39725,39725
• Citation: 35 Ill.2d 255,220 N.E.2d 475
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. S. Edward BLOOM, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 475

220 N.E.2d 475

35 Ill.2d 255

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. S. Edward BLOOM, Appellant.

No. 39725.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 23, 1966.

A. Bradley Eben and Herbert F. Friedman, Chicago, for appellant.

Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Edward J. Hladis, Chief of Civil Div., Gerald J. Mannix and Ronald Butler, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.

KLINGBIEL, Chief Justice.

On petition by the State's Attorney of Cook County the appellant S. Edward Bloom was held in contempt of court for filing a spurious will for probate. He was sentenced to confinement in the county jail for a period of 24 months. In his direct appeal to this court he contends that he was denied the constitutional right to a jury trial, that the sentence is excessive, that prejudicial argument was made by the prosecutor, that the petition was not properly verified and that by taking information and evidence on the merits in chambers prior to trial the court committed prejudicial error.

The State's Attorney's amended petition, filed on November 18, 1964, alleged in substance that William A. Melody died on July 6, 1964, that thereafter Pauline Owens, a practical nurse for the decedent, engaged defendant, an attorney, to prepare and cause to be signed a purported will of the decedent bearing the date June 21, 1964, and that defendant, knowing the document to be false, presented it for admission to probate. Hearings were held in February, 1965, at which the evidence showed beyond dispute that defendant prepared the document and offered it for probate knowing it was prepared after the testator's death. It is unnecessary to relate the details here, for defendant concedes that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding. He maintains, however, that the alleged conduct, if true would constitute the crime of forgery punishable by imprisonment from one to fourteen years, that it would be an indictable offense in a prosecution for which he would be entitled to a jury trial, and that since he can be punished, as here, by a severe prison sentence he was entitled to a jury trial in the present contempt proceeding.

We cannot accept the contention. However serious it may be, a criminal contempt is an offense against the court as an organ of public justice, not a violation of the criminal law, and the right to trial by jury is not available. (People ex rel. Martin v. Panchire, 311 Ill. 622, 143 N.E. 476; People v. Severinghaus, 313 Ill. 456, 145 N.E. 220.) The reason for the rule is not that a contempt is comparatively petty or trivial but that a summary proceeding for punishment is essential to performance of the judicial function. 'To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.' (In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595, 15 S.Ct. 900, 910, 39 L.Ed. 1092, 1106.) The reason exists with equal force whether the offense is petty or grave. A test which would make the right to a jury trial depend upon whether the contemnor's conduct was serious or petty--or a rule which would limit the penalty which could be imposed, simply because a jury trial was not had or waived (cf. dictum in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629, 634)--would lead to nothing but incongruity and confusion, and would have no relation whatever either to the nature of the proceeding, or to the purpose of trial by jury.

A contempt proceeding is not a criminal prosecution but a proceeding to vindicate the dignity of the court and enforce its orders. The power to punish in such cases does not depend on constitutional or legislative grant but is inherent in all courts as necessary for self-protection. It is an essential auxiliary to the administration of the law. (People ex rel. Brundage v. Peters, 305 Ill. 223, 137 N.E. 118, 26 A.L.R. 16.) The nature of contempt proceedings as distinguished from criminal prosecutions has long been recognized. Thus in 1812 the United States Supreme Court, in holding the judiciary could not exercise a common-law criminal jurisdiction, explained the difference as follows: 'Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not among those powers. To fine for contempt--imprison for contumacy--inforce the observance of order, etc., are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others; and so far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute; but all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases we are of opinion is not within their implied powers.' (United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L.Ed. 259.) Since the time of the Hudson case there has been a long unbroken line of decisions, both in this court (see People v. Goss, 10 Ill.2d 533, 548, 141 N.E.2d 385) and the Supreme Court of the United States (see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672, 687,) declaring and re-affirming that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right. And the exercise of summary contempt power is not restricted to offenses that may be classified as 'trivial' or 'petty' but applies as well--perhaps its exercise is even more important--where the offense is a serious one. (United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 84 S.Ct. 984, 12 L.Ed.2d 23.) Since there now exists a right of review in contempt proceedings, adequate protection is afforded against errors and abuses in a trial before the judge. The history and reasons for the rule applied here are extensively set forth by the opinion in t...