Erie R. Co. v. Jacobus

• Citation: 221 F. 335
• Decision Date: 01 April 1915
• Docket Number: 1918.
• Parties: ERIE R. CO. v. JACOBUS.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

221 F. 335

ERIE R. CO. v. JACOBUS.

No. 1918.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

April 1, 1915

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

George S. Hobart, of Jersey City, N.J., for plaintiff in error.

Warren Dixon, of Jersey City, N.J., for defendant in error.

Before BUFFINGTON, McPHERSON, and WOOLLEY, Circuit Judges.

WOOLLEY Circuit Judge.

The questions presented for review are whether the federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65 c. 149 (Comp. St. 1913, Secs. 8657-8665)), applied to the facts of this case, and, if so, whether there was sufficient evidence of negligence to warrant the submission of the case to the jury.

The defendant, the Erie Railroad Company, was a 'common carrier by railroad' engaged in commerce between various states. Under the powers conferred upon it by the laws of the state under which it was organized, it transported freight beyond its lines of railway by running its cars loaded with freight upon floats built for that purpose, and moved and propelled them by tugboats in and about New York Harbor, from point to point in the state of New Jersey and from points in the state of New Jersey to points of connection and destination in the state of New York.

Lawrence Jacobus, the plaintiff, was on the 27th day of October, 1912 a servant of the defendant, and was employed as a deck hand on one of its tugs operated in the movement of traffic of the character stated. When he was in the act of securing a line to a bitt on the tug, which was approaching and making fast to a dock, the captain or another of his fellow servants, as it is contended, negligently caused the tug to be started without awaiting a customary signal from the plaintiff and without giving him warning, whereby his hand was caught between the line and the bitt and was injured. Suit was brought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence, upon its liability under the act of April 22, 1908, entitled 'An act relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employes in certain cases.' 35 Stat. 65.

The first question is whether the statute which defines the liability of a common carrier 'by railroad' for injuries occasioned by the negligence of its employes, extends that liability for injuries so occasioned, not upon its railroad, but upon one of its tugboats engaged in the business of continuing or completing interstate traffic. The defendant contends that, in using the expression 'common carriers by railroad' in the title of the act, Congress cannot be presumed to have intended the statute to apply to common carriers by water, and that when a common carrier is continuing its business by boat it cannot be held to the liability imposed upon it as a common carrier 'by railroad.'

In considering the statute in connection with the history of congressional enactments upon the subject of employers' liability, it is clear that in limiting the statute of 1908 to common carriers 'by railroad' Congress endeavored to avoid one of the constitutional objections made to the act of 1906 (Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 28 Sup.Ct. 141, 52 L.Ed. 297), and that it did not attempt or intend to define the instrumentalities upon which their liability for negligence should exist or by which it should be limited. The expression 'by railroad' is but descriptive of the kind of common carriers to which the statute relates, distinguishes them from common carriers of other classes to which the act does not extend, and describes the kind of employers and employes who are respectively charged with and protected by its provisions, under the power of Congress to make such classifications and distinctions. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 52, 32 Sup.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44.

If the expression 'common carriers by railroad,' as used in the title of the act, is open to debate, the clear expression of the act itself with respect to carriers' liabilities in connection with the instrumentalities of railroad operation, including by enumeration boats and wharves, discloses that the scope of the act was intended to include the liability of carriers for their negligence, or that of their employes, occurring upon or in connection with those instrumentalities while engaged in interstate commerce. The trial court did not err in declining to hold as a matter of law that the act did not apply.

The defendant charges error to the court in refusing to direct a verdict in its favor upon the ground that the injury to the plaintiff did not occur 'while' the defendant carrier was 'engaging in commerce between' the states, or while the plaintiff was 'employed by such carrier in such commerce,' and excepts to the charge of the court in which consideration is given to movements of the tug prior to the accident and movements intended thereafter.

It is established by the decisions that in enacting the Employers' Liability Act of 1908 Congress intended to confine the operation of the statute to injuries occurring when the particular service in which the employe is engaged is a part of interstate commerce, and that the test is whether the employe at the time of his injury was employed by a carrier then engaged in interstate commerce. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, 34 Sup.Ct. 646, 58 L.Ed. 1051, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 163. The principal question in this case therefore is: What was the nature of the work being done at the time the plaintiff was injured?

The accident happened at the defendant's Jersey City dock, known as No. 8, at about 2 o'clock on the morning of October 27, 1912. The tugboat upon which the plaintiff was employed had been engaged throughout the preceding evening in moving the defendant's traffic from and to various points in New York Harbor. At about 11:30 o'clock of the night of the accident, according to the contention of the defendant, the tug moved light from Dock 8, Jersey City, known as the headquarters dock, or the home dock, of the tug, to Dock 2, Jersey City. It then moved a barge from Jersey City to Brooklyn, and then proceeded light from Brooklyn to Pier 7, East River. It then proceeded upon its last, and for the purpose of this case its important, movement, with a loaded float from Pier 7, East River, in the state of New York, to Dock 4, Jersey City, in the state of New Jersey. After delivering the float at the pier last named, it is claimed that the tug completed its interstate trip, ceased to engage in interstate traffic, and in default of further orders moved light from Dock 4 to Dock 8, its home dock in Jersey City, the two docks being distant one from the other about 100 yards, there to await further orders. It was while the tug was being tied up at Dock 8 on the last movement that the accident occurred.

The testimony given by the plaintiff discloses a movement of an altogether different character. According to this testimony after moving traffic about New York Harbor throughout the evening, the tug proceeded with barges of freight from the terminal of the defendant at Weehawken, in the state of New Jersey, to the Bush terminal in Brooklyn, in...