Francis S. v. Stone

Decision Date13 January 2000
Docket NumberDocket No. 97-2423
Citation221 F.3d 100
Parties(2nd Cir. 2000) FRANCIS S., Petitioner-Appellant, v. JAMES C. STONE, Commissioner, New York Office of Mental Health; RENATE WACK, Director, Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center, Respondents-Appellees. ROBERT M. MORGENTHAU, District Attorney of New York County, Intervenor-Respondent-Appellee. August Term 1999 Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Appeal from the March 5, 1998, judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Lewis A. Kaplan, Judge), denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the recommitment of a state court defendant after entering a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.

Affirmed.

Stephen J. Harkavy, New York, N.Y. (Karen Gomes Andreasian, Felice Wechsler, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for petitioner-appellant.

Marion R. Buchbinder, Asst. Solicitor Gen., New York, N.Y. (Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. State Atty. Gen., Robert A. Forte, Dep. Solicitor Gen., New York, N.Y., on the brief), for respondents-appellees.

Morrie I. Kleinbart, Asst. Dist. Atty., New York, N.Y. (Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., Mark Dwyer, Asst. Dist. Atty New York, N.Y., on the brief), for intervenor-respondent-appellee.

Before: NEWMAN and SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,*. Judge.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal challenges the constitutionality of a state court order recommitting a defendant for mental health treatment nine years after he entered a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. It also requires consideration of the new standard applicable to a federal court's exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court, see Terry Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) ("Terry Williams").1 Francis S. appeals from the March 5, 1998, judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Lewis A. Kaplan, Judge) denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Francis S. v. Stone, 995 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Applying the restricted scope of habeas corpus review required by section 2254(d)(1), we affirm.

Background
I. The statutory scheme

New York statutes, like those of other states, distinguish between the procedures to be followed for the involuntary civil commitment of persons suffering from mental illness and the procedures that apply to persons charged with a crime and determined, by a plea or a verdict, to be "not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect" ("NRRMDD defendant"). N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 220.15 (McKinney 1993) (plea procedure) (hereinafter "CPL"). Involuntary civil commitment procedures mandate numerous protections, including a requirement that the party proposing confinement must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and poses a danger to himself or others. See In re John P., 265 A.D.2d 559, 559, 697 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (2d Dep't 1999) (construing N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 9.01, 9.33 (McKinney 1996)). For an NRRMDD defendant, the court orders an examination to determine the defendant's current mental condition, see CPL § 330.20(2)-(5), and then holds a hearing as to the appropriate disposition, see id. § 330.20(6). The court has three options: (1) a finding that the defendant suffers from "a dangerous mental disorder," defined in the margin,2 in which event the court orders commitment to a secure facility, see id.; id. § 330.20(1)(f) (requiring confinement in a secure facility); (2) a finding that the defendant is "mentally ill," as defined in the margin,3 but does not suffer from a dangerous mental disorder, in which event the court orders commitment to a secure facility pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law, see N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law art. 9 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2000), with the possibility of transfer to a non-secure facility, see CPL § 330.20(1)(l), (11), and issues an "order of conditions," defined in the margin,4 see id. § 330.20(7); (3) a finding that the defendant is not mentally ill, in which event the court releases the defendant either unconditionally or with an order of conditions, see id.

With respect to an NRRMDD defendant subject to an order of conditions, whether or not released from a mental health facility, the commissioner of mental hygiene or the district attorney may apply to the court that issued the order for a recommitment order when the applicant believes that the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder. See id. § 330.20(14). At a hearing the applicant must establish "to the satisfaction of the court," id., that the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder, in which event the court orders recommitment.

II. The Mental Condition and Litigation History of Francis S.

Mental condition. Francis S. ("Francis") has a long history of drug and alcohol abuse, in-patient and out-patient psychiatric treatment, and arrests and convictions for petty crimes. Although it is undisputed that Francis has some form of mental illness, his specific diagnosis has been disputed; his treating psychiatrists have disagreed as to whether he suffers from bipolar disorder (a serious psychosis) or from attention-deficit disorder.

The episode resulting in the NRRMDD plea. In October 1983, Francis was at the scene of a drug bust in Manhattan. When he refused to leave the scene, an officer attempted to arrest him for disorderly conduct. While the officer was attempting the arrest, Francis thrust a six-inch knife in his direction. Francis was arrested and charged with attempted assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Those charges ultimately resulted in the disposition that underlies the current litigation.

While those charges were pending, Francis was arrested in May 1984 in New Jersey and charged with larceny-related offenses. He was found incompetent to stand trial and was a patient in a psychiatric institution in New Jersey until April 1986 (he escaped briefly during that time). The New Jersey charges were dismissed.

After extradition to New York and release on bail, Francis was arrested twice early in 1987, once for driving while intoxicated and once for criminal possession of a controlled substance; he pled guilty to the latter charge and was sentenced to five days in jail.

The NRRMDD plea and related proceedings. In June 1987, Francis entered a NRRMDD plea to the 1983 New York assault and weapons charges. In connection with that plea, the driving while intoxicated charge was dismissed.

Following the NRRMDD plea, Francis was remanded to Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center ("Kirby") for examination by two forensic psychiatrists, as required by CPL § 330.20(2). They concluded that Francis was mentally ill but did not suffer from a dangerous mental disorder. In August 1987, Francis's NRRMDD plea was accepted. The New York County Supreme Court held a hearing pursuant to CPL § 330.20(6) and found, consistent with the psychiatrists' reports, that Francis was "mentally ill," see note 3, supra (definition of "mentally ill"), but that he "does not have a dangerous mental disorder," see note 2, supra (definition of "dangerous mental disorder"). This was the first of two (possibly three) determinations that Francis did not suffer from a dangerous mental disorder that were made prior to the recommitment order challenged in the pending litigation. Following the requirements of section 330.20(7), the Court remanded Francis to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and ordered him committed as a civil patient for four months. The Court also issued an "order of conditions," see note 4, supra (definition of "order of conditions"), which required Francis to comply with his treatment plan and not to leave any facility without authorization while in the Commissioner's custody.

From the NRRMDD plea to the challenged recommitment proceeding. Pursuant to the court order, Francis was transferred from Kirby, a secure psychiatric facility, to an in-patient program at the Coney Island Unit of South Beach Psychiatric Center ("South Beach"). In December 1987, Francis was discharged from South Beach, with plans to receive follow-up care at South Beach's out-patient clinic. Francis did not comply with the treatment plan.5 In May 1988, the Commissioner attempted to recommit Francis pursuant to CPL § 330.20(14). When located in January 1990, he was committed to Kirby for a psychiatric examination. In July 1990, the New York Supreme Court denied the application for recommitment on a finding for a second time that Francis was mentally ill but did not suffer from a dangerous mental disorder. The Court remanded Francis to the Commissioner for treatment as a civil patient at a non-secure facility, and issued a modified order of conditions. Under that order, Francis was required, after release, to attend an outpatient program approved by the Commissioner, to inform the prosecutor of his current address, and to abstain from alcohol and non-prescription drugs.

Pursuant to the Court's remand order, Francis was again hospitalized at South Beach from July to November 1990. He protested his continued retention and in November 1990 the New York Supreme Court ordered his release, subject to the same order of conditions.6 Upon his discharge from South Beach in 1990, Francis went to live with family members in LeRoy, New York, and to receive out-patient treatment at a nearby facility. He left LeRoy for New York City in mid-December 1990. In February 1991, the Commissioner referred Francis to South Beach; however, after attending one appointment there and failing to attend another scheduled appointment, Francis sought treatment from Dr. Nels Langsten of the Metropolitan Hospital. Francis was seen by Langsten four or five times over the next year and a half.7

III. The Challenged Recommitment...

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