U.S. v. Thomas, 98-3460

• Citation: 221 F.3d 430
• Decision Date: 26 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-3460,98-3460
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee v. LEROY THOMAS, a/k/a Sheeba Leroy Thomas, Appellant Argued:
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 430

221 F.3d 430 (3rd Cir. 2000)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee v. LEROY THOMAS, a/k/a Sheeba Leroy Thomas, Appellant

No. 98-3460

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued: April 26, 2000

Filed August 1, 2000

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. Crim. No.: 95-cr-00068-3), District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish

Attorneys for Appellant: David R. Fine, Esq. (Argued) Robert L. Byer, Esq. James T. Tallman, Esq. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, L.L.P. 1500 Oliver Building Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

Attorney for Appellee: Bonnie R. Schleuter (Argued) Assistant United States Attorney United States Attorney's Office Western District of Pennsylvania 633 U.S. Post Office and Courthouse Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, BARRY, and BRIGHT,^* Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

BARRY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether the relation back of amendments provision of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") is consistent with 28 U.S.C. S 2255 and the rules governing S 2255 proceedings, such that an amendment to a timely filed S 2255 petition may relate back to the date of the petition after the expiration of the one-year period of limitations prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). We hold that it can. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an amendment which, by way of additional facts, clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory in the petition may, in the District Court's discretion, relate back to the date of that petition if and only if the petition was timely filed and the proposed amendment does not seek to add a new claim or to insert a new theory into the case. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's summary dismissal of Thomas's petition and will remand for the Court to determine whether petitioner's proposed amendment does or does not relate back to the date of his petition.

I.

The facts underlying this appeal are simply stated. In 1995, a jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania found petitioner Leroy Thomas ("Thomas") guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. Thomas was sentenced to 135 months in prison to be followed by five years of supervised release. He appealed, and we affirmed his conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court denied Thomas's petition for a writ of certiorari on May 12, 1997.

Thomas, pro se, thereafter timely filed a S 2255 petition. The petition consisted of a standardized form provided by the Clerk of the Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania which directs petitioners to:

(9) State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully. CAUTION: If you fail to set forth all grounds in this motion, you may be barred from presenting additional grounds at a later date. You must allege facts in support of the ground or grounds which you choose. A mere statement of grounds without facts will be rejected.

(a) Grounds

(b) Supporting FACTS (Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law).

App. at 8 (emphasis in original). Thomas completed the form and, in response to item 9(a), outlined a veritable laundry list of grounds in a two-page attachment.¹ In response to item 9(b), soliciting supporting facts, Thomas wrote: "facts will be presented in a separate memorandum of law in support of petition." On May 6, 1998, one day after mailing his S 2255 petition and six days prior to the expiration of the AEDPA's one-year period of limitations, Thomas filed a "Motion to Hold 2255 Petition in Abeyance until Petitioner Submits Memorandum of Law in Support of the Petition," which he represented would be submitted within sixty to ninety days. He argued that he needed additional time because the "issues are complicated, requiring an extensive review" of the record and because his time was limited due to a prison work assignment.

The government, in its response to the motion, contended that Thomas's request for extra time and permission to file a memorandum of law constituted an impermissible end- run around the AEDPA's one-year period of limitations. It maintained, as well, that the grounds set forth in Thomas's petition were vague, conclusory, and lacking in factual support and, therefore, were insufficient to entitle him to any relief whatsoever. The District Court agreed, and on June 29, 1998 denied Thomas's request to file his proposed memorandum because it would constitute an amendment beyond the AEDPA's period of limitations and dismissed the petition on the ground that it failed to set forth a cause of action as required by Rule 2 of the Federal Rules Governing S 2255 Proceedings. The Court stated:

Defendant has attached a two-page statement setting forth 24 issues which he alleges to be the grounds for his motion. The statement of these issues, however, is entirely conclusory and details none of the supporting facts. As to the supporting facts, defendant alleges "facts will be presented in a separate Memorandum of Law in support of petition[.]" Were defendant to file a memorandum setting forth the facts supporting his grounds for the motion at the present time, or in the future, the memorandum would, in effect, amend defendant's motion in a material respect after the expiration of the one-year limitation period provided by Section 2255.

Memorandum Order at 2-3.

Thomas filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, asserting that under Rule 15(c)'s provision allowing the relation back of amendments, the District Court should have permitted him to amend his petition with a memorandum of law based on the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence as alleged in the original complaint." The Court denied Thomas's motion for reconsideration and subsequently denied his request for a certificate of appealability.

On September 17, 1999, this Court granted a certificate of appealability as to the following issues: (1) whether the District Court erred in determining that it lacked the discretion to accept petitioner's memorandum of law because it would be filed out of time; and (2) whether Rule 15 is inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. S 2255 and with the rules governing S 2255 and is, therefore, inapplicable to S 2255 petitions. We also appointed counsel ("CJA Counsel") to represent petitioner, and they have ably done so both in their briefs and at oral argument. Simultaneously with the filing of their opening brief, CJA counsel moved to expand the scope of the certificate of appealability to include consideration of the factual sufficiency of Thomas's petition. This Court granted the request, including in the certification: (1) whether the original S 2255 petition included sufficient facts to avoid summary dismissal; and (2) whether, in light of the strict one-year time limit imposed by the AEDPA, district courts confronted with S 2255 petitions which the courts deem to include too few facts should allow additional filings only for the purpose of clarifying and recording factual detail.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 2255 and 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Typically, we would review a District Court's order denying a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 163 (1999). Here, however, the District Court did not exercise its discretion in denying the amendment but, rather, apparently believed that it did not have the authority to apply Rule 15 to a S 2255 petition. The question of whether Rule 15 applies to S 2255 petitions implicates the interpretation and application of legal precepts therefore, our standard of review is plenary. See Cooney v. Fulcumer, 886 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1989). We also exercise plenary review over the legal conclusions which prompted the District Court to summarily dismiss Thomas's petition. See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).

A.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas corpus proceedings "to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2). In addition, the rules governing S 2255 proceedings provide that:

If no procedure is specifically prescribed by these rules, the district court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules, or any applicable statute, and may apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whichever it deems most appropriate, to motions filed under these rules.

Fed. R. S 2255 Proceedings 12 (emphasis added). Neither 28 U.S.C. S 2255 nor the rules governing S 2255 proceedings explicitly proscribes the relation back of amendments. Rather, the statute and governing rules are silent.

The procedures applied to habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA, and, indeed, the very raison d'etre of the AEDPA itself do, however, present a potential inconsistency with the language and spirit of Rule 15(c). On the one hand, district courts maintain a liberal policy in non-habeas civil proceedings of allowing amendments to correct a defective pleading or to amplify an insufficiently stated claim and relating those amendments back to the date of the original filing when the amendments might otherwise have been barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On the other hand, Congress clearly intended to limit collateral attacks upon judgments obtained in federal criminal cases, an intent evidenced by the AEDPA's limitations period for filing petitions of one year from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. S 2255; see generally United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 651 (3d Cir. 1999). The government posits that the tension between...