Chris v. Tenet

Decision Date03 May 2000
Docket NumberDEFENDANT-APPELLEE,99-2376,No. 99-2140,PLAINTIFF-APPELLAN,V,99-2140
Citation221 F.3d 648
Parties(4th Cir. 2000) KELLY JEAN CHRIS,GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, KELLY JEAN CHRIS,GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge. (CA-99-494-A, CA-99-1231-A)

Argued: Pamela Bruce Stuart, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Charles Wylie Scarborough, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. On Brief: David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Rachel C. Ballow, Assistant United States Attorney, Marleigh D. Dover, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before Widener and Motz, Circuit Judges, and Frank W. Bullock, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Bullock wrote the opinion, in which Judge Widener and Judge Motz joined.

OPINION

Bullock, District Judge

The jurisdictional provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that, "Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under[Title VII]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). We are asked to decide in this case whether the phrase "actions brought under [Title VII]," as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), includes an action brought for the sole purpose of recovering attorney's fees and costs for work performed by counsel during administrative proceedings under Title VII that resulted in the settlement, prior to the filing of a judicial complaint, of all of Plaintiff's Title VII claims. The district court held that the phrase "actions brought under [Title VII]" referred only to legal proceedings instituted to enforce substantive rights guaranteed by Title VII and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff/ Appellant's claims brought solely for attorney's fees and costs. See Chris v. Tenet, 57 F. Supp. 2d 330 (E.D. Va. 1999). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I.

This appeal arises from two separate actions which were consolidated on appeal. Plaintiff/Appellant, Kelly Jean Chris1 ("Chris"), is an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (the"CIA" or "Agency"). In 1993, Chris filed a claim for sex discrimination with the CIA's equal employment opportunity office (the"Agency's EEO office"). The Agency's EEO office investigated the allegations and issued a report on March 30, 1994. Thereafter, on May 2, 1994, Chris filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In July 1994, while her first claim of sex discrimination was still pending, Chris filed a second claim of sex discrimination with the Agency's EEO office alleging that the CIA had initiated a criminal investigation into her relationship with a foreign national as a means of retaliating against her for filing her first complaint of sex discrimination. The Agency's EEO office investigated the second claim and issued a final report in March 1995. Following discovery, the parties entered into a confidential settlement agreement in June 1995 resolving both of Chris's complaints. The settlement agreement provided that in the event the parties did not reach an agreement on the amount of fees and costs due Chris, the CIA would pay her reasonable fees and costs in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e).2

The parties did not reach an agreement on attorney's fees and costs, and Chris filed a petition with the CIA claiming a total of $79,484.00 in fees based on 256.4 hours of attorney work at $310.00 per hour. Chris also sought $1,920.84 in costs. The CIA issued its final decision on the fee petition on August 23, 1995, and awarded fees totaling $48,350.00, which represented a fee award of $250.00 per hour for 193.4 hours of attorney work, and costs totaling $1,237.32. Chris appealed the award to the EEOC. The EEOC issued a decision on July 19, 1996, awarding Chris fees of $59,510.00, which was based on an hourly rate of $275.00 and included an award for the time Chris's counsel spent representing her in an agency Office of Inspector General investigation, as well as an award for the time Chris's counsel expended pursuing her appeal to the EEOC on the fee petition matter. The EEOC also increased the award of costs to $1,534.26. Both Chris and the CIA requested that the EEOC reconsider its decision. The EEOC agreed to reconsider its decision, and on January 7, 1998, the EEOC lowered the fee award to $56,593.00, but increased the award of costs to $1,582.26. In its order of reconsideration, the EEOC advised Chris that "the decision [was] final, and there [was] no further right of administrative appeal from the[EEOC's] decision." (J.A. at 35). The EEOC also advised Chris that if the CIA failed to comply with the EEOC's decision, Chris could "petition the Commission for enforcement of the order," or "file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement." Id. In the alternative, the EEOC informed Chris that she had "the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint," subject to statutory deadlines for such an action. Id.

Chris did not pursue one of those options, but filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking the difference between the attorney's fees and costs awarded by the EEOC and the attorney's fees and costs she requested in her fee petition. Thereafter, the matter was transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, and the CIA moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), to dismiss Chris's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On July 28, 1999, the district court granted the CIA's motion and dismissed Chris's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Chris filed a timely notice of appeal.

While Chris's first two complaints of sex discrimination were pending, Chris filed a third complaint of discrimination with the Agency's EEO office in February 1995, alleging discriminatory reprisal. In September 1996, this claim was also resolved by way of a confidential settlement. This settlement agreement also provided that, in the event the parties did not reach an agreement on the amount of the attorney's fees due Chris, the CIA would pay her reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e).3 Pursuant to the settlement, Chris's counsel submitted a fee petition to the Agency requesting compensation for 6.6 hours of work at an hourly rate of $315.00. The CIA agreed to compensate Chris's counsel for all 6.6 hours of work, but concluded that the appropriate rate was $275.00 per hour. Chris appealed the CIA's decision to the EEOC, seeking the difference between the hourly rate claimed by Chris and the hourly rate awarded by the CIA. The EEOC determined that a reasonable hourly rate was $295.00, and in a decision dated July 15, 1999, the EEOC ordered the Agency to pay an additional $20.00 per hour for each of the 6.6 hours of attorney work claimed by Chris. As in its prior decision, the EEOC advised Chris that if the CIA failed to comply with the EEOC's decision, Chris could "petition the Commission for enforcement of the order," or "file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement." (J.A. at 81). In the alternative, the EEOC informed Chris that she had "the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint," subject to statutory deadlines for such an action. Id.

On August 16, 1999, Chris filed a civil complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia seeking attorney's fees for work performed by her attorney while Chris's third claim of sex discrimination was in the administrative process. The Agency moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court, on September 15, 1999, in an amended order, dismissed the complaint for the reasons stated in the July 28, 1999, memorandum opinion dismissing Chris's first complaint. Chris filed a timely notice of appeal and the second appeal was consolidated with Chris's first appeal.

II.

This court reviews de novo the district court's dismissal of Chris's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Linney, 134 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo). Chris contends that Title VII's grant of discretionary authority to federal courts to award attorney's fees and costs, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), is a substantive right that may be enforced in a suit, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3), solely for attorney's fees and costs following settlement of all substantive claims during the course of the administrative process.4 Section 2000e-5(f)(3), the statutory provision granting subject matter jurisdiction to federal district courts over actions brought under Title VII, states, in relevant part, "Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (emphasis added). The issue before the court is whether Chris's claims solely for attorney's fees and costs are "actions brought under this subchapter," and thus within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.5

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