People v. Kozar

Decision Date25 July 1974
Docket NumberDocket No. 18691,No. 3,3
Citation54 Mich.App. 503,221 N.W.2d 170
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael James KOZAR, Defendant-Appellee
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Gary A. Stewart, Pros. Atty., Pros. Attys. App. Service, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant.

Leo W. Hoffman and Stephen M. Kantz, Allegan, for defendant-appellee.

Before ALLEN, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and SMITH,* JJ.

T. M. BURNS, Judge.

At approximately 7:30 p.m. on the night of December 9, 1972, defendant, while driving in the City of Otsego, Michigan was stopped by an Otsego police officer for a traffic violation. During the course of this investigation, it became apparent to the officer that defendant was visibly intoxicated, and defendant was consequently taken into custody.

On February 16, 1973, defendant was tried before a jury in the 57th Judicial District Court, Allegan County, Michigan, on three charges, only one of which, driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor contrary to M.C.L.A. § 257.625; M.S.A. § 9.2325, is relevant to this appeal.

Otsego Police Officer Donald Morris testified in depth regarding two breathalyzer tests which he administered to the defendant, relating that the first test was administered at 8:35 p.m. on December 9, the second test was given at 8:45 p.m. on the same date, and that both tests indicated the presence of 0.18 percent alcohol (by weight) in defendant's blood. A copy of the written results of these tests was admitted into evidence at trial.

Defendant was convicted of all three charges and subsequently appealed to the Allegan Circuit Court, alleging that under M.C.L.A. § 257.625a; M.S.A. § 9.2325(1) plaintiff was obligated to introduce expert testimony which would relate the breathalyzer test results back to the time of the alleged offense. The circuit court agreed with defendant's contention and on November 6, 1973, issued an order vacating the district court jury verdict and remanding the case for a new trial. Plaintiff appeals, by leave granted, from that order.

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether in a criminal prosecution for driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the prosecution is required to offer competent expert testimony to interpret and relate the results of breathalyzer tests back to the time of the alleged offense before such test results can be admitted into evidence.

M.C.L.A. § 257.625a; M.S.A. § 9.2325(1) provides in pertinent part as follows:

'(1) In any criminal prosecution for driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in such person's blood At the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person's * * * breath * * * shall be admissible into evidence and shall give rise to the following presumptions * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Plaintiff contends that a proper construction of the above-quoted provision is that the Legislature, via this statutory enactment, has determined that the alcoholic content of a defendant's blood at the time a chemical test is administered is admissible as sufficient evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense. It is, therefore, plaintiff's view that it is not necessary to produce expert testimony relating the test data backward to achieve an alcoholic content figure presumably applicable to defendant at the time of the offense.

On the other hand, defendant argues that a proper construction of the provision in question compels the conclusion that our Legislature intended a defendant to be penalized only according to the degree of his intoxication at the time the offense was committed, and not as a result of his blood alcohol content at some subsequent time when a chemical analysis is performed. Defendant thus maintains that in the absence of the requisite relation back via expert testimony, the results of subsequent chemical tests are intrinsically meaningless and hence inadmissible.

So far as we are able to determine from the briefs submitted and our independent research, this is a case of first impression in this state. The statute does not expressly state that expert testimony is necessary to relate test results back to the time of the alleged offense and, indeed, it is ambiguous on this point. In this type of situation, the legislative intent is to be gathered not from a particular provision but from the act as a whole, giving meaning to all sections of the act. Collins v. Secretary of State, 384 Mich. 656, 187 N.W.2d 423 (1971); Smith v. City Commission of Grand Rapids, 281 Mich. 235, 274 N.W. 776 (1937); Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich. 486 (1855). And, when interpreting an act that is ambiguous, 'we seek a reasonable construction of statutes in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished (Benjamin v. Huntington Woods, 349 Mich. 545, 555, 84 N.W.2d 789 (1957)) 'and' the intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion'. Sibley v. Smith, Supra, p. 492.

'The intent of the 'implied consent law' has been said to be 'to obtain the best evidence of blood alcohol content at the time of the arrest of a person reasonably believed to be driving while intoxicated' and ultimately 'to prevent intoxicated persons from driving on the highways'. Collins v. Secretary of State, 384 Mich. 656, 668, 187 N.W.2d 423, 430 (1971). Pursuant to this intent the Legislature has provided that certain specified chemical tests of blood alcohol content shall be admissible in evidence in criminal prosecutions for driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and has defined the effect to be given certain results.' People ex rel. Ingham Prosecutor v. 54th District Judge, 47 Mich.App. 517, 520, 209 N.W.2d 689. 691 (1973).

Looking at the act as a whole, we are unable to find support for defendant's claim that the prosecuting attorney must, by expert testimony, relate...

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17 cases
  • State v. Geisler
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 11 Mayo 1990
    ...Maricopa, supra, 139 Ariz. at 598-99, 680 P.2d at 129-130; State v. Knoll, supra, 110 Idaho at 682, 718 P.2d 589; People v. Kozar, supra, 54 Mich.App. at 508-09, 221 N.W.2d 170; Commonwealth v. Speights, supra, 353 Pa.Super. at 265-66, 509 A.2d "analysis thereof" language 9 has convinced th......
  • People v. Sloan, 100580
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 22 Agosto 1995
    ...suppression of Breathalyzer tests performed 2 1/4 hours after the defendant was first stopped by the police), People v. Kozar, 54 Mich.App. 503, 509, n. 2, 221 N.W.2d 170 (1974) (holding that there need not be expert testimony interpreting results of chemical tests conducted to detect blood......
  • State v. Ulrich, WD-83-42
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • 13 Enero 1984
    ...expert testimony is not necessary to correlate intoxilyzer test results to the time of the alleged offense. See People v. Kozar (1974), 54 Mich.App. 503, 509, 221 N.W.2d 170, 173. Recognizing that such correlation is necessary to the state's case, the legislature has provided for such a "re......
  • People v. Campbell
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 22 Octubre 1999
    ...after the arrest; and (4) the testing device was reliable. [Jacobsen, supra at 305, 517 N.W.2d 323, citing People v. Kozar, 54 Mich.App. 503, 509, n. 2, 221 N.W.2d 170 (1974).] The only requirement relevant in this case was whether the test was performed within a reasonable time. The circui......
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