Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Scroggin, AC 41929
Citation | 194 Conn.App. 843,222 A.3d 1025 |
Decision Date | 17 December 2019 |
Docket Number | AC 41929 |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Parties | CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC v. Daniel J. SCROGGIN |
Thomas P. Willcutts, with whom, on the brief, was Michael J. Habib, for the appellant (named defendant).
Benjamin T. Staskiewicz, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).
Keller, Moll and Bishop, Js.
The defendant, Daniel J. Scroggin also known as Daniel F. Scroggin also known as Daniel Scroggin, appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court, for the second time, in favor of the substitute plaintiff, AJX Mortgage Trust I, a Delaware Trust, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, Trustee.1 The defendant makes the following claims on appeal: (1) the trial court improperly failed to recuse itself pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183c following our remand in Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin , 178 Conn. App. 727, 176 A.3d 1210 (2017) ( Chase I ); (2) the trial court erred by granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability only without hearing oral argument on that motion; and (3) the trial court erred in denying on timeliness grounds the defendant's motion for an extension of time, filed pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47, to respond to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. We agree with the defendant's second claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.2
We begin with an abbreviated recitation of the factual and procedural background of this dispute, as set forth by this court in Chase I . "In December, 2009, Chase commenced the present foreclosure action against the defendant. In its original one count complaint, Chase alleged, in relevant part, that on July 20, 2007, the defendant executed a promissory note in the amount of $217,500 in favor of Chase Bank USA, N.A., and that the loan was secured by a mortgage of the premises located at 25 Church Street in Portland, which was owned by and in the possession of the defendant. Chase alleged that the mortgage was recorded on the Portland land records, that the mortgage was assigned to it, and that it was the holder of the note and mortgage. Chase alleged that beginning on July 1, 2009, the defendant failed to make installment payments of principal and interest required by the note and that it had exercised its option to declare the entire unpaid balance of the note (in the amount of $214,939.97) due and payable to it.... By way of relief, Chase sought, among other things, a foreclosure of the mortgage and the immediate possession of the subject premises.
‘‘On April 4, 2016, the defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff's amended complaint. In his answer to the amended complaint, the defendant, among other things, admitted portions of the allegations made in the first count and, with respect to other portions of the first count, left the plaintiff to its proof. Also, on April 4, 2016, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion for judgment as to count six of the amended complaint and an objection to the plaintiff's motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. On that date, the court [Aurigemma, J. ] held a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for judgment. By order dated April 4, 2016, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment with respect to counts two, three, four, and five of the amended complaint, but did not rule with respect to counts one or six of the amended complaint.
"The court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment of strict foreclosure ... and rendered judgment on count six of the plaintiff's amended complaint in the plaintiff's favor." (Footnotes omitted.) Id., at 730–37, 176 A.3d 1210.
Thereafter, the defendant appealed from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered on count one of the amended complaint. Id., at 737 n.9, 176 A.3d 1210. On appeal, this court concluded that (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 745, 176 A.3d 1210. Accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of strict foreclosure and remanded the case for additional proceedings. Id., at 746, 176 A.3d 1210.
On March 26, 2018, following our remand, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability only on count one of its amended complaint. The forty-five day period set forth in Practice Book § 17-45 (b) for the filing of a response to the motion for summary judgment expired on May 10, 2018. On May 24, 2018, the defendant filed a document captioned " Practice Book § 17-47 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Objection to Summary Judgment." The trial court denied that motion as untimely. At no time did the defendant file a substantive response to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. See Practice Book § 17-45 (b).
On May 29, 2018, the parties appeared before Judge Aurigemma at short calendar on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, which had been marked "ready." Counsel for the defendant acknowledged that he had not filed a response to the motion. Thereupon, the court ruled: "Well, there's no opposition, so the motion's granted, absent opposition." The defendant's counsel then stated that, pursuant to § 51-183c, the trial court was required to recuse itself. The court responded by asking whether the defendant's counsel had filed a motion to recuse, to which he indicated that he had not, and the proceedings concluded. A subsequent motion to reargue filed by the defendant was denied.
On June 21, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, and on July 9, 2018, the court granted the motion. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural background will be provided as necessary.
The defendant first claims that, pursuant to § 51-183c, Judge Aurigemma should have recused herself from ruling on "material issues" following this court's reversal of the judgment of strict foreclosure in Chase I . The plaintiff counters that (1) recusal was unwarranted in the absence of a written motion to disqualify filed pursuant to Practice Book §§ 1-22 (a)3 and 1-23,4 and (2) § 51-183c did not apply because there was no "trial" within the meaning of the statute. We agree with the plaintiff's second argument.5
We set forth the applicable standard of review. The defendant's claim that § 51-183c required recusal under the circumstances of this case presents a question of statutory interpretation, thereby invoking our plenary review. See State v. Riley , 190 Conn. App. 1, 8, 209 A.3d 646, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 923, 217 A.3d 993 (2019). ...
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