Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Assocs., LLC
Decision Date | 14 January 2020 |
Docket Number | SC 20188, (SC 20189) |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | JENZACK PARTNERS, LLC v. STONERIDGE ASSOCIATES, LLC et al. |
Richard P. Weinstein, West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Sarah Black Lingenheld, Farmington, for the appellant in Docket No. SC 20188 and the appellee in Docket No. SC 20189 (defendant Jennifer Tine).
Houston Putnam Lowry, Meriden, for the appellee in Docket No. SC 20188 and the appellant in Docket No. SC 20189 (plaintiff).
Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.*
The plaintiff, Jenzack Partners, LLC (Jenzack), and the defendant1 Jennifer Tine (Tine) separately appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court ordering strict foreclosure.2 See Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC , 183 Conn. App. 128, 143, 192 A.3d 455 (2018). These appeals require us to consider (1) whether an entity that was assigned a promissory note as well as a mortgage granted as collateral to secure a personal guarantee of that promissory note has standing to foreclose on the mortgage despite the fact that the guarantee was not explicitly assigned to the foreclosing party, and (2) whether an initial entry into a record of debt is admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule when that entry was provided by a third party in the course of the sale of the debt. As to the issue of standing, Tine claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that Jenzack had standing to foreclose a mortgage executed in support of a personal guarantee of a promissory note given by a third party because Jenzack did not receive a written assignment of the personal guarantee. As to the issue of hearsay, Jenzack claims that an adequate foundation was laid for the entirety of the record of debt to be admitted into evidence (exhibit 22) pursuant to the business records exception even though the initial entry was provided by a third party. Although we agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion that Jenzack had standing to foreclose the mortgage, we conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the business records exception did not apply to Jenzack's calculation of the debt owed on the promissory note. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court set forth the following facts and procedural history. Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC , supra, 183 Conn. App. at 131, 192 A.3d 455 ; see footnote 1 of this opinion. "On December 23, 2008, the Stoneridge note was modified via a modification agreement. On the same date, [Tine] executed a limited guarantee in favor of Sovereign guaranteeing repayment of the sum due under the Stoneridge note as modified [ (Tine guarantee) ]. In order to secure their respective guarantees, [Tine] and Joseph Tine executed a mortgage (Tine mortgage) in favor of Sovereign on their residential property ... in Cromwell.3 [Tine's] nonrecourse guarantee limited her liability solely to her interest in the Cromwell property. On August 27, 2009, and May 6, 2010, [Tine] executed reaffirmations of her guarantee in connection with subsequent modifications of the Stoneridge note.
"On March 22, 2012, Sovereign assigned [the Tine] mortgage and interests in the Stoneridge note to [Jenzack]." (Footnote in original.) Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC , supra, 183 Conn. App. at 131–32, 192 A.3d 455. Id., at 132 n.3, 192 A.3d 455. 4 (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 132–33, 192 A.3d 455.
5 Id., at 133, 192 A.3d 455. Id.
Before the Appellate Court, Tine argued that "the trial court improperly (1) held that [Jenzack] had standing to foreclose the Tine mortgage [and] (2) determined that [Jenzack's] exhibit 22 was sufficient to establish the amount due on the [Stoneridge] note ...."6 Id. Although the Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that Jenzack had standing to foreclose the Tine mortgage; id., at 139, 192 A.3d 455 ; it reversed the trial court's decision on the admissibility of the record of debt owed on the Stoneridge note under the business records exception, concluding that the starting balance for the computation of debt "was not calculated by [Jenzack], and, therefore, it was received, rather than made, in the ordinary course of business." Id., at 143, 192 A.3d 455. On the basis of this conclusion, the Appellate Court held that the initial entry did not satisfy the requirements of the business records exception, and, therefore, the trial court could not properly determine the amount of debt. Id., at 142–43, 192 A.3d 455. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure as to Tine and remanded the case for a new trial. Id., at 146, 192 A.3d 455. These certified appeals followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
Because the question of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we first consider Tine's claim in Docket No. SC 20188 that the Appellate Court improperly held that Jenzack had standing to foreclose the Tine mortgage. Tine claims that Jenzack does not have standing to foreclose the Tine mortgage because Sovereign did not expressly assign the Tine guarantee to Jenzack in the allonge, and, therefore, Jenzack is not a party to the Tine guarantee.7 Although Tine correctly points out that the allonge did not explicitly incorporate or mention the Tine guarantee, we conclude that Jenzack nonetheless had standing according to the language of the Tine guarantee.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland , 310 Conn. 147, 161, 75 A.3d 651 (2013). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 288 Conn. 143, 155, 953 A.2d 1 (2008). "It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Ins. , 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2014).
D'Amato Investments, LLC v. Sutton , 117 Conn. App. 418, 422, 978 A.2d 1135 (2009). Even though a guarantee is not explicitly assigned along with the underlying obligation it is ensuring, guarantors are "bound by the contractual...
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