United States v. Beckman, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

Citation222 F.3d 512
Decision Date15 March 2000
Docket Number99-2978,Nos. 99-2975,DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,s. 99-2975
Parties(8th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,, v BRUCE A. BECKMAN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,, v. THOMAS KELLY, Submitted:
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Richard S. Arnold, Lay, and Beam, Circuit Judges.

Lay, Circuit Judge.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 16, 1997, Bruce A. Beckman and Thomas Kelly, along with six other defendants, were charged by indictment with Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. On March 13, 1997, these same individuals were charged by Superseding Indictment, altering the time frame but not the crimes charged. Prior to trial, a number of the defendants changed their pleas and entered guilty pleas. Specifically, George Bradstream, Davia Haines, John Root, and Gene Rossman each entered into plea agreements by which they could receive recommended reduced sentences in exchange for providing "substantial assistance" to the prosecution. The remaining defendants, Beckman, Kelly, and two others, proceeded to trial, which began June 22, 1998. On June 29, 1998, the district court declared a mistrial due to the jury's inability to reach a verdict. Following this trial, but prior to retrial, the other two defendants entered guilty pleas, leaving Beckman and Kelly to be re-tried beginning April 6, 1999. A guilty verdict was returned against each on April 9, 1999.

The conspiracy at issue centered on Patrick Mitchell, who had moved to South Dakota in early 1995 and began importing methamphetamine from his prior home state of Oregon. Mitchell made driving trips from South Dakota to the West Coast with various individuals, including Beckman, to obtain methamphetamine. Mitchell initially imported smaller amounts of the drug, but with the passage of time and the growth of the conspiracy, he eventually transported larger quantities. The drugs were sometimes stored at Beckman's residence. Mitchell temporarily lived at Kelly's house and provided Kelly with drugs in lieu of rent.

During the course of the conspiracy, Mitchell's ex-wife, Dana Chaffee, also moved from Oregon to South Dakota, and the relationship between the two resumed. Chaffee assisted with the drug operation by traveling with Mitchell, keeping records, distributing drugs, and collecting money, all at Mitchell's direction. Because of her involvement, Chaffee was able to identify both Beckman and Kelly as being participants in the drug conspiracy.

It was after Mitchell's death in the fall of 1996, that evidence of the drug conspiracy surfaced and the eight defendants were indicted.

II. DISCUSSION 1
A. BECKMAN'S APPEAL

On appeal, Beckman claims: 1) the district court erred by failing to specifically voir dire potential jurors on the presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proof; 2) the district court insufficiently instructed the jury on the government's control of sentence reduction in connection with plea bargains, resulting in insufficient instruction on witness credibility; 3) the district court erred by failing to give a supplemental jury instruction on the buyer/seller principle in response to a jury question; and 4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. We affirm Beckman's conviction on all issues.

1. Voir Dire

Beckman contends that the district court erred in conducting voir dire by failing to specifically question potential jurors regarding the presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proving all charges beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

It is undisputed that voir dire is critical to ensuring a defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (citations omitted), Justice White, speaking for the plurality, stated:

Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. Similarly, lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges where provided by statute or rule, as it is in the federal courts.

It is also well-settled, however, that district court's have broad discretion in conducting voir dire. See id. at 188-89. When no contemporaneous objection is made to the conduct of voir dire, as is true in this case, 2 this court reviews challenges under the plain error standard. See United States v. Van Chase, 137 F.3d 579, 582 (8th Cir. 1998). When considering challenges to voir dire, "the central inquiry is whether the overall jury examination, coupled with the jury charge, adequately protects the defendant from prejudice." United States v. Eagle Hawk, 815 F.2d 1213, 1219 (8th Cir. 1987).

In United States v. Cosby, 529 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1976), this court faced a question similar to that presented here. On appeal, the defendant in Cosby argued that the district court, while not bound by the language of the suggested questions, should have more thoroughly explored the notions of presumption of innocence and governmental burden of proof. The Cosby court, after reviewing the transcript of the voir dire and jury instructions, rejected this argument in light of the court's general instructions on the presumption and burden, the overall thoroughness of the voir dire inquiry, and the inquiry of the potential jurors regarding whether they could abide by the court's instructions. See id. At 148-49.

On a number of occasions during voir dire in this case, the district court generally addressed the issues of presumption of innocence and governmental burden. Specifically, the court stated:

[D]efendants are presumed to be innocent of this crime and that presumption stays with them throughout the trial until the jury returns a verdict after due deliberation that the defendants either are guilty or not guilty of the offense for which they have been indicted.

And the burden of proof based upon that presumption is by what is called proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the district court discussed and instructed on these principles on at least two other occasions. We recognize that the district court did not specifically ask each potential juror whether they comprehended and could apply these legal principles; however, it did instruct the panel that it must accept the law as provided by the court and then asked for a show of hands of those who could do so. The record reveals that every juror's hand was raised.

We find that the overall voir dire and instructions in this case adequately apprized the potential jurors of the presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proof. Additionally, this court should and does assume that a jury, sworn by oath to follow the law, did, in fact, do so. Therefore, we hold that a district court need not ask prospective jurors specific questions on their ability to apply instructions on these principles, especially when no contemporaneous objection is made. Accord United States v. Miller, 758 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding court was not required to ask specific questions of potential jurors regarding burden of proof, presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and whether they agreed with such principles); Grandsinger v. United States, 332 F.2d 80 (10th Cir. 1964) (finding no abuse of discretion where court refused to explain legal principles of reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence and refused to ask whether prospective jurors would give accused the benefit of these principles); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding no error when court refused to instruct on presumption of innocence and burden of proof and failed to ask jurors whether such laws were fair, where court did ask if jurors would follow instructions and, at the close of trial, instructed on such principles); United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding no abuse of discretion in court's refusal to propound requested questions regarding whether panel could accept and apply legal principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt); United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding no abuse of discretion where court refused to ask jury panel whether legal principles of reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence were understood). But cf. United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding, where specific request is made, a court's failure to specifically inquire of prospective jurors on ability to accept and abide by the presumption of innocence is a denial of right to impartial jury); United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding, where specific request is made, court's failure to ask questions of prospective jurors regarding their understanding and ability to apply instructions on burden of proof and presumption of innocence is reversible error). We hold, following the majority of circuit courts, the district court did not plainly err in failing to more specifically or individually question potential jurors on the legal principles at issue.

2. Jury Instructions

Beckman asserts that the district court's instructions to the jury did not adequately instruct on the government's role in sentencing departures so as to allow a proper assessment of witness credibility. We review the district court's jury instructions for abuse of discretion. See Grain Land Coop v. Kar Kim Farms, Inc., 199 F.3d 983, 995 (8th Cir.1999). In conducting such review, this court must...

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