In re G.D.L., No. 18-FS-538

• Decision Date: 02 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-FS-538
• Citation: 223 A.3d 100
• Parties: IN RE G.D.L., Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

223 A.3d 100

IN RE G.D.L., Appellant.

No. 18-FS-538

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued September 16, 2019

Decided January 2, 2020

G.D.L., pro se.

Melissa Colangelo, with whom Abraham Sisson was on the brief, for amicus curiae Children's Law Center.

Before Fisher, Beckwith, and McLeese, Associate Judges.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

Appellant G.D.L. seeks review of an order denying his request for access to unredacted records relating to his adoption, including his original birth certificate. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

I.

The following facts appear to be undisputed. Appellant G.D.L. was born and adopted in the District of Columbia in the mid-1960s. In 2000, G.D.L.'s biological mother contacted G.D.L., and the two began to develop a close relationship. G.D.L. then also got to know his biological mother's family, including her siblings, G.D.L.'s cousins, and G.D.L.'s grandparents. Through these relationships G.D.L. learned his biological father's identity, and he communicated with at least one member of his paternal family. In 2011, G.D.L. learned through a paternal uncle that his biological father did not wish to have contact with G.D.L. G.D.L. respected his biological father's wish and has had no contact with his biological father.

G.D.L.'s mother died in 2001, leaving G.D.L. her personal records and diaries. Those materials were extensive, but few covered G.D.L.'s birth and subsequent adoption proceedings. In 2016, G.D.L filed a petition requesting a copy of his original birth certificate on file with the District of Columbia Department of Health, the Superior Court's records of his adoption proceedings, and adoption-related documents in the possession of the child-placement agency.

The trial court initially granted G.D.L.'s motion in part. The trial court did not specifically address either the request for an order directing the Department of Health to disclose G.D.L.'s original birth certificate or the request for disclosure of the Superior Court's adoption records. Rather, the trial court focused exclusively on records held by the child-placement agency. The trial court appeared to assume, however, that the child-placement agency would have a copy of the original birth certificate. Although the trial court focused on records held by the child-placement agency, it relied on a statute apparently addressing disclosure of court adoption records. D.C. Code § 16-311 (2019 Supp.) (addressing disclosure of "the petition, records and papers in adoption proceedings"). See In re D.B. , 133 A.3d 561, 562 (D.C. 2016) (noting questions whether § 16-311 applies to adoption records held by child-placement agencies and whether D.C. Code § 4-1405 (2012 Repl.) applies to such records). Section 16-311 precludes disclosure in the absence of a finding that "the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or protected." D.C. Code § 16-311. The trial court concluded, however, that the protections of that provision were inapplicable to G.D.L. because G.D.L. was no longer a minor. The trial court therefore viewed itself as free to balance the relevant interests in deciding the motion for disclosure. In order to "protect [G.D.L.'s] birth father's privacy as much as possible," the trial court directed the child-placement agency to give G.D.L. redacted copies of the original birth certificate and "adoption records," omitting his biological father's name and any "information related to" his biological father.

G.D.L. sought reconsideration, arguing among other things that (1) the trial court did not address the request for an order directing the Department of Health to disclose the original birth certificate; (2) the trial court did not address the request for disclosure of the Superior Court's adoption records; and (3) with respect to the agency's records, the trial court applied the wrong standard and erroneously required redaction of the agency's records. The trial court vacated its original order and issued a new order. The trial court reiterated its understanding that it was required to "protect the birth father's right to privacy as much as possible." The trial court again did not explicitly address the requests for an order to the Department of Health directing disclosure of the original birth certificate or for direct disclosure of the Superior Court's adoption records. Rather, the trial court appeared to assume that the agency would have access to the original birth certificate and the Superior Court's adoption records, and directed the agency to disclose redacted versions of those documents, omitting "identifying information related to the birth father." Finally, the trial court also directed the agency to disclose its records, similarly redacted.

According to G.D.L., the child-placement agency subsequently provided G.D.L. with eighty pages of copied documents, all of which were in the agency's files. Those documents included a redacted copy of the original birth certificate and some copies of court records.

II.

G.D.L. challenges (1) the trial court's failure to directly release to G.D.L. unredacted Superior Court records relating to the adoption; and (2) the trial court's failure to direct the Department of Health to give G.D.L. an unredacted copy of his original birth certificate. G.D.L. does not raise a claim on appeal with respect to the redacted agency records, so we do not address that issue. Similarly, although the pertinent statutes refer to inspection of records, D.C. Code §§ 4-1405(c) (2012 Repl.), 7-231.21(h) (2019 Supp.), 7-210(c) (2018 Supp.) (repealed), 16-311, G.D.L. requested copies of records. The trial court granted the request for copies in part. Because no one has raised the issue, we have no occasion to address the possible distinction between a right to inspect and a right to obtain a copy. Compare, e.g. , Direct Mail Serv. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles , 296 Mass. 353, 5 N.E.2d 545, 546-47 (1937) ("The right to inspect commonly carries with it the right to make copies without which the right to inspect would be practically valueless."), with, e.g. , Acosta v. Local Union 26, UNITE HERE , 895 F.3d 141, 143-46 (1st Cir. 2018) (concluding under particular statutory scheme that right to inspect did not confer right to copy). Finally, we emphasize that we are addressing only the issue of G.D.L.'s right of access to the records at issue, which otherwise remain sealed.

A.

We turn first to G.D.L.'s request for access to unredacted Superior Court records relating to his adoption. We conclude that further proceedings are necessary with respect to that request.

1. Meaning of "Child" in § 16-311.

As previously noted, § 16-311 governs access to "the petition, records and papers" in adoption proceedings in Superior Court. Those documents "shall be sealed" and "may not be inspected ... except upon order of the court, and only then when the court is satisfied that the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or protected." D.C. Code § 16-311. Relying on a decision of this court, In re D.E.D. , 672 A.2d 582, 584 (D.C. 1996), the trial court interpreted the word "child" in § 16-311 to be limited to those who are minors at the time of the motion for disclosure. Although the trial court's reliance on In re D.E.D. for this conclusion was quite understandable, we conclude that In re D.E.D. is better read more narrowly.

In In re D.E.D. , D.E.D., who was an adult at time of the request, sought access under § 16-311 to the records of her own adoption. 672 A.2d at 583. D.E.D.'s adoptive mother, biological mother, and putative biological father all consented. Id. at 583, 584-85. D.E.D.'s adoptive father did not file a formal consent but had not indicated that he would file an objection. Id. at 583. The trial court denied access, concluding that D.E.D. had failed to demonstrate a need to review her adoption records. Id.

This court vacated the trial court's ruling. 672 A.2d at 585. We pointed out that § 16-311 did not require a showing of particularized need, but rather only a finding that the child's welfare would be promoted or protected. Id. at 584. We held that where an adult seeks disclosure only to herself and with the consent of all other affected persons, the purpose of § 16-311 "is fully protected." Id. We therefore remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether D.E.D.'s biological and adoptive parents all consented. Id. at 585.

It is true that there is language in In re D.E.D. suggesting more broadly that the word "child" in § 16-311 is most naturally read as referring to minors, and that adoptees who are adults fall outside § 16-311 's "welfare" requirement. 672 A.2d at 584 & n.3. In re D.E.D. did not definitively rule, however, that the "welfare" requirement is categorically inapplicable to an adoptee who is or has become an adult. Id. at 584-85. So expansive a holding would have surprising consequences: for example, a third party could seek access to the adoption records of someone who had become an adult, and the trial court could grant such access even if doing so would be contrary to the welfare of the adoptee. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the word "child" in § 16-311 extends to adoptees who are or have become adults.

We decide issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Facebook, Inc. v. Wint , 199 A.3d 625, 628 (D.C. 2019). In interpreting statutory text, "[w]e first look to see whether the statutory language at issue is plain and admits of no more than one meaning." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the correct reading of statutory language, we consider statutory context and structure, evident legislative purpose, and the potential consequences of adopting a given interpretation. E.g. , J.P. v. District of Columbia , 189 A.3d 212, 219 (D.C. 2018).

Considered in isolation, the word "child" is ambiguous. It can refer to an individual who is chronologically a minor, but it can also refer to an individual of any age who stands in a familial relation...