Aguilera v. Armstrong Tire Corp.
| Decision Date | 11 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-16899,98-16899 |
| Citation | 223 F.3d 1010 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 2000) MARIO AGUILERA; RODOLFO ABELLA; JAMES ALCORN; JAMES APODACA; JESSE ARENIVAS, JR.; RICHARD ARROYO; VALENTIN JOSE AVILA; TONYA BADGETT; JAMES A. BARNES; RONALD L. BAUMGARTNER; DANIEL BAUTISTA; DAVE BLAIR; JOHN BLAIR; VERNON BRESENIO; JOHN BRIGGS; TONY BRUNO; JOHN R. BURLESON; RUBEN CANO; GENARO CASTILLO; EUGENE CHESTER; BEN CHRISTIAN; DAVID CLEMENTE; RANDALL COOMER; WILFREDO CUNANAN; RICHARD B. CUNNINGS; DAVID DANIEL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PIRELLI ARMSTRONG TIRE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Office of the Circuit Executive |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Joseph Clapp, Herron & Herron, San Francisco, California, for the appellants.
Philip L. Ross, Littler Mendelson, PC, San Francisco, California, for the appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, D.C. No. CV-97-05170-OWW; Oliver W. Wanger, District Judge, Presiding
Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, Dorothy W. Nelson, and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.
The questions before us are whether the appellants' state law fraud and breach of contract claims against their former employer are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. S 185, and whether their statutory claim was properly dismissed. The district court granted summary judgment to the appellants' former employer on the appellants' claims brought under California law, ruling that section 301 preempted them. The court also held that the appellants' state statutory and public policy claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations or, in the alternative, were without merit. We affirm the district court's judgment in all respects.
Rodolfo Abella and other workers (collectively "appellants" or "replacements"), were hired as strike replacements during a United Rubber Workers' strike at Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corporation's ("Pirelli") tire manufacturing plant in Hanford, California. The United Rubber Workers Union Local 703 ("union") represented the production and maintenance employees at Pirelli for the purposes of collective bargaining. In May 1994, Pirelli and the union began negotiations to replace an expiring collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). When the negotiations failed in July 1994, more than 500 union employees began a strike at the Hanford plant.
In August 1994, Pirelli began hiring temporary replacement workers to replace the striking workforce. Pirelli continued to hire replacement workers on a staggered basis and subsequently converted temporary replacements to permanent replacements. The appellants were replacement workers hired in September and October 1994 and contend that at the time they were hired, they were promised that they would be permanent employees who would not subsequently be replaced by returning strikers. The terms and conditions of the appellants' employment were not expressly governed by a CBA.
On September 14, 1994, the union filed unfair labor practice charges against Pirelli with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). In a decision issued February 24, 1995, the NLRB regional director agreed with the union that Pirelli had engaged in unfair labor practices. On February 28, 1995, the union offered to settle the strike and return to work. Pirelli's appeal of the NLRB Regional Director's decision was denied without comment on March 7, 1995. Pirelli then accepted the union's offer to return to work on March 8, 1995.
In order to accommodate returning strikers, Pirelli laid off the 207 replacement workers who were hired after October 3, 1994, because they had the lowest seniority. Replacement employees with "clock numbers" 3561 or lower (hired on or before October 3, 1994) were retained; those with clock numbers higher than 3561 (hired after October 3, 1994) were laid off with future rehire rights. Strikers returned to work beginning March 13, 1995. The appellants--all of whom were hired on or before October 3, 1994--were not laid off at this time.
Pirelli and the union entered into a new CBA on March 27, 1995. The CBA recognized the union as "the exclusive collective bargaining agent for the employees" of Pirelli. Appellants were employed in collective bargaining unit positions during and after the strike and became members of the union at the conclusion of the strike pursuant to the terms of the CBA, which conditioned future employment on union membership. Former strikers retained seniority when the strike ended based on original hire dates.
During the strike, Pirelli's tire sales dropped nearly 25% from pre-strike levels. Diminished sales continued after the strike ended and Pirelli's post-strike earnings were lower than management projections. Consequently, on September 23, 1995, Pirelli laid off 175 union workers with the least seniority, including the appellants.
The appellants did not file union grievances following their layoffs. They instead chose to file suit in the district court on November 1, 1995. That case, Anderson et al. v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corporation, was originally brought by three named plaintiffs and pled as a class action on behalf of the 175 former replacement employees laid off during the September 1995 reduction in force. The operative facts and legal arguments in Anderson were identical to those in the instant case and each appellant herein was a putative class member in the Anderson case. The Anderson class was never certified and in March 1997, the district court granted summary judgment for Pirelli on all counts of the complaint. We affirmed in an unpublished Memorandum Disposition. See Anderson v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Co., 152 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998).1
The instant suit was filed February 27, 1997. The complaint alleged state law causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of individual employment contract, violation of California Labor Code S 970, and discharge in violation of the public policy expressed in California Labor Code S 970. On August 31, 1998, the district court issued an opinion granting Pirelli's summary judgment motion. The court found that (1) the state law fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract claims were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act S 301 as each claim required an interpretation of the CBA; (2) the breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims were also preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 151, et seq., as the claims involve "arguably prohibited" activity (unfair labor practices) within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB; and (3) the California Labor Code and public policy claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations or otherwise lacked merit. This appeal, in which the appellants abandoned the negligent misrepresentation claims, followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we affirm.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and we will affirm only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the trial court correctly applied the substantive law. See Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court's decision regarding preemption is reviewed de novo. See Niehaus v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 173 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999).
Section 301 of the LMRA preempts state law claims that are based directly on rights created by a collective bargaining agreement, and also preempts claims that are substantially dependent on an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. See Biels v. Kiewit Pacific Co., Inc. , 114 F.3d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987)). When the meaning of particular contract terms is not disputed, however, the fact that a collective bargaining agreement must be consulted for information will not result in S 301 preemption. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1994) ).
The appellants argue that the terms of their CBA are neither disputed nor relevant because their claims were fully actuated before the existence of the CBA and consequently fall outside the orbit of S 301 preemption. Pirelli counters that preemption is necessary because the appellants were laid off pursuant to the layoff and seniority provisions of the CBA and interpretation of the CBA's terms is integral to resolution of those claims. For the following reasons, we agree with Pirelli, and conclude that both the breach of contract and fraud claims are preempted by S 301.
Appellants contend that their breach of contract claims stem from independent employment contracts between themselves and Pirelli in which, at the time they were hired, Pirelli allegedly promised each of the replacements that no other replacement would be replaced by returning strikers. They maintain that these contracts were breached in March 1995, when Pirelli laid off 207 other replacements, and are wholly independent of the later negotiated CBA. Though appellants were not laid off at this time, they argue that the March 1995 layoff of less senior replacement workers placed them at an enhanced risk of future layoff and thus constituted a breach of contract. In other words, the appellants argue that their breach of contract claim accrued and was actionable in March 1995, prior to the adoption of the CBA, and that their current claim is independent of any rights created by the CBA.
We first consider whether the appellants' purported independent contracts were in fact breached in March 1995 when other, less senior, replacements were laid off....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Stasi v. Inmediata Health Grp. Corp.
...the standard for damages under California contract law may be higher than that for negligence claims. See Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. , 223 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs must show appreciable and actual damage that is not nominal, speculative, or based on fear of ......
-
In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL No.11md2258 AJB (MDD)
...diminution in value fail to allege how Plaintiffs have suffered an appreciable, non-speculative harm. See Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000). Although the FACC attempts to bolster the allegations in the Consolidated Complaint by alleging that Plain......
-
Copart, Inc. v. Sparta Consulting, Inc.
..."Under California law, a breach of contract claim requires a showing of appreciable and actual damage." Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. , 223 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Const. Co. , 256 Cal.App.2d 506, 511, 64 Cal.Rptr. 187 (19......
-
Barbieri v. United Technologies Corp.
...agreement, bargaining agreement controls and state law claims are preempted by §§ 301). See also Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2000) (independent agreement regarding job security inconsistent with portions of collective bargaining agreement gover......