Shelton v. Univ. Medicine & Dentistry NJ

• Decision Date: 10 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-5527,99-5527
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2000) YVONNE SHELTON, Appellant v. UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE & DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY; JOHN DOE OWNERS, (said name being fictitious for various owners); MANNY MOE'S CORP, (said name being fictitious); ABC PARTNERSHIPS, (same name being fictitious)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 220

223 F.3d 220 (3rd Cir. 2000)

YVONNE SHELTON, Appellant v. UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE & DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY; JOHN DOE OWNERS, (said name being fictitious for various owners); MANNY MOE'S CORP, (said name being fictitious); ABC PARTNERSHIPS, (same name being fictitious)

No. 99-5527

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued March 6, 2000

Filed August 10, 2000

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey: Honorable William G. Bassler (D.C. Civil Action No. 97-cv-02689) [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Attorney for Appellant: F. MICHAEL DAILY, JR., ESQUIRE (ARGUED) Quinlan, Dunne & Daily 16 North Centre Street Merchantville, New Jersey 08109-2519

Attorney for Appellee, University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey: BARBARA A. BERRESKI, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) Office of Attorney General of New Jersey, Division of Law P.O. Box 112 Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Before: SCIRICA, ALITO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

OPINION FOR THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

In this employment discrimination case, the issue on appeal is whether a state hospital reasonably accommodated the religious beliefs and practices of a staff nurse who refused to participate in what she believed to be abortions. The District Court held it had, and we agree. We will affirm.

I. Background

Yvonne Shelton worked as a staff nurse in the Labor and Delivery section of the Hospital at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. The Hospital's Labor and Delivery section provides patients with routine vaginal and cesarean-section deliveries. The Labor and Delivery section does not perform elective abortions.¹ On occasion, Labor and Delivery section patients require emergency procedures that terminate their pregnancies. Labor and Delivery section nurses are required to assist in emergency procedures as part of their job responsibilities.

Shelton is a member of the Pentecostal faith; her faith forbids her from participating "directly or indirectly in ending a life." The proscription includes abortions of live fetuses. Shelton claims she notified the Hospital in writing about her religious beliefs when she first joined the Hospital in 1989, and again in 1994. During this time, the Hospital accommodated Shelton's religious beliefs by allowing her to trade assignments with other nurses rather than participate in emergency procedures involving what Shelton considered to be abortions.

Two events precipitated Shelton's termination. In 1994, Shelton refused to treat a patient. According to the Hospital, the patient was pregnant and suffering from a ruptured membrane (which the Hospital describes as a life-threatening condition). Shelton learned the Hospital planned to induce labor by giving the patient oxytocin. Shelton refused to assist or participate.²

After the incident, Shelton's supervisor asked her to provide a note from her pastor about her religious beliefs. Instead, Shelton submitted her own note:

Before the foundations of the earth, God called me to be Holy. For this cause I must be obedient to the word of God. From his own mouth he said `Thou shalt not kill.' Therefore, regardless of the situation, I will not participate directly or indirectly in ending a life.. . .

In November 1995, Shelton refused to treat another emergency patient. This patient--who was "standing in a pool of blood"--was diagnosed with placenta previa. The attending Labor and Delivery section physician determined the situation was life-threatening and ordered an emergency cesarean-section delivery.³ When Shelton arrived for her shift, she was told to "scrub in" on the procedure. Because the procedure would terminate the pregnancy, Shelton refused to assist or participate. Eventually, another nurse took her place. The Hospital claims Shelton's refusal to assist delayed the emergency procedure for thirty minutes.

Two months later, the Hospital informed Shelton she could no longer work in the Labor and Delivery section because of her refusal to assist in "medical procedures necessary to save the life of the mother and/or child." The Hospital claimed that staffing cuts prevented it from allowing Shelton to continue to trade assignments when situations arose she considered would lead to an abortion. The Hospital believed Shelton's refusals to assist risked patients' safety.

But the Hospital did not terminate Shelton. Instead, it offered her a lateral transfer to a staff nurse position in the Newborn Intensive Care Unit ("Newborn ICU"). The Hospital also invited Shelton to contact its Human Resources Department, which would help her identify other available nursing positions.

Shelton undertook her own investigation of the Newborn ICU position. She claims she spoke with a nurse (whose name she does not remember) in that unit, who said that "extremely compromised" infants who were not expected to survive would be "set aside" and allowed to die. Shelton did not attempt to confirm this information with the Hospital. Nor did she contact the Human Resources Department to investigate other available positions. Shelton claims she believed no other positions would be available.

The Hospital gave Shelton thirty days to accept the position in Newborn ICU, or to apply for another nursing position. Shelton did neither. Instead, on the thirtieth day, she wrote to her supervisor:

. . . The ultimatum given me however, doesn't align with the response I am unctioned to submit. The decision is not ours to make but the Lords'. The Living God is in control of that which concerns my life and job. "Many are the plans in a mans heart but it's Gods plan/purpose that will prevail."

On February 15, 1996, the Hospital terminated Shelton.

II. Proceedings

Shelton sued, claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq. (Count I), the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5 et seq. (Count II), and the First Amendment (Count III). The District Court granted summary judgment for the Hospital on Shelton's federal claims, concluding the Hospital reasonably accommodated Shelton by offering to transfer her to the Newborn ICU and by inviting her to work with its Human Resources Department to identify other available positions. The court declined to continue jurisdiction over Shelton's state law claims. Shelton appealed, claiming the District Court erred by ignoring material issues of fact and by failing to consider the New Jersey Conscience Statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:65A-1, A-2, A-3 (West 1987).

We have jurisdiction over Shelton's appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of a summary judgment is plenary. We view all evidence and draw all inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant, affirming if no reasonable jury could find for the non- movant. See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. Discussion

A. The Title VII Religious Discrimination Claim

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for their employees' religious beliefs and practices, unless doing so would result in "undue hardship" to the employer. 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-2(a)(1),⁴ 2000e(j)⁵ (1982). To establish a prima facie case, the employee must show:

1. she holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement;

2. she informed her employer of the conflict; and

3. she was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.

See Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it made good faith efforts to accommodate, or that the requested accommodation would work an undue hardship. See United States v. Board of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1990) (no Title VII violation; allowing Muslim teacher to wear religious garb while teaching, thereby violating state criminal statute, would impose undue hardship on school district); Getz v. Pennsylvania, 802 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1986) (no Title VII violation; employee failed to establish prima facie case where Commonwealth allowed her to take religious holidays with pay, but did not allow her to work overtime to earn extra vacation time).

The approach employed in Protos and Getz is similar to that employed by many of our sister courts of appeals. See, e.g., Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2000); Wilson v. U.S West Comm., 58 F.3d 1337, 1340 (8th Cir. 1995); Beadle v. Hillsborough Co. Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592, 592 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Arlington Transit Mix, Inc., 957 F.2d 219, 221-22 (6th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we are mindful that the Supreme Court has declined to accept or reject any particular prima facie case or burden-shifting approach to Title VII religious accommodation cases. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986). In Philbrook, the Court reviewed a Title VII religious discrimination case in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had applied a prima facie case test virtually identical to that we now apply (and previously applied in Protos and Getz, both decided shortly before Philbrook). The Court of Appeals had held the employee established his prima facie case. See id. at 66. Then, assuming without discussion the employer's policy constituted a reasonable accommodation, the court held that where the employer and employee both propose a reasonable accommodation, the employer must accept the employee's proposal unless doing so works an undue hardship. See id. On this latter point the Supreme Court reversed, commenting that it found "no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation." Id. at 68. The Court specifically declined to ...