Schoffstall v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 13 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-4192,99-4192
• Citation: 223 F.3d 818
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) DEBORAH L. SCHOFFSTALL, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM HENDERSON, AGENT; U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, APPELLEES. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 818

223 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2000)

DEBORAH L. SCHOFFSTALL, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM HENDERSON, AGENT; U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, APPELLEES.

No. 99-4192

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: June 13, 2000

Filed: August 18, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Hansen and Heaney, Circuit Judges, and Mills¹ , District Judge.

Heaney, Circuit Judge.

Deborah Schoffstall sued the United States Postal Service (USPS) for sex discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment. ² She moved for protective relief to prevent the USPS from discovering certain information. The district court denied her motion, and later dismissed three of her claims as a discovery sanction. The district court also granted summary judgment on her remaining claims and denied her motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Schoffstall has worked since 1984 as a mail distribution clerk at the USPS plant in Bismarck, North Dakota. In 1990, she was diagnosed with a back injury that she alleged occurred while on the job. Schoffstall's supervisor accommodated her injury, and following a fitness-for-duty examination late that year, restricted her work duties. Because Schoffstall alleged a work-related injury, she believed she qualified for limited-duty status, a status more favorable than the light-duty status given to employees whose injuries occur outside of work.

The USPS was realigned in 1992. Bismarck moved into the Dakota District, and David Morton became Schoffstall's supervisor. In August 1993, Morton sent a letter to postal employees instructing them to update their light-duty documentation. Morton asked Schoffstall to review her records and to apply for light duty, stating that he could no longer accommodate her work restrictions without a light-duty request. Schoffstall signed the request under protest that she qualified for limited-duty status.

Schoffstall alleges that over the next couple of years, Morton increasingly scrutinized her; stationed himself directly by her; intimidated her; spread rumors about her; made derogatory comments about her; and physically threatened her. She complained to him that her work environment had become hostile and told him that if he did not correct the problem, she would file an EEOC complaint. Two weeks later, on May 22, 1995, Morton asked Schoffstall to submit to another fitness-for-duty examination. Dr. Melissa Ray evaluated Schoffstall and concluded that in addition to her current work restrictions, she should not repetitively lift above her shoulders.

Upon receiving Ray's report, Morton conferred with the USPS's injury-compensation specialist and a USPS nurse to discuss Schoffstall's new work restriction. The nurse recommended that Schoffstall not be permitted to work unless her restrictions could be accommodated. In accordance with this recommendation, Morton prohibited Schoffstall from working for approximately three days so the nurse could clarify with Ray the additional work restriction. Schoffstall was given administrative leave for the time missed.

Morton also removed Schoffstall from the desired overtime list because according to Morton, her work was restricted to eight hours a day, forty hours a week. Schoffstall filed a union grievance on September 27, 1995 to contest her removal from the overtime list. During the grievance process, Morton admitted error, and Schoffstall's name was returned to the list. She received $400 in settlement.

Schoffstall officially filed an EEOC complaint against Morton on October 8, 1995. The next February, Morton requested that Schoffstall and a male employee update their light-duty documentation by 5:00 p.m. on February 21, 1996. Both Schoffstall and the male employee turned their requests in late, and both were prohibited from working their next scheduled shift. Schoffstall took eight hours of sick leave for the time missed.

In April 1998, Schoffstall sued the USPS. Although her claims are difficult to decipher and interspersed with allegations of extreme emotional distress, they apparently boil down to sex discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment.

As part of discovery, the USPS requested that Schoffstall provide signed medical releases for any doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, and counselors she had seen since 1970. When USPS's counsel had not received the releases by February 5, 1999, he sent a letter to Schoffstall's counsel requesting the releases. Hearing nothing in response, he followed up with an additional letter on February 11, 1999.

On March 3, 1999, Schoffstall sent the releases to the USPS, but she limited the scope of those for Alison Krumm, a counselor with the Spirit of Life Church (SLC) and for Val Wangler, a counselor with Archway Mental Health Services (AMHS). Finding the limitations unacceptable, USPS's counsel asked Schoffstall to reexecute the releases as requested. Schoffstall did not respond.

On April 26, 1999, the USPS filed a motion to compel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Schoffstall filed a cross-motion for protective relief to preclude the USPS from discovering certain information from Krumm and Wangler. On May 14, 1999, the district court granted USPS's motion, and denied Schoffstall's cross-motion. Pursuant to the district court's order, USPS sent another letter requesting the releases. Schoffstall moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied on June 6, 1999. Schoffstall signed the releases during a June 22, 1999 discovery conference.

Counsel for the USPS sent the releases to the SLC and to AMHS. In response, he received a letter from the SLC's lawyer, refusing to provide the requested information based on recent instructions from Schoffstall. A similar letter from AMHS's attorney followed.

On July 21, 1999, USPS's counsel sent Schoffstall's counsel a letter informing her that unless Schoffstall withdrew her instructions to the SLC and AMHS by July 26, 1999, he would move to dismiss her claims based on her willful failure to comply with the court's order. When Schoffstall did not respond, the USPS moved for discovery sanctions. The district court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice Schoffstall's first, sixth, and eighth claims for relief, all claims that essentially alleged emotional distress. The USPS also moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on the remaining claims. Schoffstall's motion for reconsideration was denied.

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of Protective Relief

Schoffstall first appeals the district court's denial of her motion for protective relief. She argues that the district court erred because the USPS's discovery request was made merely to annoy, embarrass and harass her; her medical records would not be kept confidential; and the request sought privileged information.

We review the district court's discovery decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Williams v. Mensey, 785 F.2d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 1986); Sylla-Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 47 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1995). "Our review is very deferential, and generally we will not interfere with the great latitude exercised by the district court in discovery matters." Sylla-Sawdon, 47 F.3d at 280.

Parties may discover any relevant, unprivileged information that is admissible at trial or is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However, the court may issue a protective order to prevent discovery where "justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

Schoffstall first argues that the USPS's discovery requests were intended to harass, embarrass or annoy her. We cannot agree. Schoffstall failed to present any evidence that the USPS requests were made in this vein. Further, her claims against the USPS placed her medical condition at issue, making the information sought by the USPS relevant, and absent a showing of bad faith, discoverable.

Schoffstall also contends that protective relief should have been ordered because the information would not be kept confidential. She alleges that Morton disclosed to her co-workers information regarding her medical record and deposition statements. The district court may in appropriate cases seal documents or deposition testimony to ensure that they will be used only for judicial purposes and will not be disseminated. See id. We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by declining to seal this information and by denying protective relief.

Lastly, Schoffstall claims the information sought from Krumm and Wangler is protected from discovery by psychotherapist-patient privilege. The USPS counters that the information is discoverable because Schoffstall has placed her medical condition at issue. The Supreme Court has recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal question cases, see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996), but has not addressed whether the privilege is waived by a plaintiff who places his or her medical condition at issue. Numerous courts since Jaffee have concluded that, similar to attorney-client privilege that can be waived when the client places the attorney's representation at issue, a plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing his or her medical condition at issue. See Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 346, 349-50 (C.D. Ill. 1997); EEOC v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 225 (D. N.J. 2000); but see Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 225-30 (D. Mass. 1997) (declining to find waiver where plaintiff sought emotional distress damages). Finding these cases persuasive, we agree that by placing her medical...