Smith v. Muccino, 3:98CV324(JBA).

• Decision Date: 25 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 3:98CV324(JBA).,3:98CV324(JBA).
• Citation: 223 F.Supp.2d 396
• Parties: Stephen SMITH v. Captain MUCCINO et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

223 F.Supp.2d 396

Stephen SMITH v. Captain MUCCINO et al.

No. 3:98CV324(JBA).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

September 25, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steven L. Smith, Suffield, CT, pro se.

Madeline Ann Melchionne, Atty. General's Office, Hartford, CT, Antoria D. Howard, Atty. General's Office, Hartford, CT, for defendants.

Ruling on Motion to Reopen [Doc. # 35]

ARTERTON, District Judge.

This case was closed when the plaintiff failed to respond to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set out below, the motion to reopen this case is granted.

I. Background

Steven Smith, an inmate in the Connecticut correctional system, filed this lawsuit in February 1998, asserting several claims against correctional officers and officials of the Department of Corrections. While Smith makes numerous assertions regarding the disciplinary process in the Department of Corrections, the gist of his complaints appears to relate to defendants' alleged practice of housing him with violent inmates, sometimes in retaliation for his complaints and other times out of convenience to the DOC. Specifically, Smith, who is Caucasian and who believes he is perceived to be gay, alleges that he is repeatedly housed with racist and homophobic inmates, and that defendants consistently refuse his requests for a cell change. E.g., Compl. Page 2, ¶ 7¹; Compl. Page 3.

Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. # 13] on May 18, 1999, asserting that: (1) claims for money damages against defendants in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity; (2) defendants are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity; (3) the allegations in the complaint fail to state a cause of action; (4) certain of plaintiff's claims relief are precluded by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), collateral estoppel and res judicata; and (5) plaintiff's claims against certain supervisory DOC officials, such as Commissioner Armstrong, failed to allege the requisite personal involvement in the alleged deprivations at issue.

In response to defendants' motion, Smith filed a "Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Deny Summary Judgment / And Motion to Deny Summary Judgment" [Doc. # 19], in which he listed two cases, U.S. v. Lara and Jensen v. Clarke (no citations were provided),² and argued, inter alia, that "[a]lthough the plaintiff has no choice of cellmate, the state does have an obligation to make cell assignments that consider an inmate['s] risk factors or is it o.k. to place a predatory inmate in with a vulnerable one to be repeatedly raped?" [Doc. # 19] at 2 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff further argued:

The plaintiff asserts that he made complaints at Osborn CI when he heard a white officer threaten a black inmate. In retaliation for those complaints I received several violent, racists blacks — all hateful towards gays. I made it known to prison officials but I was told "No moves of convenience." Apparently prison officials believe that gays need to be double celled with the most homophobic inmates available. I ask the Court to review [Lara]. My time is significantly harder because 90% of the inmates DO NOT WANT a homosexual that's known in their cell.

* * * * * *

If X says if you put a white guy in my cell — I will kill him — I would hope the Court agrees, that if officials still put X in with a white inmate — that constitutes deliberate indifference. I assert the inmates I was double celled with all had long histories of being violent racists. I assert I was double celled with them out of retaliation for the complaints.

Id. at 3-4 (emphasis in original).

Before a ruling was issued on defendants' motion, the case was reported settled, see Notice to Counsel [Doc. # 23], and the Court denied the pending motion as moot. [Doc. # 25]. After judgment of dismissal entered [Doc. # 26], Smith moved to re-open [Doc. # 27], because the reported settlement was never consummated. The Court granted Smith's motion, see [Doc. # 28], but Smith apparently never received notice of this ruling or of any proceedings subsequent to that order, as a result of his transfer to an out-of-state prison. Smith states as much in his current motion to reopen, and the defendants' opposition to the motion to re-open shows that Smith was transferred out of Connecticut on March 30, 2000, returned briefly in late 2000, and was again transferred out of Connecticut until May 8, 2001.

After the case was re-opened, defendants again moved for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. # 30], advancing arguments identical to those raised in their previous motion. Defendants' second 12(c) motion was filed May 16, 2000, and on June 21, 2000, as a matter of routine, the Court issued an "Order of Notice to Pro Se Litigant" [Doc. # 32] advising Smith that if he failed to respond to the motion, it would be granted. Id. at 1 ("Accordingly, if Mr. Smith fails to file any opposition within twenty (20) days of the date of this notice, or by July 11, 2000, the defendants' motion shall be granted.") (emphasis deleted; citation omitted). No opposition was filed, and the Court granted the motion based solely on Smith's failure to respond. See Ruling on Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 33]. Judgment entered on August 17, 2000. See Judgment [Doc. # 34].³

Approximately one year later, Smith filed a "Motion to Re-Open" [Doc. # 35].⁴ In this motion, he refers to the unrealized October 1999 settlement and his subsequent motion to reopen, but to no proceedings after that point. Smith writes:

On or about 10-21-99 a telephonic settlement was reached. In good faith plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss due to the settlement. Several months later Asst. Atty. Gen. Victoria Howard sent a letter reneging on the deal. Plaintiff filed to reopen on 5-3-00. However, plaintiff was transferred into federal custody and held 6 mos. at M.C.C. in Manhattan. Plaintiff received no mail for the court regarding this action. Upon return to CT DOC plaintiff was again transferred out of state to Mass. Again no mail was received. Plaintiff returned in May 2001 but has been in R.H.U. and Northern for several months.

The plaintiff acted in good faith, accepting the settlement offer made. The defendants reneged. Such tactics should be penalized.

Therefore the plaintiff requests the Honorable Court to order this action be reopened.

[Doc. # 35].

II. Analysis

Smith's motion to reopen was made after a final judgment was entered in the case, and is thus governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), which provides in pertinent part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment ... for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ...; (3) fraud[,] misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

"A motion under Rule 60(b) ... is addressed to the sound discretion of the court that entered the judgment, and a determination of such a motion will not be disturbed upon appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of the judicial power." Parker v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 289 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.1961); accord Altman v. Connally, 456 F.2d 1114, 1116 (2d Cir.1972). While "the determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission," Carcello v. TJX Cos., Inc., 192 F.R.D. 61 (D.Conn.2000) (internal quotations omitted), the discretion of the Court is not limitless. See Canfield v. Van Atta Buick/GMC Truck, 127 F.3d 248, 251 (2d Cir.1997) (a party claiming excusable neglect for failure to read and obey an unambiguous rule will ordinarily lose); Greater Baton Rouge Golf Assoc. v. Recreation & Park Com., 507 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir.1975) (district court abused its discretion when it denied Rule 60(b) motion when case had been dismissed for counsel's 28 minute tardiness for start of hearing).

The Court concludes that while Smith is foreclosed from seeking relief on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any misconduct of the state in the settlement proceedings given that more than one year elapsed between the entry of judgment and Smith's motion to reopen,⁵ the residual provision of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) ("any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment") is appropriately invoked in this case. "This catch-all clause in Rule 60 gives the district court a `grand reservoir [of] equitable power to do justice in a particular case.'" Radack v. Norwegian America Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir.1963) (quoting 7 Moore, Federal Practice (1950 ed.) at 308 and citing Pierre v. Bernuth, Lembcke Co., 20 F.R.D. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y.1956)); accord Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-615, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949) (plurality opinion) ("In simple English, the language of the `other reason' clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice."); Matter of Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir.1981) (court's discretion "is especially broad under subdivision (6), because relief under it is to be granted when appropriate to accomplish justice") (citations and quotations omitted).

The Court concludes that the circumstances of this case are such that an exercise of the Court's power under Rule 60(b)(6) is warranted, because the Court incorrectly granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings without assessing the sufficiency of defendants'...