Johnson v. Martin, Case No. 2:00-CV-75.

• Citation: 223 F.Supp.2d 820
• Decision Date: 26 September 2002
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:01-CV-515.,Case No. 2:00-CV-75.
• Parties: Fingal JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Bill MARTIN, et al, Defendants. Michael Jenkins, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bill Martin, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

223 F.Supp.2d 820 Fingal JOHNSON, Plaintiff,
v.
Bill MARTIN, et al, Defendants.
Michael Jenkins, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Bill Martin, et al., Defendants. Case No. 2:00-CV-75. Case No. 1:01-CV-515. United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division. September 26, 2002.

Page 821

Fingal Johnson, Ionia, MI, Michael J. Steinberg, Detroit, MI, Daniel E. Manville, Ferndale, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Linda M. Olivieri, Christine M. Campbell, John L. Thurber, Patrick J. Wright, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.

Page 822

Kevin J. Hasson, Washington, DC, Eddie Lee Thompson, Marenisco, MI, for Movants.

Charles R. Gross, Grand Rapids, MI, for Intervenors.

OPINION

ENSLEN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Objections to Magistrate Judge Greeley's Report and Recommendation of April 16, 2002. Magistrate Judge Greeley has recommended denial of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Defendants' moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1,¹ is unconstitutional, as applied to institutionalized persons, under the First Amendment Establishment Clause and the Tenth Amendment, and is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Spending Power and Commerce Power.² The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and the United States have intervened and filed briefs in support of RLUIPA's constitutionality. On September 21, 2001, Magistrate Judge Greeley consolidated two previously filed suits into the present lawsuit. The case was certified as a class action limited to injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2)³ on April 29, 2002.⁴ (Dkt. No. 146).

I. Background

Plaintiffs are the Melanic Islamic Palace of the Rising Sun, a non-profit religious

Page 823

corporation recognized in the State of Michigan; its President, Michael Jenkins; and prisoners Fingal Johnson, Vernon Pressley, Lacey J. Fondren and Morris Martin. Plaintiffs name as Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") Director Bill Martin, MDOC Security Threat Group Coordinator Robert Mulvaney, and MDOC Deputy Director Dan Bolden. MDOC recognized Melanic Islamic Palace of the Rising Sun ("Melanic") as an official religion in 1983 pursuant to a consent decree. Islamic Palace of the Rising Sun v. MDOC, No. 82-72083 (E.D.Mich.1983). However, in January 2000 MDOC classified Melanic and its prisoner members as a security threat group. MDOC required members of Melanic to renounce their membership or face a higher security classification. MDOC also banned all Melanic materials from entering the prison.

Plaintiffs generally allege that the actions taken by Defendants violate their rights under the Due Process Clause, their First Amendment rights of freedom of religious worship, association and expression, their rights to be treated equally with other religious groups under the Equal Protection Clause, and their rights under RLUIPA. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated RLUIPA by banning the practice of Melanic religion throughout MDOC, by requiring members to renounce their association with Melanic, by confiscating Melanic materials and requiring members to dispose of Melanic literature, and by refusing to accept delivery of Melanic materials. Plaintiffs regard Defendants' treatment of the group as a dangerous and violent group as factually unwarranted and the treatment of security threat group members as inappropriate.

II. Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), a magistrate judge's report that is case-dispositive and/or concerns prisoner litigation shall be reviewed de novo by the district court, and the court may accept, reject, or modify the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); L. Civ. R. 72.3(b).

Review of a motion for summary judgment requires the Court to determine if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is the function of the Court to decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The question is "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving party] on the evidence presented." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The facts are to be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and "... all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Schaffer v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 74 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (other citations omitted).

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that RLUIPA is unconstitutional on four grounds: (1) it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; (2) Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the statute; (3) Congress exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause in enacting the statute; and (4) it violates the Tenth Amendment. The Court will review each argument in turn.

A. RLUIPA Violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment

RLUIPA states:

Page 824

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person —

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Defendants argue that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause because it enhances the rights of religious groups over those of secular groups by subjecting regulation of religious activity in prison to strict scrutiny. The Establishment Clause provides "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...." U.S. Const. Amend. I. Defendants fail to acknowledge that Congress has the authority to legislate in any way and in any area constitutionally permissible. Therefore, although in prior Supreme Court decisions the Court has applied a rational basis review to prison regulation affecting inmates' constitutional rights,⁵ Congress may legislatively overturn such Supreme Court decisions and impose a higher standard of review. Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir.1995); Allah v. Menei, 844 F.Supp. 1056, 1062 (E.D.Pa. 1994). Congress has done just that with RLUIPA.

The real question then is whether RLUIPA, separate from the standard of review it establishes, violates the Establishment Clause.

To satisfy the Establishment Clause, a statute:

(1) must have a secular purpose;

(2) its primary effect must be neither to advance nor to inhibit religion; and

(3) it must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). As elucidated below, RLUIPA meets all three criteria.

1. Secular Purpose

Defendants argue that RLUIPA has a religious purpose because it affords religious groups greater protection from interference by prison officials than any secular group commands. However, Defendants misinterpret the purpose of RLUIPA. The clear language of RLUIPA indicates it is intended to protect the free exercise of religion from unnecessary governmental interference, not to favor religious activity over secular activity. As the statute states, "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). (emphasis added). A reasonable observer would understand this language to indicate government endorsement of the free exercise of religion and not of a particular religion or even of religion in general. See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that reaction of reasonable observer is relevant to decision on Establishment Clause challenge). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to uphold a law that exempted religious organizations from registration requirements on the ground that the statute did not "evidence governmental advancement of religion merely because special consideration is given to religious groups." Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons.

Page 825

Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474, 1483 (6th Cir.1995). In light of that decision, this Court would be hard pressed to find an even more generally applicable statute to have a religious purpose.

Merely addressing religion in the subject matter of a statute does not mean the statute necessarily has a religious purpose. The Supreme Court concluded that to serve a "secular purpose," a law does not have to be unrelated to religion. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987). Rather, the Court held that because the purpose of the statute at issue was to keep the government from "abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters," it had a secular purpose. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (upholding § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 thereby allowing the Mormon Church to terminate employment on the basis of religion). While RLUIPA mandates accommodation of religious practice, the purpose of the statute is not to favor or disfavor religion. The purpose of the statute is to insure that the government does neither, but rather adopts a neutral position with respect to religion. Government should not burden the practice of religion nor should it champion religion. RLUIPA helps to realize this stance.

RLUIPA addresses religion and religious practice in an effort to accommodate both. In Amos, the Supreme Court determined, "it...