Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-5234.,99-5234.
• Citation: 224 F.3d 840
• Parties: Ella WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

224 F.3d 840

Ella WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-5234.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued February 1, 2000.

Decided and Filed August 29, 2000.

Rehearing and Rehearing Denied October 12, 2000.

Rehearing Denied October 26, 2000.

Leslie Rosenbaum (argued and briefed), Rosenbaum & Rosenbaum, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Savarise (argued and briefed), Katherine Ann Hessenbruch (briefed), Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, Louisville, Kentucky, John A. West (briefed), Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: MERRITT, BOGGS, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied October 12, 2000.

MERRITT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MOORE, J., joined. BOGGS, J., delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

AMENDED OPINION

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

In this case under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., plaintiff Ella Williams was transferred by the defendant auto manufacturer to the paint inspection section of the defendant's quality control operation in its Kentucky assembly plant because the manual tasks Williams had been performing on the assembly line using pneumatic tools had caused her to develop carpal tunnel syndrome and tendinitis in her hands and arms. Williams then spent approximately three years inspecting cars on the assembly line for defective paint and manually wiping down each newly painted car as it passed on the conveyor. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we must when the district court has granted summary judgment for the defendant-employer, Williams' job duties were then expanded to include another job in the paint inspection section requiring her to grip a block of wood with a sponge attached to the end and wipe down the passing cars with a highlight oil at the rate of approximately one car per minute. In addition to gripping the block of wood, this new work required Williams to keep her hands and arms up around shoulder height repetitively over several hours. Her ligament and muscle problems reappeared in a more severe form as a result of the new job, with tendinitis now in her shoulders and neck as well. As a result, Williams asked her employer to assign her back to her former jobs within the paint inspection section. The employer refused according to Williams, but the employer disputes this fact. The central question in this case is whether the employer violated the ADA by refusing to accommodate Williams by allowing her to return to her former, less strenuous work within paint inspection. The district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff primarily on the ground that she does not have a "disability," as defined in the Act, and therefore is not covered by the Act. The key issue before us is simply whether plaintiff's physical difficulties in using her hands, arms and shoulders, as required by her new job within paint inspection, constitute a "disability." In other words, should Williams' inability to perform certain manual tasks bring her within the coverage of the Act. Williams also claims that the defendant violated the ADA by terminating her due to her disability. The district court found that Williams failed to make a prima facie case with respect to her wrongful termination claim, because Williams was completely restricted from doing any kind of work at the time of her termination and therefore could not be a qualified individual under the ADA.

The ADA is unclear as to when it should be applied to protect an employee, as the Supreme Court recently suggested in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). The Act provides that the employer may not "discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability . . . in regard to . . . hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employees compensation, job training, and other terms . . . of employment." § 12112(a). The phrase "qualified individual with a disability" is defined as a person "with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." § 12111(8). In the crucial section in the litigation before us, the Act defines the word "disability" as follows:

(A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) A record of such impairment; or

(C) Being regarded as having such an impairment.

§ 12102(2) (emphasis added).

The EEOC in its regulations interpreting the ADA and the Supreme Court in Sutton have said that the language in the definition of disability that the impairment in question must "substantially limit one or more of the major life activities" requires for the major life activity of "working" that the individual be unable to perform a class or broad range of jobs. The analysis must be class based. "One must be precluded from more than one type of job," i.e., "a substantial class of jobs." Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2151. The plaintiff here asserts primarily that her impairments disable her from performing manual tasks,¹ a different disability from "working," the disability at issue in the Sutton case. It would appear, nevertheless from the language of the Act, the EEOC's interpretation and the Supreme Court's analysis in Sutton that in order to be disabled the plaintiff must show that her manual disability involves a "class" of manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.

In this case, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that the plaintiff's set of impairments to her arms, shoulders and neck are sufficiently disabling to allow the factfinder to find she crosses the threshold into the protected class of individuals under the ADA who must be accorded reasonable accommodation. Her ailments are analogous to having missing, damaged or deformed limbs that prevent her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual assembly line jobs, manual product handling jobs and manual building trade jobs (painting, plumbing, roofing, etc.) that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time.

The fact that Williams can perform a range of isolated, non-repetitive manual tasks performed over a short period of time, such as tending to her personal hygiene or carrying out personal or household chores, does not effect a determination that her impairment substantially limits her ability to perform the range of manual tasks associated with an assembly line job. In addition, looking at all of the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, the duration of Williams' impairment, as well as the expected permanent impact of it, are inferrable from the permanent work restrictions prescribed by Williams' treating physicians. As a result, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Williams was substantially limited as to a major life activity and that the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant was inappropriate.

Because we conclude that Williams is substantially limited in performing manual tasks, we do not need to determine whether Williams is substantially limited as to the major life activities of lifting or working. Moreover, as to the major life activity of working, the case of McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.1997), is distinguishable from the case at hand. McKay was decided before the Supreme Court recognized in Sutton that "there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining `major life activities' to include work, for it seems to argue in a circle to say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of an impairment, from working with others ... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap." 119 S.Ct. at 2151 (internal citation omitted). The Sutton Court further noted that "even the EEOC has expressed a reluctance to ... include working and has suggested that working be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last resort, only `if an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity.'" Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)) (emphasis in original).

In this case, the plaintiff's claim is not based solely on the difficult concept that she is disabled as to work generally, but rather, includes the rather simple concept that she is disabled as to performing manual tasks because she suffers from a severe impairment to her limbs, shoulders and neck that seriously reduces her ability to perform the manual tasks that are job-related. Ultimately, McKay is distinguishable from this case for the same reason that Sutton is, in that these cases only turned on the "difficult concept" of working which is viewed as a "last resort." The concept of "manual tasks" requires a disability analysis to come before the life activity of working is considered and includes looking at a person's ability to use their limbs in a way called for by a broad range or class of manual activities that, as in this case, require the gripping of tools and arms to be kept overhead or at shoulder level repetitively for an extended period of time. Here, the impairments of limbs are sufficiently severe to be like deformed limbs and such activities affect manual tasks associated with working, as well as manual tasks associated with recreation, household chores and living generally. The notion of "class" advocated by the Sutton Court can be based on a more limited concept than "working," and can be based on limits on manual activities which can affect other major life...