People v. Milton

• Citation: 393 Mich. 234,224 N.W.2d 266
• Decision Date: 19 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 20,20
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edgar MILTON, Defendant-Appellant. 393 Mich. 234, 224 N.W.2d 266
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 266

224 N.W.2d 266

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edgar MILTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20.

393 Mich. 234, 224 N.W.2d 266

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 19, 1974.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., John A. Wilson, Keith D. Roberts, Asst. Attys. Gen., Crim. Div., Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.

State Appellate Defender Office by Larry R. Farmer (P--13301), Deputy Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant; Kathleen Cummins, Kenneth Lerner, Research Assts.

Before the Entire Bench (Except FITZGERALD, J.).

LEVIN, Justice.

Edgar Milton appealed his conviction of second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unreported memorandum opinion, but did not discuss the issues now presented which were subsequently raised by a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus which we breated as a motion for reconsideration of a previous denial of deave and granted.

Following his arrest, Milton was bound over by a district court to circuit court for trial. He asserts that 1968 P.A. 154, creating the district court and providing whatever jurisdiction it may have to bind over felons, violates Const.1963, art. 4, § 24, the title-body clause:

'No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.'

and that this unconstitutionality and resulting lack of jurisdiction renders void the criminal prosecution against him.

We hold that the district court act does not violate the title-body clause and affirm Milton's conviction.

I

The Revised Judicature Act, 1961 P.A. 236, ¹ superseded the Judicature Act enacted in 1915. The RJA, as did the 1915 Judicature Act, contains provisions concerning the organization and powers of the Supreme Court and, in a separate chapter, of the circuit court. A chapter concerning the organization and powers of the Court of Appeals was added in 1964. The RJA also contains chapters concerning proceedings and procedures in the courts and at least one chapter concerning an extra-judicial procedure. ²

In 1968 the Legislature added Chapters 81--86 and other sections to the RJA thereby establishing the district court and providing for its jurisdiction and powers. In addition to civil jurisdiction in cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed $3,000, ³ the act confers criminal jurisdiction to try certain misdemeanors and to hold preliminary examinations in felony cases. ⁴

Milton contends that the title of the RJA and its statutory scheme evidence an intent that its provisions pertain only to civil matters. He asserts that statutory provisions defining criminal jurisdiction belong in the Code of Criminal Procedure. ⁵ He asks us to hold that the 1968 act creating the district court is defective insofar as it purports to vest criminal jurisdiction in that court because criminal jurisdiction is not germane to the RJA and statutory provisions defining criminal jurisdiction should be set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Read literally, the subject matter of the 1968 addition (district court act) to the RJA, placed alongside the title of that act, does not violate the title-body clause. While the entitlement of the RJA does refer to the 'forms and attributes of Civil claims and actions; the time within which Civil actions and proceedings may be brought in said courts; pleading, evidence, practice and procedures in Civil actions and proceedings in said courts' (emphasis supplied), these clauses follow the opening language of the title: 'AN ACT to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the courts of this state; the powers and duties of such courts, and of the judges and other officers thereof.' The words 'organization and jurisdiction' and the words 'powers and duties' are not qualified by the word 'civil'. The literal meaning of those words manifestly is sufficiently broad to include criminal as well as civil jurisdiction, powers and duties.

Milton responds that the title of the RJA must be read in conjunction with the title of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that when so read '(i)t can only be concluded that each act seeks to define the jurisdiction of courts in their respective spheres; that is, that the Revised Judicature Act defines the jurisdiction of civil courts while the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the jurisdiction of criminal courts. ⁶ * * * The Revised Judicature Act title speaks Generally of jurisdiction, but then proceeds to catalogue purely civil procedure' while 'the title to the Code is much more specific.' (Emphasis in original.)

II

Milton's contentions find support in People v. Stanley, 344 Mich. 530, 75 N.W.2d 39 (1956) in which this Court ruled violative of the title-body clause an amendment to the 1915 Judicature Act providing that a writ of error to the Supreme Court shall issue as a matter of course following final judgment in a criminal case involving the personal liberty of the appellant. The title of the 1915 Judicature Act and of the RJA are in all material respects identical. ⁷

In reaching its conclusion, the Stanley Court reasoned, much as does appellant Milton:

'The title of the Judicature Act negatives a conclusion that it was intended by the legislature to apply to procedure in criminal cases. The later enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, without making reference to the Judicature Act, shows the legislative intent. These 2 acts were obviously intended by the legislature to apply to the practice and procedure in civil cases separate from that in criminal cases. A mere reading and comparison of the titles of the Judicature Act and of the Code of Criminal Procedure can lead to only one conclusion--one was intended by the legislature to refer to practice and procedure in civil cases, and the other to criminal procedure.' People v. Stanley, Supra, 540, 75 N.W.2d 44.

In support of its reasoning, the Supreme Court referred to the three clauses in the title, previously quoted, where the word 'civil' appears, ⁸ adding: 'Nowhere does the title of the act, nor the provisions in the act itself, expressly apply to appeals in criminal cases. To the contrary, the legislature, as before indicated, subsequently enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure, applying specially and solely to that subject.' People v. Stanley, Supra, 539, 75 N.W.2d 43.

The Stanley Court nowhere acknowledged or otherwise adverted to the opening clauses of the title of the 1915 Judicature Act, the clauses not qualified by the word 'civil'.

The Attorney General, emphasizing the opening clauses of the RJA's title, argues that Stanley voids only RJA provisions concerning criminal Procedure and not those pertaining to criminal Jurisdiction. Milton responds that the proffered jurisdiction-procedure dichotomy is 'facile,' 'illusory,' 'transparent' and 'intellectually dishonest.'

We agree with Milton that the distinction between jurisdiction and procedure would not be a sound basis of reconciling our conclusion that the inclusion of criminal jurisdiction provisions in the RJA does not violate the title-body clause, with Stanley's conclusion that the inclusion of an appeal as of right in criminal cases violated the Judicature Act, both acts bearing the same title.

We are of the opinion that the Stanley analysis is incorrect in considering the entitlement of another act (the Code of Criminal Procedure) in deciding whether the subject matter of the challenged act (the 1915 Judicature Act) was within and germane to the object expressed in its title.

When passing new legislation, the Legislature is free either to enact an entirely new and independent act or amend Any act to which the subject of the new legislation is 'germane, auxiliary or incidental.' ⁹

Not infrequently there will be a number of existing acts to which the new legislation would be germane, auxiliary or incidental. The legislative choice will not be held invalid merely because an alternative location for the new legislation might appear to some more appropriate.

In Detroit Board of Street Railway Commissioners v. Wayne County, 18 Mich.App. 614, 622--623, 171 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1969), the Court of Appeals rejected a claim of the DSR that a statutory provision imposing liability for Ad valorem taxes on public transportation facilities acquired by home rule cities violated the title-body clause because the amendment to the Home Rule Act imposing the liability should properly have been located in the property tax law:

'It might have been better draftsmanship to have placed the provision concerning the taxability of municipal transportation utilities in the general property tax law (where one might expect to find it) rather than in the home rule act. There is, however, no constitutional requirement that the legislature do a tidy job in legislating. It is perfectly free to enact bits and pieces of legislation in separate acts or to tack them on to existing statutes even though some persons might think that the bits and pieces belong in a particular general statute covering the matter. The constitutional requirement is satisfied if the bits and pieces so enacted are embraced in the object expressed in the title of the amendatory act and the act being amended.' ¹⁰

No purpose would be served by perpetuating the Stanley analysis. The constitutional validity of an amendatory statute does not turn on an appraisal of whether it was located in the most appropriate of the possibly many statutes to which it is germane.

Nor does Stanley stand up when analyzed in the light of the facts as they were when the Judicature Act was enacted. In 1915 there was no codification of criminal procedure. The legislation on criminal procedure, while compiled as Part Two of Title XV of the Compiled Laws of 1915, was not a codification, but rather consisted of provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1846 interspersed with numerous subsequent enactments. When the 1915 Judicature Act was adopted, the...