Hester v. BIC Corp.

• Citation: 225 F.3d 178
• Decision Date: 01 August 1999
• Docket Number: Docket No. 98-9465
• Parties: (2nd Cir. 2000) ANNIE HESTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BIC CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 178

225 F.3d 178 (2nd Cir. 2000)

ANNIE HESTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BIC CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 98-9465

August Term, 1999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Argued: August, 1999

Decided: September 14, 2000

Plaintiff-Appellant BIC appeals from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Squatrito, J.) denying BIC's motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.

Reversed and Remanded.

MICHAEL DELIKAT, New York, N.Y. (John D. Giansello, Rene Kathawala, Orick Herrington & Sutcliff LLP on the brief) for Defendants-Appellant.

STEPHEN J. HYMAN, New York, N.Y. (Janet C. Neschis, Deanna R. Waldron, Leavy Rosenweig & Hyman, New York, N.Y., on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: NEWMAN, JACOBS, CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges.

JACOBS, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellee Annie Hester prevailed in a jury trial on her claims that her employer, BIC Corporation ("BIC"), discriminated against her on the basis of race and retaliated against her in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant-appellant BIC appeals from the final judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Squatrito, J.) on the grounds, inter alia, that the court erred by (i) permitting co-workers to offer lay opinions that the nastiness of Harris's supervisor was racially motivated, and (ii) refusing to charge the jury on what it contends were disputed components of Hester's prima facie case. We agree with BIC that evidentiary errors justify a new trial under the circumstances, but (taken as a whole) we find no error in the court's jury instruction.

BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Facts

BIC hired Hester in 1986 as an order-processing clerk in its Order Processing Department (the "OPD"). Hester, who is African-American, worked in that position until January 1993, when the OPD was merged with BIC's Customer Service Department into a unified Customer Service Department (the "CSD"). The manager and coordinator of the newly merged CSD was Rick McEttrick, who was assisted by Marilou Beck. McEttrick and Beck were in turn supported by two Customer Service Group Leaders, one for the Office Products ("OP") area and another for the Over-the-Counter ("OTC") area, who were responsible for maintaining price files, implementing new systems, handling customer calls for large accounts, and generally coordinating the Group administration.

Some employees in the merged unit resented Beck's perceived favoritism toward workers who had worked in the old CSD. In September 1993, there was an opening for a Group Leader in the OP area of the CSD. Beck recommended an employee with customer service experience, but McEttrick preferred to appoint someone who had been in the defunct OPD in order to abate post-merger resentments. McEttrick personally chose Annie Hester and promoted her to the Group Leader position.

There is no dispute that Hester was qualified for the Group Leader position. She had had frequent client contact in her six years as an order-processing clerk, and her "outstanding" performance evaluations continued during her year in the merged unit. The outgoing OP Group Leader, Lynn Benson, gave Hester a handwritten list of duties and sat down with her to discuss the new job responsibilities. The first few months went well; Beck increased Hester's salary in January and September 1993.

In early 1994, however, Beck and McEttrick received a series of complaints about Hester from customer salespeople and manufacturer representatives (third parties who find customers for BIC products), including several complaints from BIC's largest clients to senior BIC managers (and relayed to McEttrick). These clients complained of various difficulties and claimed to have lost confidence in her ability to resolve issues for them, citing specific examples of Hester's failure to respond effectively to routine inquiries. In addition, Richard Seigall, BIC's district sales manager, complained about Hester to McEttrick, citing poor writing skills and repeated failures to respond promptly to requests for information.

In June 1994, McKettrick removed Hester from her Group Leader position and transferred her to another department as an EDI Representative, a position that had the same salary and security level, but entailed mainly routine data entry, with minimal supervisory responsibility.

B. Prior Proceedings

Hester filed her complaint against BIC in September 1995, alleging race discrimination in violation of the civil rights statutes. She alleged that Beck sabotaged her performance as a Group Leader by providing next to no training or professional feedback during Hester's ten months in that position. Specifically, the complaint alleged (i) that without the benefit of any support from Beck, and without the benefit of even one performance evaluation as was required by BIC's policy and procedures manual, Hester could not have known that Beck or anyone else was dissatisfied with her performance as Group Leader; (ii) that Joanne Passariti, a Caucasian female and the other group leader within the CSD, was routinely provided timely feedback and evaluations concerning her ongoing job performance; and (iii) that Beck demoted Hester and then replaced Hester in her Group Leader position with Sharon Zagata, a less qualified Caucasian female.

At trial, Hester acknowledged the rift between former OPD and CSD employees, but testified that Beck's neglect of her was solely attributable to race. Over BIC's objections, Hester's evidence consisted primarily of the testimony of co-workers that Beck neglected Hester and that this neglect, in substance, "must have been" on account of Hester's race. Also over BIC's objection, other co-workers testified regarding the factual circumstances of their own race discrimination claims against BIC. BIC adduced evidence that Hester was removed because she never fulfilled the duties of a Group Leader, not because of her race. After six days of trial, a jury awarded Hester $10,000 in compensatory damages.

BIC appeals chiefly on the grounds (i) that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to consider unsupported lay opinion testimony regarding alleged motivations behind Beck's exhibited hostility towards Hester, and (ii) that the district court erred in instructing the jury only on the ultimate issue of discrimination and not, also, on the prima facie elements of Hester's claim.

DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Error

1. Standard of Review

A district court's evidentiary rulings will be disturbed only if they are "manifestly erroneous." Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court will order a new trial if it "find[s] that the introduction of inadmissible evidence was a clear abuse of discretion and was so clearly prejudicial to the outcome of the trial that we are 'convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'" Id. (quoting Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 1992)). Prejudice is measured in light of the record as a whole.

2. Lay Opinion Testimony

The rules of evidence allow a lay witness to testify in the form of an opinion, provided such testimony "is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determinations of a fact in issue." Fed. R. Evid. 701. In this case, four witnesses testified that they observed Beck's condescension toward Hester and that, in their opinion, Beck's manner was attributable to Hester's race. Since these statements are at least peripherally based on the witnesses' own observations, BIC has elected not to challenge admissibility under Rule 701(a). See United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that Rule 701(a) codifies the "familiar requirement of first hand knowledge or observation"). The evidentiary question on appeal is whether the testimony met the helpfulness requirement of Rule 701(b).

Rule 701(b) is designed to "provide assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach." Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701 Advisory Committee Note on 1972 Proposed Rule) (emphasis added). Thus if "'attempts are made to introduce meaningless assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides, exclusion for lack of helpfulness is called for by [Rule 701(B)].'" Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215 (quoting Advisory Committee Note).

"[T]he likely benefits" of lay opinion testimony "must outweigh its costs." 29 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6255 at 2. Lay opinion testimony may be helpful even if it bears on the ultimate issue in the case, see Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) (opinion testimony on ultimate issue must be "otherwise admissible"), but "the costs of lay opinion increases and the benefits diminish the closer the opinion approaches the crucial issues in the case." Wright and Miller, at 2 (emphasis added); see also Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215 (noting that "there is no theoretical prohibition against allowing lay witnesses to give their opinions as to [the ultimate issue] in the case.") (emphasis added). This is because, even where (as Hester asserts) the opinion is accompanied by supporting facts, "the risk remains that the opinion may distract jurors from their task of drawing an independent conclusion as to an ultimate issue in the case." Id.

This Court has not decided whether, in a Title VII action, a lay witness can opine about the employer's discriminatory motivation without personal knowledge of facts that formed the basis of the employer's adverse action. In Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 911 (2d Cir. 1997), we held that Rule 701 allowed a former employee to opine at trial that age...