225 U.S. 101 (2016), Railroad Commission of Ohio v. Worthington
|Citation:||225 U.S. 101, 32 S.Ct. 653, 56 L.Ed. 1004|
|Party Name:||Railroad Commission of Ohio v. Worthington|
|Case Date:||May 27, 1912|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
AND THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO, EASTERN DIVISION AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
In cases of intervention in foreclosure suits, where jurisdiction depends upon diverse citizenship, jurisdiction of the intervening petition is determined by that of the original case, but petitions in original proceedings to enforce rights and protect the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court take their jurisdiction from that of the original case. St. Louis, K. C. & C. R. Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 217 U.S. 247.
Where the petition of the receiver, appointed in a case dependent on diverse citizenship, invokes the jurisdiction of the circuit court not only as ancillary to the receivership, but also to protect the estate on grounds involving alleged infractions of the federal Constitution and rights secured thereby, the case is not one in which the judgment of the circuit court of appeals is made final by the Act of 1891, and an appeal lies to this Court where the amount in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars
Where the case can be taken to the circuit court of appeals, the fact that it involves grounds that warrant a direct appeal to this Court does not deprive the circuit court of appeals of jurisdiction.
Under the Constitution of the United States, the national government has exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce, and any attempt by the state to regulate rates for interstate transportation is void. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27.
An order made by a state Commission under assumed authority of the state which directly burdens interstate commerce will be enjoined. McNeill v. Southern Railway Co., 202 U.S. 543.
A rate fixed on that part of interstate carriage which includes the actual placing of the shipment into vessels ready to be carried beyond the state destination is, as to merchandise intended for points beyond the state, a burden on interstate commerce, and beyond the power of the State to impose, even if the merchandise is billed from a point within the state to the point where the vessel is. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403, distinguished.
Through billing to the point beyond the state is not always necessary to determine that a shipment is interstate. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Young, 219 U.S. 498.
A rate fixed by the Ohio Railroad Commission for coal from state points to "on board" vessels at the port of Huron, Ohio, and intended for shipment to some point beyond the state undetermined at time of shipment, and, for convenience, billed to the shippers' own order at Huron, held to be a rate affecting interstate shipment, and void under the commerce clause of the Constitution as a attempt to regulate interstate commerce.
Quaere whether transportation under the circumstances of this case is such a transportation within the state or to points without the state, partly by railroad and partly by water, as to be within the jurisdiction and control of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
187 F. 965 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the Railroad Commission of the State of Ohio fixing and establishing a rate on "lake cargo coal" and whether such order was void as an attempted regulation of interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion.
DAY, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case originated in a bill filed in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, against the Railroad Commission of Ohio and
other parties, to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Commission fixing and establishing a rate of seventy cents a ton on what is called "lake cargo coal," transported from the No. 8 coal field, in eastern Ohio, to the ports of Huron and Cleveland, Ohio, [32 S.Ct. 654] on Lake Erie, for carriage thence by lake vessels. A permanent injunction was granted in the circuit court against the enforcement of the rate on the ground that it was a regulation of interstate commerce. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and that court affirmed the decree of the circuit court. 187 F. 965. From the decree of the circuit court of appeals an appeal was taken to this Court. An appeal was also prayed and allowed from the circuit court directly to this Court, being case No. 505 on the docket of this term, which is submitted with the present case. A petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decree of the circuit court of appeals has also been filed and submitted upon briefs.
The first question to be dealt with is one of jurisdiction. The question of the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals was raised and decided in that court, which held that it had jurisdiction of the case, also intimating that there were grounds of jurisdiction which might have warranted a direct appeal to this Court, and that court allowed the present appeal to this Court.
The argument that the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals is final is based upon the contention that, as Worthington, the complainant in the present case, was appointed receiver of the Wheeling & Lake Erie Railroad Company in a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, wherein jurisdiction depended upon diversity of citizenship, and since the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in an ancillary proceeding is that of the original case, therefore, under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act,
the decree of the court of appeals is final. It is undoubtedly true that, in cases of intervention in foreclosure suits, where jurisdiction depends upon diverse citizenship, jurisdiction of the intervening petition is determined by that of the original case. It is equally true that petitions in original proceedings to enforce rights and to protect the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court take their jurisdiction from that of the original case ( St. Louis, K. C. & C. R. Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 217 U.S. 247), and the many previous cases in this Court therein cited.
An examination of the bill in this case, which was filed under the authority of the circuit court, shows that the order of the Commission was attacked not only upon the ground that its findings were alleged to be unsupported by the testimony and to have been made upon improper consideration of the facts, but also because the order affected and interfered with interstate commerce, in which the complainant was engaged and over which the Railroad Commission of Ohio had no authority because of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. It further was alleged that the owners of the property constituting the receivership estate would be deprived thereof without due process of law; that they would be denied the equal protection of the laws, and that their property would be taken without compensation. It thus appears that jurisdiction was invoked not only because that the present case is ancillary to the receivership suit, which depended upon diverse citizenship, but upon grounds which involve...
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