Miccosukee Tribe v. Florida State Athl. Comm'n
Decision Date | 13 September 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-13669,99-13669 |
Citation | 226 F.3d 1226 |
Parties | (11th Cir. 2000) MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLORIDA STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION, Alvin Goodman, Florida State Athletic Commission, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 99-00347-CV-DLG), Donald L. Graham, Judge.
Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, and DUBINA and SMITH*, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff, the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida ("Tribe"), filed suit against the Florida State Athletic Commission ("Florida Commission") and several of its officials and representatives, alleging violations of the Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 6301-6313, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and federal common law. The district court dismissed the Tribe's complaint, finding that the Tribe failed to allege an injury in fact. The district court also found that the Florida Commission was entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. We hold that the Tribe fails to allege any injury as to its Equal Protection claim, but that the Tribe does allege a sufficient injury as to its tax claim. We also affirm the district court's Eleventh Amendment Immunity decision.
The Tribe is a federally-recognized Indian tribe exercising powers of self-governance. In December 1998, the Tribe established the Miccosukee Athletic Commission ("Miccosukee Commission"). The Miccosukee Commission regulates professional boxing matches held within the Miccosukee reservation. Florida has a similar entity-the Florida State Athletic Commission-to regulate professional boxing matches within Florida. Both the Miccosukee Commission and the Florida Commission license and appoint boxing officials and regulatory staff to officiate boxing matches. The Commissions employ many of the same officials.
Soon after the Tribe created the Miccosukee Commission, the Florida Commission threatened boxing officials with adverse employment action if they declined a state assignment in order to accept an assignment with the Miccosukee Commission. According to the Tribe, the Florida Commission has not similarly threatened boxing officials who accept assignments with non-Indian entities. In addition, the Florida Commission has attempted to tax boxing promoters who conduct professional boxing matches on the Miccosukee Reservation as if the matches occurred in Florida. Those taxes require, inter alia, that the promoter pay a tax on the sale of broadcasting rights and on the proceeds from a pay-per-view operator.
The Tribe argues that the district court incorrectly held that the Tribe failed to allege an injury in fact and thereby lacked Article III standing to bring this lawsuit. This court reviews de novo a district court's order dismissing a complaint for lack of Article III standing. See Florida Ass'n of Med. Equip. Dealers, Med-Health Care v. Apfel, 194 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir.1999).
In order to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). An "injury in fact [consists of] an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Thus, to satisfy the injury prong of Article III standing, a plaintiff must "present 'specific, concrete facts' showing that the challenged conduct will result in a 'demonstrable, particularized injury' to the plaintiff." Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1204 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). An allegation of an abstract injury will not suffice. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) () (citations omitted); see also E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979, 984 (11th Cir.1990) () (citations and internal quotations omitted).
With regard to the Tribe's Equal Protection claim, the district court correctly held that the Tribe's complaint fails to set forth a "particularized injury." In its complaint, the Tribe asserts that the Florida Commission acted unconstitutionally by making oral and written threats of adverse employment action against boxing officials if they declined a state boxing assignment in order to accept a Miccosukee boxing assignment. The Florida Commission, however, did not similarly threaten boxing officials who declined a state boxing assignment in order to accept an assignment from another state. The Tribe alleges that these actions "unequally and unfairly burdened the Tribe and its Commission," (Compl. at ¶ 58), and "[t]he actions of the Defendants operate to the detriment of the ... Tribe," (Compl. at ¶ 64).
The Tribe, however, does not allege how the Florida Commission's actions have burdened it or operated to its detriment. For instance, the Tribe does not allege that the Florida Commission's actions prevented the Tribe from conducting any particular boxing match. The Tribe also does not allege that the Florida Commission prevented or even hindered its ability to hire, train, or procure boxing officials from within or outside of Florida for its matches. Nor does it allege that the Florida Commission's activities will have such an effect in the future.1 Nowhere in the complaint does the Tribe identify any particularized injury resulting from the Florida Commission's alleged misconduct.2 Instead, the Tribe's complaint only sets forth abstract injuries. Cf. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167-68, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) ( ).
Even though the Tribe's complaint sets forth facts from which we could imagine an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III's standing requirements, we should not speculate concerning the existence of standing, nor should we imagine or piece together an injury sufficient to give plaintiff standing when it has demonstrated none. See Cone Corp., 921 F.2d at 1210. The plaintiff has the burden to "clearly and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy [ ] Art. III standing requirements." Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717; see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 518, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (). If the plaintiff fails to meet its burden, this court lacks the power to create jurisdiction by embellishing a deficient allegation of injury. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (). In this case, the Tribe fails to allege a "particularized injury," and thus, lacks Article III standing to bring a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the Tribe's Equal Protection claim.
We now turn to the question of whether the Tribe has standing to challenge Florida's authority to tax a non-Indian boxing promoter on revenues gained from a boxing match conducted on the Tribe's reservation.3 The district court held that the Tribe lacked standing because it failed to allege an injury. In particular, the district court noted that the Tribe did not allege that the tax on promoters hindered the Tribe's efforts to conduct boxing matches or to collect its taxes. In turn, the district court held that absent these allegations, the Tribe acted as a third party challenging the imposition of a tax on promoters. Absent exceptional circumstances, a third party does not have standing to challenge injury to another party. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197.
Even though the Tribe does not allege that the tax hindered its ability to conduct boxing matches or to collect its boxing taxes, the Tribe has a legitimate basis for standing-that the state's tax on boxing promoters infringes upon the Tribe's sovereignty. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a tribe has an interest in protecting tribal self-government from the assertion by a state that it has regulatory or taxing authority over Indians and non-Indians conducting business on tribal reservations. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980); see also Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 845, 102 S.Ct. 3394, 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982) ( ); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) ( the merits an Indian Tribe's claim that a state's...
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