Mason v. Cranor

Decision Date21 June 1955
Docket NumberNo. 14597.,14597.
Citation227 F.2d 557
PartiesBen F. MASON, Appellant, v. John R. CRANOR, Superintendent Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, Washington, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Ben F. Mason, appellant, in pro. per.

Don Eastvold, Atty. Gen., Cyrus A. Dimmick, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Washington, for appellee.

Before STEPHENS, HEALY and FEE, Circuit Judges.

JAMES ALGER FEE, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Judge held a hearing on the petition and a return and answer filed by John R. Cranor, Superintendent of the Washington State Penitentiary, through Don Eastvold, Attorney General of the State of Washington. Petitioner was not present in person, but was represented by attorneys. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered. The petition was then dismissed.

It appears from the return that: Petitioner is confined in the Washington State Penitentiary on a judgment founded on a plea of guilty to the crime of grand larceny. On June 21, 1939, he was sentenced thereon to fifteen years' imprisonment; "that this sentence has not yet expired; that the petitioner has not been granted a pardon; and he is not now entitled to a parole." These statements are not controverted. This record alone justified the dismissal of the petition.

The return also sets up commitment upon a judgment and sentence entered in the state court on March 11, 1950, after a trial of defendant and conviction by jury of four counts of first degree forgery. This sentence has not expired, and petitioner has not been pardoned and is not entitled to a parole. It would probably be unnecessary to pass upon the validity of this judgment since imprisonment is unquestionably legal under the judgment of June 21, 1939. However, the able trial judge did review this matter and has granted a certificate of probable cause, although it seems undoubtedly this was done out of conscientious scruples and not compelled by the record.

There is no doubt this judgment is valid as against any points raised in this proceeding. Besides, it has been passed upon previously.1

Petitioner complains he was arrested without a warrant before his forgery of the four checks upon which he was last convicted had as yet become known to the authorities. But he had already forfeited his liberty in the interests of society by a felony conviction of June 21, 1939. The term of imprisonment had not expired. He had been granted a parole which provided:

"This parole is granted to and accepted by the parolee subject to all its terms and conditions, and with the understanding that the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles may at any time within its discretion and without notice cause the parolee to be returned to the said institution to serve the full maximum sentence or any part thereof."

Mason had expressly agreed in writing to the conditions.

Mason was arrested by Spokane City Police, charged with disorderly conduct on January 10, 1950, and posted bail of $15.00. He forfeited bail, was taken into custody by the City Police and the state parole officer in the Spokane district, A. J. Murphy. There is a curious contention that this recapture and detention was not lawful or lacked some formality. Bail is posted for appearance. Nonappearance and forfeiture of bail do not free the defendant of the necessity of responding to the charge or of returning to custody until he answer. Since the Spokane City Police officer took part in the apprehension of petitioner and he was reconfined in the city jail, there was a complete justification for detention upon the above circumstances alone.

But in December, 1949, Mason had forged checks and cashed these at the Spokane Hotel and the Desert Hotel. Such instruments were the basis of the charges upon which he was later convicted and sentenced on the judgment now under attack. These forged documents had been in possession of the Spokane City Police almost a month before the arrest of Mason for disorderly conduct on January 10, 1950. However, these officers did not know at the time of this arrest that Mason was the forger.

However, the city police officer who went with Murphy, the parole officer, to take Mason into custody, was Lampier, who had these forged checks in his office. He did not know when he took Mason to the city jail that the latter was the forger.

Mason's objection seems to be that he was picked up without a warrant, not for the offense of disorderly conduct, but for a violation of his parole by failing to conduct himself in accordance with the conditions. But, at the time he was taken into custody, Murphy, the state parole officer "informed him that he was a violator for two reasons: One, inasmuch as he came to Spokane and got arrested for being drunk and disorderly, and the other because I had been notified that there was a check out." It is apparent from this statement that the drunk and disorderly charge upon which he had been arrested and which was still pending was linked with his recapture as a parole violator.

It would be a highly technical mind which could find a way to make the detention of Mason on January 10 appear unlawful.

Murphy had in his possession a memorandum dated October 7, 1949, from the chief parole officer, stating in effect that petitioner had violated his parole in Klickitat County and that he was to be classed as a violator as he was "wanted by the Prosecuting Attorney of Klickitat County on a check deal." This memorandum contained the direction: "If you should locate this subject, please apprehend and then notify this department immediately." This communication was on stationery headed "Board...

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2 cases
  • Talley v. Stephens, PB-65-C-33.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • November 15, 1965
    ...Roberts v. Pegelow, 4 Cir., 313 F.2d 548; Sewell v. Pegelow, 4 Cir., 291 F.2d 196; Coleman v. Johnston, 7 Cir., 247 F.2d 273; Mason v. Cranor, 9 Cir., 227 F.2d 557; Tabor v. Hardwick, 5 Cir., 224 F.2d 526; Coffin v. Reichard, 6 Cir., 143 F.2d 443, 155 A.L.R. 143. Prior exhaustion of availab......
  • Long v. Hayslip
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • November 23, 1955
1 books & journal articles
  • The Case for Attempted Perfidy: An 'Attempt' to Enhance Deterrent Value
    • United States
    • Journal of National Security Law & Policy No. 13-3, July 2023
    • July 1, 2023
    ...But the facts of the allegation against Lindh implicated neither of these exceptions. See Lindh, 212 F. Supp. at 553. 177. See Lindh, 227 F.2d at 557. 178. Id. ; see also GPW Convention, supra note 3, at art. 4(A)(2). 2023] ATTEMPTED PERFIDY 427 Lindh who bears the burden of establishing th......

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