227 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2000), 98-6308, Kentucky Assoc. Health Plans v Nichols
|Citation:||227 F.3d 352|
|Party Name:||Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc.; Advantage Care, Inc.; Aetna Health Plans of Ohio, Inc.; Choicecare Health Plans, Inc.; FHP of Ohio, Inc.; HMPK, Inc.; HPLAN, Inc.; Humana Health Plan, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. George Nichols, III, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Insurance,Defendant-Appellee.|
|Case Date:||September 07, 2000|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit|
Argued: September 20, 1999
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort. Nos. 97-00024--Joseph M. Hood, District Judge.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Barbara Reid Hartung, Greenebaum, Doll, & McDonald, Louisville, KY, Robert N. Eccles, Karen M. Wahle, O'MELVENY & MYERS, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Shaun T. Orme, Anna R. Gwinn, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.
Before: KENNEDY and NORRIS, Circuit Judges; HOLSCHUH,[*] District Judge.
HOLSCHUH, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORRIS, J., joined. KENNEDY, J. (pp. 372-84), delivered a separate dissenting opinion with respect to Part III of the majority opinion.
HOLSCHUH, District Judge.
Plaintiffs are seven health maintenance organizations (HMOs) licensed under the laws of Kentucky, and the Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc., a non-profit association organized to promote the business interest of its HMO members (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs filed this action against George Nichols III ("defendant"), in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Insurance. Plaintiffs argued that Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 304.17A-110(3) and 304.17A-171(1)-(8) (Banks-Baldwin 1995), should be found preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), and sought injunctive relief from their enforcement. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied plaintiffs' request for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding that §§ 304.17A-110(3) and 304.17A-171(2) were saved from preemption by ERISA because they "regulated insurance" under ERISA's savings clause. Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in this conclusion.
I. The State Statutes
In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the Kentucky Health Care Reform Act (the "Act"). The Act contained an "Any Willing Provider" provision that stated: "Health care benefit plans shall not discriminate against any provider who is located within the geographic coverage area of the health benefit plan and is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the health benefit plan." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.17A-110(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1995). The Act defined a health benefit plan as:
[Any] hospital or medical expense policy or certificate; nonprofit hospital, medical-surgical, and health service corporation contract or certificate; a self-insured plan or a plan provided by a multiple employer welfare arrangement, to the extent permitted by ERISA; health maintenance organization contract; and standard and supplemental health benefit plan as established in KRS 304.17A-160. § 304.17A-100(4)(a) (Banks Baldwin 1995).
In 1996, the Kentucky General Assembly added §§ 304.17A-170 and 171 to the code. The additions specifically regulate how "health benefit plans" can interact with chiropractors1. Not only does the statute contain an "any willing provider" provision addressed particularly to chiropractors,2 but it also imposes various additional requirements on health benefit plans that include chiropractic benefits3. See § 304.17A-171.
In April of 1997, plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of Kentucky, requesting that § 304.17A-110(3) and § 304.17A-171 (for convenience we will collectively refer to § 304.17A-110(3) and § 304.17A-171(2) as Kentucky's "AWP" laws) be declared, among other things, preempted by § 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issue and Commissioner Nichols cross-moved for partial summary judgment as well. The district court determined that while the Kentucky AWP laws were related to employee benefit plans under ERISA § 514(a), they regulated the business of insurance and therefore fell under the saving clause of § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The court thus granted partial summary judgment in favor of Commissioner Nichols and determined its order to be final and appealable. This appeal followed.
Sections 304.17A-110(3) and 304.17A-100(4)(a) were repealed by the Kentucky legislature effective July 1, 1999. The parties acknowledge that this appeal is not moot, however, as the legislature, through House Bill No. 315 (Ky. 1998), replaced the repealed provisions with the same requirements, but substituted the term "health insurer" for "health benefit plan" in its any willing provider provision, now located at Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated § 304.17A-270 (Banks-Baldwin 1999). The Bill's definition of "insurer" was codified at Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated § 304.17A-005(22) (Banks-Baldwin 1999), which defines "insurer" as:
[A]ny insurance company; health maintenance organization; self-insurer or multiple employer welfare arrangement not exempt from state regulation by ERISA; provider- sponsored integrated health delivery network; self-insured employer-organized association, or nonprofit hospital, medical-surgical, dental, or health service corporation authorized to transact health insurance business in Kentucky.
The parties having agreed that this appeal is not rendered moot by the new language used in the present statutes, the court will consider the AWP laws in their present form in the court's analysis of their validity, rather than adjudicating the validity of repealed statutes.
The chiropractic provisions contained in § 304.17A-171 and § 304.17A-170 were left intact by House Bill No. 315 and continue to remain unchanged.
The issue of the potential preemption of §§ 304.17A-270 and 304.17A-171(2) by ERISA is therefore properly before this court4. We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo, applying the same test as that employed by the district court. Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is proper if
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Schachner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 77 F.3d 889, 892-93 (6th Cir. 1996).
We are required by this appeal to define the boundaries of preemption under ERISA § 514 (a) and (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) and (b). Section 514(a), the preemption provision, reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (emphasis added).
Section 514(b)(2)(A), the "savings" provision, reads:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking or securities.
Section 514(b)(2)(B), the "deemer" provision, reads:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
The federal courts have addressed the scope of ERISA's preemption of State law on numerous occasions; however, the wording of the Act combined with the obvious federalism concerns involved have made it difficult to discern clear boundaries. Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have commented on the vexingly broad and ambiguous nature of the provisions.5 Despite such interpretational difficulties, we must determine whether Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 304.17A-270 and 304.17A-171(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1999) "relate to" employee benefit plans covered by ERISA. If so, then the provisions are preempted, unless they fall under ERISA's saving clause as laws regulating insurance.
ERISA is a comprehensive act designed to regulate employee welfare and pension benefit plans, including those that provide "'medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits' for plan participants or their beneficiaries 'through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.'" New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650-51, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1674, 131 L.Ed. 2d 695, 702 (1995) (discussing and quoting ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)). To assure that the regulation of employee welfare benefits would remain an area of exclusive federal concern, Congress passed § 514(a) of ERISA, the preemption provision.
The Supreme Court has specifically found that in passing § 514(a) it was Congress' intent:
to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives...
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