Brown v. Division of Water Rights
| Decision Date | 09 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 20080995.,20080995. |
| Citation | 2010 UT 14,228 P.3d 747 |
| Parties | Lawrence BROWN, Marilyn Brown, Joseph Sorenson, and Kathleen Sorenson, Plaintiffs and Petitioners, v. The DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS OF the DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES of the State of Utah; Jerry D. Olds, in his capacity as the Utah State Engineer; and James A. McIntyre, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Benson L. Hathaway, Alexander Dushku, Peter C. Schofield, Justin W. Starr, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Norman K. Johnson, Richard K. Rathbun, Julie I. Valdes, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants the Division of Water Rights and Jerry D. Olds.
James A. McIntyre, Richard R. Golden, Sarah E. Viola, Salt Lake City, for defendant James A. McIntyre.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 This case comes to us on writ of certiorari and presents important issues regarding the interaction between our substantive standing requirements and the standard of review applicable at various procedural stages of litigation. Lawrence and Marilyn Brown, together with Joseph and Kathleen Sorensen (collectively, the "Browns"), filed this action to challenge James McIntyre's construction of a bridge over a part of Little Cottonwood Creek that bisects his property. McIntyre filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, which the district court granted. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed. Because we conclude that the Browns' complaint satisfies our traditional test for standing, we reverse.
¶ 2 McIntyre owns real property in Murray, Utah, that is bisected by Little Cottonwood Creek. The Browns are the owners of adjoining property that, while not bordering the creek, sits atop the escarpment created by the creek channel. McIntyre lives on the east side of the creek and has historically accessed the western portion of his property by fording the creek. In order to enable access to the west side of his property during times of high water flow, he decided to build a bridge connecting the eastern and western portions of his property.
¶ 3 On August 21, 2006, McIntyre applied to the Division of Water Rights (the "Division") for a permit to alter a natural stream channel, with the ultimate goal of building a bridge across the creek. The Browns objected to McIntyre's application, contending that (1) the application was technically deficient, (2) the bridge would unreasonably diminish the creek's ability to conduct high water flow, and (3) the bridge would adversely impact the natural stream environment. Despite the Browns' objections, the Division approved the permit on October 11, 2006.
¶ 4 After the Division denied the Browns' request for reconsideration, the Browns petitioned the district court for judicial review of the Division's decision. The Browns combined with their petition a complaint seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent McIntyre from constructing the bridge.1 In their complaint, the Browns alleged that the bridge would "diminish the stream's ability to conduct high water flows... and thereby increase the risk and danger of flooding." The Browns further alleged that increased flooding would lead to erosion of the stream bank that would result in subsidence of the soil, damaging the structures located on their property. They also attached a privately commissioned engineering report (the "SECOR Report") in support of their allegations. This report described in detail the geological and hydrological conditions of the stream and concluded that it was "very likely" that McIntyre's bridge would result in increased erosion, which the Browns alleged would result in harm to the structures on their property.
¶ 5 McIntyre filed a motion to dismiss the Browns' complaint, arguing that (1) the Browns lacked standing as to both their administrative and injunctive claims because they had failed to allege a distinct and palpable injury, and (2) their claim for injunctive relief failed on its merits as a matter of law. While McIntyre's motion was pending before the district court, he began construction on the bridge. Upon receiving notice that McIntyre had begun construction, the Browns sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from proceeding. The district court denied the Browns' motion after an informal in camera hearing. Subsequently, on April 20, 2007, the court issued a memorandum decision granting McIntyre's motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
¶ 6 A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal, determining that the Browns had failed to allege an injury sufficient to confer standing because they had not adequately demonstrated that future harm was "imminent" or "`certainly impending.'"2 While the court acknowledged that the Browns' complaint had asserted "some actual facts suggesting that a flood or high water flows would cause harm to their property," the court found these allegations insufficient since they were "contingent on key, unknown events ... dictated by unknown weather patterns ... `that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.'"3
¶ 7 Judge Thorne dissented, arguing that while the majority panel had correctly articulated the substantive standard for standing, it had erred by failing to accept the truth of the Browns' allegations. On a motion to dismiss, Judge Thorne contended, "the only question the court should be considering... is whether the complaint alleges sufficient harm to confer standing, not whether that harm actually exists."4
¶ 8 We granted certiorari and have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).
¶ 9 When a case is before us on certiorari review, we review the decision of the court of appeals rather than the decision of the district court.5 We accord no deference to the court of appeals' decision, reviewing it de novo to determine whether the court of appeals correctly applied the appropriate standard of review to the district court's determinations.6
¶ 10 A district court should grant a motion to dismiss only when, assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.7
¶ 11 This case presents us with an opportunity to clarify both (1) the interaction between challenges to standing and the differing burdens of proof applicable at different stages of litigation, and (2) the substantive requirements for standing in cases based on allegations of future injury. We begin by discussing the appropriate standard of review for challenges to a plaintiff's standing and then set forth the requirements of our standing law in "future injury" cases. We conclude by determining whether the court of appeals correctly applied these standards in its review of the district court's decision.
¶ 12 As to federal courts, standing is a constitutional requirement, derived from Article III of the United States Constitution, which limits the judicial authority of the federal courts to "`actual cases or controversies.'"8 Although the Utah Constitution includes no similar express limitation, we have held it nevertheless mandates certain standing requirements, which emanate from the principle of separation of powers.9 Accordingly, in Utah, as in the federal system, standing is a jurisdictional requirement.10
¶ 13 Jurisdictional challenges, in contrast to challenges to the merits of a plaintiff's claims, raise fundamental questions regarding a court's basic authority over the dispute. And a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court is unique among jurisdictional challenges in that it is not only given its own procedural vehicle—rule 12(b)(1)11—but can be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.12
¶ 14 But despite the fundamental nature of standing as a jurisdictional prerequisite to adjudication, requiring a plaintiff to provide full proof of standing at the moment of challenge, regardless of the stage of litigation, risks creating premature and unduly burdensome "mini-trials" on standing at times when the precise contours of the dispute are just developing. And because issues relevant to the standing inquiry, such as the extent or likelihood of an injury and the causal link between the alleged injury and the defendant's conduct, are often bound up with the merits of the plaintiff's case, requiring that a plaintiff prove standing immediately upon challenge would impose a burden on the plaintiff inconsistent with the burden imposed regarding the merits of his claims. Faced with such a burden, plaintiffs who are not yet required to prove the merits of their claims could nevertheless have their claims dismissed for failure to prove standing prior to discovery. We have rejected this approach in the past, with regard to both standing and other jurisdictional challenges.13 We find the United States Supreme Court's analysis helpful in explaining the appropriate approach:
The party invoking ... jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements i.e., the elements of standing. Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim....
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