Thomas v. Thomas Truck & Caster Co., 2--56622

• Citation: 228 N.W.2d 52
• Decision Date: 16 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 2--56622,2--56622
• Parties: J. Faulkner THOMAS, Appellee, v. THOMAS TRUCK AND CASTER COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 52

228 N.W.2d 52

J. Faulkner THOMAS, Appellee, v. THOMAS TRUCK AND CASTER COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 2--56622.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 16, 1975.

Bell & Hansen, New London, for appellant.

Deitchler, Thomas, Lawse & Saunders, Fort Madison, for appellee.

Heard by MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

The sole issue in this case is whether the plaintiff, J. Faulkner Thomas, breached an agreement made with defendant Company and resultantly forfeited a contractual right to lifetime payments of $20,000 per year and related life insurance benefits. Trial court held there was no breach. We agree.

The facts before us are uncontroverted. Thomas, 76 years old at trial, founded the Company in 1937. In 1955 he sustained a heart attack and was thereafter only semi-active in the business. His son Walter became the managing officer. In 1963 Thomas had a stroke.

July 15, 1968, Walter, acting as his father's agent, contracted to sell the latter's majority stock interest for a large sum of money to John F. Raney. In this instrument, Walter obtained a two-year option to purchase 100 percent of the stock of Buffalo Caster and Wheel Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary.

The sales agreement provided 'in further consideration of the transfer' Thomas would be retained on the payroll,

'* * * at a consideration to be paid sufficient to assure the continued participation of Mr. J. Faulkner Thomas in and to certain life insurance policies * * * which said policies require the employment of the said J. Faulkner Thomas as a prerequisite coverage afforded under the policies, in a yearly compensation determined under the terms of the * * * contracts * * *.'

This agreement was '(s)ubject to the preparation and execution of a more detailed and formal agreement' and to 'the preparation of necessary collateral documents.'

There followed on October 28, 1968, a written 'agreement' between the Company and Thomas. Thomas agreed 'to act as advisor and consultant' to the Company for so long as he lived, and as chairman of the board of directors for so long as the Company desired. Thomas further agreed 'not to engage as consultant or otherwise to any competitor' of the Company. In consideration of the foregoing promises, the Company agreed to pay Thomas $20,000 per year for so long as he lived. This was apparently the amount required to keep in force $37,500 in coverage for Thomas under certain executive group life policies.

Pursuant to the July 15, 1968 sales agreement, Walter, the son, was retained by the Company as vice president and general manager. At some subsequent time his services were terminated. May 1, 1969 Walter exercised his option to acquire Buffalo Caster and Wheel Company, which was thereafter in direct competition with defendant Company until Buffalo went out of business in April 1972. Walter was at all times subsequent to May 1, 1969, president and principal stockholder of Buffalo.

From May 1, 1969 through April 1972, Thomas co-signed one $90,000 promissory note with Walter and made gifts and loans to him totaling $54,683.65. Thomas paid $30,000 on the $90,000 note and as surety stands liable for a $20,000 balance due on that indebtedness. Of the money advanced to his son Walter by Thomas, $30,500 was in the form of loans and the balance was a gift. Walter used most of the money so advanced in the business of Buffalo, as Thomas knew.

Thomas suffered from poor health. He was called upon only three or four times to advise or consult the Company. His testimony he had at all times held himself available for consultation was not disputed. There was no evidence he advised or consulted Buffalo or any of its officers.

The Company terminated its $1666 monthly payments to Thomas January 31, 1972. February 9, 1972 the Company sent Thomas written notice it would not make future payments, charging he had breached their agreement. Thomas filed suit for specific performance of the contract and later amended to ask for damages. Jury was waived. The cause was tried in equity.

Trial court awarded Thomas damages of $31,062.53 (unpaid installments with five percent interest) and specific performance of the contract, including maintenance of the insurance policies.

I. This matter was tried below in equity and our review is therefore De novo. Buda v. Fulton, 261 Iowa 981, 985, 157 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1968). In any event, the facts are conceded and we are confronted with the construction of a contract, a matter of law for the court. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Farmers Insurance Group v. Merryweather, 214 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1974).

II. Trial court found the second agreement constituted part of the original sales agreement and was in fact part of the consideration for the stock sale. As such, trial court found the case law dealing with covenants not to compete, ancillary to the sale of a business, more applicable than case law relating to obligations imposed upon employees to be faithful to employers.

Appealing, the Company asserts this finding was unjustified, that Thomas' conduct should be measured by the rule requiring a corporate employee to act at all times in the interest of his employer. Holden v. Construction Machinery Company, 202 N.W.2d 348, 364 (Iowa 1972) and citations. The burden is upon the employer to show disobedience, misconduct, incompetence or other justification for a valid dismissal for cause. LaFontaine v. Developers & Builders, Inc., 261 Iowa 1177, 1187, 156 N.W.2d 651, 658 (1968); see Holden v. Construction Machinery Company, supra at 364.

Thomas asserts the second agreement, properly interpreted, was a covenant not to compete given in connection with the sale of a business. He thus seeks to bring himself within the protection of a number of decisions, hereinafter cited, holding financial assistance to a competitor, standing alone, will not violate such covenants.

III. As above noted, the court must determine the actual significance and proper legal meaning of the parties' agreement. Extrinsic evidence which throws light on the situation of the parties, the antecedent negotiations, the attendant circumstances and the objects they were thereby striving to attain is regarded as relevant. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, supra at 172; Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 306, 154 N.W.2d 164, 168 (1967).

And as the parties have discerned, the determinative issue is whether the agreements more nearly relate to an employment contract or to a covenant not to compete. It is true the contract, once classified, affects our perspective in a given situation. Where there is an employer-employee contract we examine an employee's conduct to determine whether he or she has done something hostile to his or her master's interests. See LaFontaine v. Developers & Builders, Inc., supra, 156 N.W.2d at 658; Miller v. Jones, 178 Iowa 168, 172...