People v. Wright

Decision Date24 February 1975
Docket NumberDocket No. 16938,No. 3,3
Citation228 N.W.2d 807,58 Mich.App. 735
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond L. WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

James R. Neuhard, State App. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Edward D. Durance, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and R. B. BURNS and VanVALKENBURG, * JJ.

HOLBROOK, Presiding Judge.

Raymond Wright, defendant, was charged with the crime of rape, and juryconvicted on February 9, 1973. On February 21, 1973, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He now appeals as of right.

The offense occurred on June 7, 1972, in the morning sometime after complainant's husband departed for work. Defendant came to complainant's home, represented he was having car trouble, and requested to use the telephone to call his wife. Complainant allowed defendant to use the phone. At the time the complainant was eating breakfast with her two daughters, 6 and 5 years of age. After using the phone, defendant came back into the kitchen. He appeared nervous and quite concerned about losing his job because he was going to be late. Complainant then fixed him a cup of coffee. At defendant's request complainant said he could use the bathroom. When he came out of the bathroom, he went and picked up complainant's oldest daughter, pulled out a knife with a 4-inch blade, and threatened the child. He handed complainant a note which read: 'Put your hands behind you or I will kill your girls'. Defendant tied complainant's hands behind her with an electric shaver cord. The defendant then took complainant and her daughters upstairs. After checking to see if there was anyone else upstairs, he threw complainant on the bed and had the girls stand over in the corner of the room. The defendant had the knife pointed at complainant and near her. Complainant begged him repeatedly not to do anything to her and said: 'You have a wife'. He replied: 'Damn it, I know I do'. Defendant told the little girls to remove their pants. Complainant then begged him to leave the little girls alone. Defendant then proceeded to rape the complainant and shortly thereafter left the house.

The defense presented by defendant at trial was insanity. After defendant's arrest, he gave two statements to the police. In the first statement he denied the assault and rape. This statement was objected to by defense counsel, but was admitted upon a finding by the court that it was made voluntarily after the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), warnings were fully given and defendant had signed the statement. In the second statement defendant admitted the offense and gave a detailed account of what had happened. This statement was not objected to, and was admitted as having been voluntarily given by the defendant.

The defendant raises several issues to be considered on appeal.

I

Defendant claims that the trial judge committed reversible error when he charged the jury in part as follows: 'One who indulges in that convenient form of insanity referred to as temporary or emotional insanity, which lasts just long enough to enable him to commit an act of violence, is not relieved from criminal responsibility'.

The defendant argues that this instruction undercut his insanity defense because it conveyed to the jury the implication that the defendant fabricated this theory in order to save himself. The above quoted instruction was approved by the Supreme Court in People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482 (1878), in the context of distinguishing pure passion from legal insanity. See also People v. Johnson, 53 Mich.App. 329, 334, 220 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1974). We consider instructions as a whole to determine if an instruction is proper. People v. Carr, 2 Mich.App. 222, 139 N.W.2d 329 (1966), People v. Weems, 19 Mich.App. 553, 172 N.W.2d 865 (1969), and People v. Dyd, 356 Mich. 271, 96 N.W.2d 788 (1959). After a careful review of the instructins given the jury, we are convinced the trial court properly instructed the jury on the definition of insanity, including the 'irresistible impulse' element.

II

Did the trial judge and the prosecuting attorney erroneously intermingle the terms of (1) competent to stand trial with (2) the defense of insanity?

The subject of this issue was the report of a forensic examination conducted on the defendant and introduced into evidence at the trial by defense counsel with a stipulation providing that a cautionary instruction would be given to the jury. The cautionary instruction given by the court was as follows:

'This is a letter addressed to myself as circuit judge and it deals with Raymond Wright. You heard that letter read and this psychiatric consultant at Ann Arbor is simply reporting to the court that at the request of the court this defendant was examined and that he was found to be fit for trial, that he understood the nature of these proceedings against him, that he was able to cooperate with his attorney and in connection with his defense and so forth. In other words, that he was competent to stand trial.

'Now, this determination was made on July 12th, 1972. The purpose of this was not to decide whether or not he was competent on June 7th, 1972; this was for the only purpose of deciding whether he was competent ot stand trial. And you should consider it for that purpose only.'

The prosecutor in closing argument stated that defendant was found legally competent to stand trial. In defendant's closing argument, counsel noted the difference between competency to stand trial and legal insanity. As we have previously ruled, the trial judge gave a thorough instruction on the test of insanity and the cautionary instruction did not, in our opinion, confuse the issue for the jury.

The prosecutor did not commit reversible error in his closing argument as he had the right to comment on the evidence and the reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. People v. Jones, 48 Mich.App. 334, 343, 210 N.W.2d 396, 400 (1973). It was thus proper for the prosecutor, in his closing argument, to make reference to the forensic examination result.

III

Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on the disposition of the defendant under a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity?

Defendant claims that the instruction given was not proper under People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969). The Cole instruction given in the instant case is as follows:

'I will tell you, however, that if you should reach a verdict in this case of not guilty by reason of insanity, if you find that verdict, then I will inform you that this does not mean that the accused will go free. It means that I have no further control over him as judge of this court.

'It means that I will commit him to the mental health authorities of the State of Michigan. And that statute (M.C.L.A. 767.27b; M.S.A. 28.966(12)) reads as follows: Any person who is tried for a crime and is acquitted by the court or jury by reason of insanity shall be committed immediately by order of the court to the Department of Mental Health for treatment in an appropriate state hospital until discharged in accordance with law.

'This means that this man, if you reach such a verdict, will be committed to the Department of Mental Health and he will remain there in an institution to be selected by them and that he will remain there until such time as they decide to release them. This court will have no further control over him.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The purpose of the Cole instruction is to insure that the jury is informed of the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, and for the further reason to inform them that such a verdict would not immediately set the defendant free.

The emphasized portions of the subject instruction, defendant asserts, accomplished what the instruction was intended to prevent, I.e., jury fear of a quick release for the defendant. We interpret the challenged portions of the instruction were to the effect that the judge had no sentencing discretion when the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity. This fact being true, and the jury being fully informed of the necessary facts under Cole, no error was committed. People v. Widgren, 53 Mich.App. 375, 220 N.W.2d 130 (1974).

IV

Was a proper foundation laid for the admission of lay testimony on the question of defendant's sanity?

Defendant concedes that lay testimony can be admitted on the question of insanity. He claims, however, that the lay witnesses in the instant case were not sufficiently acquainted with the defendant to provide proper foundations for such opinions.

The prosecutor submitted the testimony of five men who worked with the defendant, concerning defendant's sanity. This evidence was admitted by the court over the objection of the defendant.

James McClellan testified that he was the president of Mac Distributing Company and that the defendant was employed by the company. He testified that over an eight-week period he had an opportunity to spend two to three hours a day with the defendant.

Jack Moeller, also an employee of the Mac Distributing Company, testified that he was with the defendant on a daily basis and talked with him on those occasions.

Wayne Cummings, an employee of Mac Distributing Company, testified that he worked with the defendant and would spend three to four hours a day with him. During this time they would load trucks together and would talk together. Further, they would often eat lunch together.

Jack Kessler testified that he was an employee for Mac Distributing Company and that he would go on deliveries with the defendant who was a truck driver.

Bill Buddy testified that he was a driver and serviceman with the Mac Distributing Company and worked with the defendant on a daily basis.

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