229 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir. 1955), 4, Alvado v. General Motors Corporation

Docket Nº:4, 23190.
Citation:229 F.2d 408
Party Name:James ALVADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Case Date:December 22, 1955
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Page 408

229 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir. 1955)

James ALVADO, Plaintiff-Appellant,



Nos. 4, 23190.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

December 22, 1955

Argued Oct. 11, 1955.

Opinion Revised Feb. 8, 1956.

Page 409

Plaintiff sues under § 8 of the Selective Training & Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. Appendix § 308 [*] (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on behalf of himself and other veterans similarly situated 1 to recover vacation pay for the fiscal year ending in June 1946, which allegedly was denied them by a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement entered into by defendant and plaintiff's union, United Auto Workers, CIO, on March 19, 1946. Plaintiff has been in the employ of defendant since 1933. He entered military service in February 1944, and, after being honorably discharged, was reinstated as an employee on October 30, 1945.

Beginning in 1940, a clause providing for vacation pay has been adopted annually in an agreement between the United Auto Workers Union and defendant, through collective bargaining between defendant and the Union. Until the 1946 agreement, and for each year since, the annual collective bargaining agreement provided for vacation pay for all hourly-rated employees who were employed for any period of time at the end of the vacation year, July 1 to June 30, or, in 1943 and thereafter, a single day in the last weekly pay period at the end of the vacation year. The amount of vacation pay was determined by seniority; those with one-year seniority were entitled to forty hours' pay, and those with five or more years seniority received eighty hours' pay. During the war years of 1943, 1944, and 1945, when the work week was increased from five to six days,

Page 410

the vacation pay was raised to forty-eight and ninety-six hours' pay.

On November 21, 1945, the union called a strike which lasted until March 13, 1946. Because of the strike, defendant proposed, in negotiations with the union, that the amount of vacation pay be based on a percentage of earnings for the fiscal year ending in June 1946, rather than on the forty or eighty hours' pay basis used up to that time, in order to reduce vacation pay proportionately to the time lost in the strike. The union objected because this would place the entire burden of the strike on the employees; it proposed that the percentages be applied to earnings during the calendar year 1945. This would be more favorable to the strikers, since the bulk of the strike had taken place in 1946. Defendant agreed, and the new contract provided, that the amount of vacation pay was to fixed at 2%, 3% or 4 1/2% of the employees' total gross earnings for the calendar year 1945, for those with more than one, three, or five years seniority, respectively. Eligibility was still determined by whether an employee worked in the last weekly pay period at the end of June 1946.

The plan ultimately adopted effectively deprived returning veterans of most, if not all, of their vacation pay for 1946, since most of them returned to work in the latter part of 1945; with the strike on from November 21, 1945, they had little earnings in the calendar year 1945. The result would have been the same, though not to such a great degree, if the defendant's plan to take a percentage of the earnings in the fiscal year 1946 had been adopted.

Plaintiff alleged that the agreement deprived veterans in the class, on whose behalf this suit is brought, of rights expressly granted to them under § 8(c) of the Act. Plaintiff, in particular, alleged that, at the time of the negotiations which resulted in the 1946 agreement, defendant knew and intended that the agreement would have the effect of depriving veterans of almost all vacation pay in the year in which they returned (i.e., calendar year 1945 and fiscal year 1946).

Defendant, in...

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