United States v. Brand

• Decision Date: 05 February 1916
• Citation: 229 F. 847
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. BRAND.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

229 F. 847

UNITED STATES v. BRAND.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 5, 1916

Harold A. Content, Asst. U.S. Atty., of New York City, for the United states.

John F McIntyre, of New York City, for defendant.

CLAYTON District Judge.

This morning, at the opening of the court, the defendant interposed a demurrer to the indictment in the case of United States of America v. Katherine Brand, charged with having violated the White Slave Traffic Act, commonly known as the Mann Act. I have decided the matter, and desire the following memorandum opinion to be put in the record. I have not had time to write an opinion, but now dictate it.

This case is submitted upon the demurrer of the defendant to the indictment. The demurrer, which is reduced to writing, is a general demurrer, and does not meet the requirements of correct practice in the federal courts. The defendant's attorney, however, in his oral presentation of the matter to the court, specified his ground of demurrer to the indictment; that is, the defendant demurs to the indictment because the defendant contends that the indictment is defective, in that it fails to allege that the intent of the defendant was consummated by the commission of a specific act of prostitution or debauchery. And I have heard the argument of counsel in behalf of the defendant on the demurrer, and of the counsel for the government, Assistant District Attorney Content, in opposition-- no point having been made as to the form of the demurrer.

The indictment has three counts. The first two counts are predicated upon section 2 of the White Slave Traffic Act, or the Mann Act. The third count is predicated upon section 3 of the act. Referring first to count 1 of the indictment, an examination shows that this count substantially follows in its averment the language of the law. I quote from section 2 of the act the language pertinent for proper consideration of count 1 of the indictment:

'That any person who shall knowingly * * * aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, * * * any woman or girl * * * with the intent and purpose to induce entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice.'

This count, the first count of the indictment, charges that the defendant--

'did unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, and feloniously aid and assist in obtaining transportation for and in transporting in interstate commerce, to wit, from the city of Dayton, in the state of Ohio, to the city of New York, in the state of New York, in the Southern district of New York, a girl of the name of Annie Planner, with the intent and purpose to induce the said Annie Planner to become a prostitute and to give herself up to debauchery and to engage in other immoral practices,' etc.

If the statute and the indictment be put in parallel columns, it will be readily seen that the indictment follows, as I have said, substantially the language of the statute. Of course it is elementary to say that, when a statute denounces certain acts as an offense, an indictment, as a general rule, which follows the language of a statute, is a good indictment.

As to the second count, which is also predicated upon section 2 of this act, all of the language of the statute, applicable to this count, is as follows:

'Or who shall knowingly * * * aid or assist in procuring or obtaining any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, * * * with the intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in

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