Monroe v. Board of Com'rs of City of Jackson, Tenn.

• Citation: 229 F. Supp. 580
• Decision Date: 21 May 1964
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1327.
• Parties: Brenda Kay MONROE et al. v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF JACKSON, TENNESSEE, et al. and County Board of Education of Madison County, Tennessee, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

229 F. Supp. 580

Brenda Kay MONROE et al. v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF JACKSON, TENNESSEE, et al. and County Board of Education of Madison County, Tennessee, et al.

Civ. No. 1327.

United States District Court W. D. Tennessee, E. D.

May 21, 1964.

Avon N. Williams, Jr., Looby & Williams, Nashville, Tenn., J. Emmett Ballard, Jackson, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Jack Manhein, Jackson, Tenn., Edwin F. Hunt, Nashville, Tenn., W. M. Shaw, Shaw & Shaw, Homer, La., Jack Kershaw, Nashville, Tenn., Russell Rice, Jackson, Tenn., for defendants.

BAILEY BROWN, District Judge.

This cause is before this court for consideration of a plan for desegregation of schools that has been filed, pursuant to order of Court, by the Board of Education of Madison County, Tennessee. This Court has heretofore held a hearing on the plan submitted by the City of Jackson, Tennessee and the plaintiffs' objections thereto and its memorandum decision dealing with the City's plan appears at 221 F.Supp. 968, 975.

Succinctly outlined, the plan submitted by the Board of Education of Madison County is as follows:

1. Segregation would be abolished in stages: grades 1 through 3 in the first year, grades 4 through 6 in the second year, grades 7 and 8 in the third year, and one additional grade each year thereafter.

2. With respect to desegregated grades, pupils would be entitled to be admitted to the school of their choice, provided the Board would have the right to transfer pupils, under non-discriminatory regulations, based on such factors as distance from school and achievement level. The right to choose would be a continuing one in the sense that a new choice could be made each year.

3. Transportation facilities, and school facilities, such as cafeterias, and school activities, such as athletics, would be desegregated.

4. The electronics course offered only at South Side High would be desegregated in the first year.

The plaintiffs, Negro citizens and parents of Madison County, have filed objections, stating, in general, that the plan proposed does not meet the requirement that schools be desegregated and at all deliberate speed. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) and 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955).

Madison County operates eight heretofore Negro grade schools and eleven heretofore white grade schools and operates two heretofore Negro high schools and three heretofore white high schools. The school population is approximately 3379 Negro and 4254 white or approximately 44% Negro and 56% white.

The average age of the Negro school buildings is 5.4 years (all having been constructed since the Brown decision), and the average age of the white school buildings is 22.6 years. Total cost of the nine Negro school buildings is $1,835,000 and total cost of the thirteen white school buildings is $3,290,000.

The average student-teacher ratio in the Negro schools is 32.3 to 1 and in the white schools is 29.2 to 1. All of the faculty in the Negro schools are Negroes and all of the faculty in the white schools are white. There are a total of 108 Negro teachers of whom 4 have master's degrees, 96 have bachelor's degrees, 4 have three years of college and 4 have two years of college. There are a total of 153 white teachers of whom 33 have master's degrees, 96 have bachelor's degrees, 10 have three years of college and 14 have two years of college. Salaries of Negro and white teachers who have the same educational qualifications, experience, et cetera are equal.

The curricula in the Negro and white schools are comparable, the only substantial difference being that the white high schools are teaching more classes of foreign languages and sciences than the Negro high schools are teaching. However, this results from the fact that the demand for such courses in Negro schools is not as great as in the white schools, and the Board offers such courses in Negro schools whenever the demand is sufficient to form a class.

The median achievement levels, determined by tests, of the Negro and white children are substantially the same in the beginning grades but by the time the pupils reach the fourth grade, the median achievement level of white students is substantially higher, and this disparity increases gradually in the higher grades. This disparity does not result from any inherent difference in the races; it results from a difference in cultural advantages present in the homes as well as a general lack of motivation of Negro pupils because of the disadvantage of living in a segregated community.

Historically, there has been no formal geographical zoning with respect to these schools, although, in general, the white and Negro pupils, because of convenience in school bus transportation, have attended the school nearest to their homes.

The Negro schools have been operated on a "split season" in that the school year begins around July 15, then recesses in September for four to seven weeks, then reconvenes for the completion of the school year. The purpose of this recess is to allow the children to harvest cotton. The white schools formerly recessed similarly, but this recess was abolished some years ago. There is no indication that a purpose of this recess of Negro schools is the preservation of segregation. The labor of these Negro pupils is needed by some of the parents as a matter of economic necessity — the parents being tenant farmers — but the total economic effect of the abolition of this split season cannot be determined from the evidence. This split season is undesirable from an educational point of view as it interferes with and has a detrimental effect on the teaching process.

The main points of conflict between the position of plaintiffs and the position of school Board are these:

1. Plaintiffs insist that desegregation for all grades be immediate beginning with the school year 1964-65 while the Board insists that it be gradual as set out in the proposed plan.

2. Plaintiffs insist that the Court order the Board to adopt a system of unitary non-racial geographical zoning with no transfers allowed except for reasons that are administrative and which are completely unrelated to racial preferences of the pupils and parents. The Board insists that Negro and white pupils be given a free choice as to which schools they will attend and that no formal geographical zones should be established.

3. Plaintiffs insist that the split season of heretofore Negro schools be abolished, and the Board insists that it not be abolished.

4. Plaintiffs insist that the faculties be integrated, and the Board insists that they not be.

Rate of Desegregation

The second Brown decision, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), requires desegregation with all deliberate speed. The Supreme Court in the Memphis public parks case, Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 83 S.Ct. 1314, 10 L.Ed.2d 529 (1963), indicated that a plan of desegregation of schools that would have met the test of deliberate speed if it had been adopted in 1955 would not necessarily meet that test now. Though this statement is dicta, it constitutes a clear indication of the Court's thinking on this question. In this connection, the Board contends that there is no obligation to institute a plan of desegregation until a formal demand is made by Negro pupils or parents. While the proof is not clear as to when such a demand was first made here, we are of the opinion that no such demand is necessary and that all Boards operating segregated school systems have the affirmative duty to adopt plans for desegregation whether or not demands have been made or a suit filed. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7, 8, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958) and Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 83 S.Ct. 1314, 10 L.Ed.2d 529 (1963).

In determining the amount of delay to be allowed in bringing about desegregation, there can be considered administrative problems, second Brown decision, supra, degree of equality of tangible factors of the Negro and white school systems, Boyce v. Board of Education of Humphreys County, 7 Race Rel. L.Rep. 372, 378, (M.D.Tenn.1961), and the good faith or lack of good faith of the school board as evidenced by voluntary efforts to comply with the law. Dove v. Parham, 181 F.Supp. 504, 513, (E.D.Ark.1960), aff'd 282 F.2d 256 (C.A. 8, 1960).

After considering all of the evidence in the case and the applicable law, we are of the opinion that the Board should not be required to desegregate all grades in one year. On the other hand, we are of the opinion that the proof does not justify the amount of time proposed by the Board. We are of the opinion that the first eight grades should be desegregated at the beginning of the school year 1964-65 and the last four grades should be desegregated at the beginning of the school year 1965-66.

Geographical Zones

Plaintiffs, as previously indicated, contend that unitary non-racial geographical zones are constitutionally required, relying on Northcross v. Board of Ed. of City of Memphis, 6 Cir., 302 F.2d 818 (1962). Whil...