United States v. Pate

Citation229 F. Supp. 818
Decision Date28 May 1964
Docket NumberNo. 63 C 767.,63 C 767.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America ex rel. Robert CLEGGETT, Plaintiff, v. Frank J. PATE, Warden, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Edwin A. Rothschild, Gerald J. Sherman, Sonnenschein, Levinson, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal, Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for plaintiff.

Daniel N. Kadjan, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Illinois, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

WILL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Robert Cleggett originally filed this action pro se under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendant Pate, Warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, had prevented his participation in the academic program offered at the prison and denied him the right to worship at the Episcopal services conducted there. In an amendment to the complaint filed for the plaintiff by court appointed counsel1 it is further alleged that the plaintiff remains confined to the Segregation Unit as a direct result of the pendency of this suit and that confinement for such reason is a deprivation of access to the Courts in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.

Cleggett, whose lawful incarceration at Joliet is not at issue here, was removed from the general prison population and placed in the Segregation Unit on March 28, 1963. Prior to that date he had been reported for various infractions of the prison rules, including having forced another inmate to engage in an act of sodomy with him. When initially confronted by the Warden with regard to this last offense, the plaintiff denied any involvement in the incident. The examiner who administered a subsequent polygraph test was of the opinion that Cleggett had not truthfully answered questions relating to his participation in the alleged assault. The prison report of the event states that when the results of this test were made known to him, the plaintiff admitted the attack in question. The report and Cleggett's signed admission are part of the record in this case.

The defendant, in his original response to the plaintiff's complaint, moved to dismiss this action on the authority of Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990, 70 S.Ct. 1015, 94 L.Ed. 1391 (1950), and Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 321 U.S. 783, 64 S.Ct. 639, 88 L.Ed. 1075 (1944), cases regularly cited to this Court by the state as holding that internal administration and discipline at state prisons are subject only to state control and regulation and are not within the purview of the federal courts. That motion was denied, but, upon appointing counsel for the plaintiff, the Court limited the case, and the hearing held herein, to the issue relating to the plaintiff's right to attend church services. At the hearing, testimony on the allegations of the amended complaint charging a denial of unhampered access to the Courts was also received.

ATTENDANCE AT PRISON CLASSES

That portion of the complaint alleging a deprivation of an opportunity to attend prison classes does not raise a constitutional question and therefore is not a proper subject for Civil Rights Act relief. Denial of attendance at the prison school is among the many restrictions and limitations upon activity incidental to lawful incarceration and necessarily within the discretion of prison administrations. See Numer v. Miller, 165 F. 2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948). This Court recognizes the need for flexibility and wide latitude in dealing with the myriad situations which confront penal officials. Lawful incarceration necessarily brings about the withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948). The Warden's exercise of his supervisory authority does not give rise to a cause of action which survives the prison discipline defense unless deprivation of a constitutional right is involved. See this Court's opinion in U. S. ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F.Supp. 202 (N.D.Ill.1963).

ATTENDANCE AT CHURCH SERVICES

Eight different religious services are conducted for prisoners in the general population at Joliet. The prison staff includes three full time chaplains; five additional clergymen are associated with the institution on a part-time bases. One of the latter is a minister of the Episcopalian church. All inmates, including those in the Segregation Unit, may confer individually with any of these chaplains about spiritual matters. Such personal ministry has been extended to Cleggett and he has availed himself of it. In his complaint, however, the prisoner seeks the opportunity to practice his religion by participating in corporate worship with his fellow believers. This the Warden has forbidden to Cleggett and all other prisoners similarly confined.

The Warden remains firm that to permit the plaintiff or any prisoner in the Segregation Unit to participate in services held for the general population would create problems of administration and be of some risk to the other inmates. Warden Pate's testimony at the hearing parallels his answer to the original complaint:

"If the plaintiff, in his present frame of mind, were permitted to attend regular services in the general population, defendant does not think it would be safe for the other inmates who are abiding by the rules and regulations to attend church services with him. Plaintiff is confined to the Segregation Unit because of his institutional misbehavior and his sexual act against another inmate; and, until such a time as plaintiff is released from Segregation Unit to the general population, he cannot expect to receive the same treatment as the inmates who are confined to the general population and who are obeying the rules and regulations." (Defendant's Answer, p. 5.)

The defendant further claims that the determination as to when the prisoner is to be released is totally within his discretion and not subject to the intervention of the federal courts.

Apart from the instant case, this Court does not agree with the Warden's comprehensive interpretation of the internal discipline defense. That doctrine is not without limitation. The Seventh Circuit has held that a suit brought under the Civil Rights Act alleging a warden's failure to cause medical attention to be given to a wounded prisoner states a cause of action against the prison official. Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957). Similarly, the late Judge Clark in Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961), enunciated other situations which would warrant federal court intervention:

"Whatever may be the view with regard to ordinary problems of prison discipline, however, we think that a charge of religious persecution falls in quite a different category. * * * Freedom of religion and of conscience is one of the fundamental `preferred' freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. We must approach decision with that admonition in mind." 293 F.2d at 235.

The Pierce court went on to hold that a complaint by a prisoner alleging that he had been deprived of good time and placed in solitary confinement because he held certain religious convictions did not fall to the prison discipline doctrine but rather stated a cause of action which a federal court must entertain.

The special position of religious freedom as a constitutional right excepted from the internal discipline defense is also apparent from the decision in Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961), in which the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of complaints alleging religious discrimination at the United States Reformatory at Lorton, Virginia, an institution maintained for prisoners sentenced by courts of the District of Columbia. Chief Judge Sobeloff, writing for the court, recognized that there is a limit to the prison discipline doctrine: "* * * It has never been held that upon entering a prison one is entirely bereft of all of his civil rights and forfeits every protection of the law." 291 F.2d at 198.

Nor are the Second and Fourth Circuits in conflict with the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963). The discipline there allowed was the restriction placed not on a religious group, but on a movement found by the court to have taken on a religious facade better to implement its objective of violent overthrow of the white race.

Answering the broad — and I think erroneous — interpretation of the prison discipline defense raised by the warden, however, does not dispose of the particular situation before me. This is not a case of discrimination against particular religious beliefs. The prisoner is not being punished for having certain religious convictions. Nor is this prisoner being deprived of opportunities permitted others similarly situated. The plaintiff here is seeking to exercise his religious beliefs by attending corporate worship in the general prison population despite his being assigned to the Segregation Unit.

The distinction between the freedom to believe and...

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  • Roberts v. Pepersack
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • June 29, 1966
    ...defense has been stated in various ways by federal courts: "deprivation of a constitutional right" (United States ex rel. Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818, 819 (N.D.Ill.1964)); "exceptional circumstances" (Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 1966), United States ex rel. Knight v. ......
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