Quarton v. Barton

Decision Date06 March 1930
Docket NumberNo. 165.,165.
Citation229 N.W. 465,249 Mich. 474
PartiesQUARTON v. BARTON et al.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Oakland County, in Chancery; Glenn C. Gillespie, Judge.

Suit by Fred V. Quarton, executor of the last will and testament of Louis H. Rousseau, deceased, against Mrs. Robert Barton and others, for the purpose of securing a judicial construction of the paragraph of the will. From the decree, defendants appeal.

Reversed and rendered.

Argued before WIEST, C. J., and FEAD, BUTZEL, CLARK, McDONALD, POTTER, NORTH, and SHARPE, JJ.G. R. Empson, of Gladstone, for appellants.

Howard I. Bond, of Pontiac, for appellee Eudora H. Rousseau.

Pelton & McGee, of Pontiac, for appellee Fred V. Quarton.

SHARPE, J.

The bill of complaint herein was filed to secure a judicial construction of the second paragraph of the last will and testament of Louis H. Rousseau. It reads as follows: ‘Second I give, devise and bequeath all of my property, either real estate or personal to my wife, Eudora H. Rousseau, (for) her lifetime to do with as she sees fit. At her death my estate is to be equally divided among the following:’ (The word ‘for’ preceding ‘her lifetime’ seems to have been omitted, but the intent to include it seems plain.)

A number of relatives were thereafter named. The first question presented is whether an estate in fee simple passed to the widow, or a life estate with remainder over to the persons named.

It may be stated at the outset that the decisions of this court relied upon by counsel on both sides go far to sustain the construction they claim should be given to this paragraph. But, as was said by Chief Justice Marshall in the early case of Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 80, 8 L. Ed. 322 (quoted with approval in Jones v. Deming, 91 Mich. 481, 482, 51 N. W. 1119): ‘It has been said truly * * * ‘that cases on wills may guide us to general rules of construction; but, unless a case cited be in every respect directly in point, and agree in every circumstance, it will have little or no weight with the court, who always look upon the intention of the testator as the polar star to direct them in the construction of wills.’'

Counsel are agreed that the intention of the testator, as expressed in the instrument, taken as an entirety and giving to the words used the meaning the testator gave to them, must control. This rule of construction seems to be universal. Rood on Wills, § 413; Bateman v. Case, 170 Mich. 617, 620, 136 N. W. 590;In re Ives' Estate, 182 Mich. 699, 704, 148 N. W. 727;In re Manshaem's Estate, 207 Mich. 1, 173 N. W. 483.

With the intent of the testator as a polar star to guide us, let us examine this paragraph. It clearly states that the testator gives all of his property to his wife for her lifetime. It just as clearly states that at her death it is to be equally divided among certain persons, naming them. Were not the words ‘to do with as she sees fit’ inserted, following the word ‘lifetime,’ it seems clear that but a life estate in the widow, with remainder over to the persons named, was created. Must we construe these words as granting such an absolute and unlimited power of disposal in the widow that she takes the fee, notwithstanding the use of the words ‘for her lifetime’ and the provision for remainder over at her death?

In giving effect to the intent of the testator, we must consider the clause as a whole. That part of it providing for a remainder over is superfluous and must be expunged, if the fee passed under the language theretofore used. But we are no more at liberty to disregard this provision than the gift to the wife. Is not the intent of the testator easily understood? In making the gift to his wife, he, in effect, says to her: ‘You may do as you will with this property. Keep it as it is, or sell and dispose of it as you please. You may use any part or all of it, but, whatever you may do with it, that which you have left will belong to the persons I have named as remaindermen.’ The words ‘for her lifetime’ clearly limit her estate to one for life. They are so simple, and of such familiar use, that the testator, when he read this will, or when it was read to him, must have clearly understood their meaning. He doubtless wanted his wife to have the use of his property so long as she lived. He fully appreciated the limitation of her ownership to her lifetime, and left it to the scrivener to express his further intent by appropriate language. Unfortunately, that use has created the uncertainty to which this litigation is due. But, if the intent is to be gathered from the four corners of the instrument, a life estate only passed to the widow, with remainder over to the persons named.

Rules of construction are adopted and applied in the interpretation of wills where the language used does not clearly and definitely express or convey the testator's intent, or where the intention is obscure because of the use of inconsistent words or clauses, but should not be applied in any case where the purpose and intention of the testator is positive and unmistakable, even though badly expressed and by words and phrases improperly used or arranged. Hoffer v. Damskey, 220 Mich. 97, 189 N. W. 843.

In the briefs of counsel, the decisions of this court, as well as those of other jurisdictions, are cited and commented on at length. Counsel for the widow relies, as did the trial court, on the rule announced in the early case of Jones v. Jones, 25 Mich. 401, and followed in the more recent case of Gibson v. Gibson, 213 Mich. 31, 181 N. W. 41, 43. In this latter decision, the two classes of cases decided by this court are cited. The opinion in that case may well be said to hold that, when the devisee, even if limited to a life estate, is given ‘full power of alienation and consumption,’ an estate in fee is created. The writer of this opinion did not concur in that of Mr. Justice Brooke, in which a majority of the court joined. I thought then, and I think now, that in so deciding this court lost sight of the cardinal rule which must be applied in the construction of wills: ‘That the real intent and meaning of the testators, as expressed in the will, should be given effect, and that for this purpose all the clauses of the will are to be considered.’ Gadd v. Stoner, 113 Mich. 689, 691, 71 N. W. 1111, 1112.

In Cary v. Toles, 210 Mich. 30, 177 N. W. 279, 280, decided less than six months before the Gibson Case was submitted, and in which the same justices participated, there was unanimous concurrence in the opinion written by Mr. Justice Clark, in which it was held that, where there was a gift without reservation to a granddaughter, ‘to have and to hold the same to her forever,’ followed by a proviso that, in case she should die without lawful issue, the unexpended part of the property so willed to her should go to others, the granddaughter took but a life estate. The authorities supporting this construction are reviewed and quoted from at length, and the conclusion reached that there should be gathered ‘from the four corners of this will a definite intention on the part of the testatrix to give a life estate in the property to her daughter.’ It may be noted that this case was not referred to in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brooke in the Gibson Case. The case of Law v. Douglass, 107 Iowa, 606, 78 N. W. 212, was quoted from to sustain the holding in that case. The same quotation appears in Killefer v. Bassett, 146 Mich. 1, 109 N. W. 21. In the latter case, as well as in the Iowa case, the bequest was not limited to the lifetime of the taker. Neither of these decisions is applicable to a...

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  • Nye v. Bradford
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 27 Febrero 1946
    ...power that the will conferred upon the survivor. Merchants' Trust Co. v. Russell, 260 Mass. 162, 157 N.E. 338; Quarton v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465, 69 A.L.R. 820; Van Every v. McKay, 331 Mo. 355, 53 S.W.2d 873; Maynard v. Raines, 240 Ky. 614, 42 S.W.2d 873; Quisenberry v. J. B. W......
  • In re Estate.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 26 Agosto 2010
    ...received only a life estate and therefore had no right to dispose of the property. This Court stated, “Unlike in Quarton [ v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465 (1930) ], Herbert received a fee simple estate in the couple's property at Ila's death; hence, he was free to dispose of the prop......
  • Bienvenu v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta
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    • 16 Octubre 1941
    ... ... Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291, 36 A.L.R ... [17 S.E.2d 260] ...          1171; ... Quarton v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465, 69 ... A.L.R. 820, 825; Hutchinson's Estate v. Arnt, ... 210 Ind. 509, 1 N.E.2d 2d 585, 4 N.E.2d 202, 108 ... ...
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    • 16 Octubre 1941
    ...to the following cases: National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291, 36 A.L.R.[17 S.E.2d 260] 1171; Quarton v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465, 69 A.L.R. 820, 825; Hutchinson's Estate v. Arnt, 210 Ind. 509, 1 N.E. 2d 585, 4 N.E.2d 202, 108 A.L.R. 530, 542; Williams v. Col......
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