Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes, 93-4291

Citation23 F.3d 345
Decision Date20 June 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-4291,93-4291
PartiesIn re the Complaint of the SEA VESSEL, INC., for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability as the Owner of the M/V SEA LION V, Appellant, v. Juan REYES, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Reginald M. Hayden, Jr., James N. Hurley, Hayden and Milliken, P.A., Miami, FL, for appellant.

Adam H. Lawrence, Lawrence & Daniels, Miami, FL, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before COX and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge.

COX, Circuit Judge:

On appeal, we address the issue of whether a case involving damages resulting from a fire on a vessel undergoing routine repairs in a dry dock on a navigable waterway is cognizable in admiralty. We hold that admiralty jurisdiction attaches.

I. BACKGROUND

Sea Vessel, Inc. ("Sea Vessel") is the owner of the M/V SEA LION V ("SEA LION V"), a commercial cargo vessel. (R.1-1 at 1). Sea Vessel filed a complaint for exoneration from or limitation of liability as the owner of the SEA LION V for damages resulting from a fire that erupted on that vessel. (Id.). In its complaint, Sea Vessel alleges that in October of 1991, the SEA LION V was dry-docked for routine repairs and maintenance at Miami Shipyards. (Id. at 2). 1 Sea Vessel further alleges that on November 11, 1991, several shipyard workers were welding on board the SEA LION V, which was still in dry dock, when a fire erupted on the vessel. (R.1-1 at 2). 2 Finally, Sea Vessel alleges that the fire killed two of the shipyard workers, including Orlando Umanzor, and critically injured a third. (Id.).

Potential claimant Juan Reyes ("Reyes"), personal representative of the estate of Orlando Umanzor, filed a motion to dismiss Sea Vessel's complaint for lack of admiralty jurisdiction. (R.1-16). Therein, Reyes argues "[i]t is clear from the face of Sea Vessel's complaint that the fire on the Sea Lion V did not occur on navigable waters[,].... [f]ires in drydock, under these circumstances, do not satisfy the locality test for maritime torts." (Id. at 3). Alternatively, Reyes argues that "[e]ven if, arguendo, Sea Vessel could satisfy the locality requirement for maritime tort jurisdiction, [Sea Vessel] would still be unable to satisfy the nexus requirement." (Id.). Reyes also asserts that "information gathered to date suggests that the work being done to Sea Lion V was far more extensive and unplanned than" mere scheduled routine repairs. (R.1-16 at 2). In support of that contention, in a footnote to his motion, Reyes references a statement allegedly made by "Miami Shipyards chief [of] supervision, Luis Paez." (Id.).

In response to Reyes's motion to dismiss, Sea Vessel counters that the "SEA LION V sailed into Miami Shipyards for her scheduled routine steel work which included replacing side steel plating in the forward one-third of the vessel, replacement of tank bulkheads and swash plates as necessary." (R.1-19 at 2). 3 Sea Vessel contends that allegations of a fire on a vessel undergoing routine repairs in dry dock satisfy the nexus requirement, that the SEA LION V was on navigable waters at the time of the fire, and that Reyes's motion to dismiss should therefore be denied. (Id. at 5-8).

A magistrate judge concluded "that admiralty jurisdiction is lacking as the [SEA LION V] was not on navigable waters" and recommended that Reyes's motion to dismiss be granted. (R.1-31 at 7-8). The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R.1-38 at 3). In finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court arrived at the following conclusions: (1) "[A] fire on a vessel, not docked at a marina on navigable waters, but, raised from the water three weeks prior to the incident--does not satisfy the requirement of potential disruption to commercial maritime activity." (Id. at 1); (2) "[T]he drydock repairs in this case do not elevate the claim to a substantial relationship with traditional maritime activities." (Id. at 1-2); (3) "[T]he drydock in this case cannot be considered anything other than an extension of land to which admiralty and maritime jurisdiction does not attach." (Id. at 2); (4) "[T]he Limitation of Liability Act ... does not provide Reyes with an independent basis of admiralty jurisdiction." (Id.); and, (5) "[T]he vessel was out of the water only for the scheduled repairs and was 'certainly withdrawn from navigation.' " (Id. at 3). The district court's order did not, however, turn on the nature of repairs made to the SEA LION V. (R.1-38). Stated otherwise, the district court did not resolve any factual dispute that might exist regarding the nature of the repairs made to the SEA LION V. (Id.). Nor do we resolve any such conflict. In its complaint, Sea Vessel alleges that "[o]n November 11, 1991, the M/V SEA LION V ... was in drydock undergoing scheduled routine repair and maintenance." (R.1-1 at 2). We accept that allegation as true for purposes of reviewing the district court's dismissal of Sea Vessel's complaint. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S.Ct. 358, 66 L.Ed.2d 217 (1980).

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL & CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Sea Vessel contends that the SEA LION V was on admiralty waters, that routine repairs to a vessel in dry dock bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity, and that the fire constituted a potential threat to maritime commerce. Sea Vessel argues, therefore, that the district court erred in dismissing the action for lack of admiralty jurisdiction. 4 Reyes counters that a dry dock is an extension of the land and the SEA LION V was therefore not on admiralty waters. Further, Reyes argues that even if the SEA LION V was on admiralty waters, routine repairs to a vessel in dry dock do not bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Finally, Reyes argues that the fire did not constitute a potential threat to maritime commerce. Accordingly, Reyes contends that the district court did not err in dismissing Sea Vessel's complaint for want of admiralty jurisdiction.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's determination that it is without subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Barnett v. Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1039 (11th Cir.1992). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be based on lack of jurisdiction on the face of the complaint. Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511. "A 'facial attack' on the complaint requires the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Id. That is, "the nonmoving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6)." Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990). "The general rule is that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 729-30 n. 6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Our task is to determine whether this case is cognizable in admiralty. Federal admiralty jurisdiction derives from Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitution, which extends the judicial power of the United States "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Pursuant to that grant of jurisdiction, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(1) wherein it vests district courts with original and exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Historically, admiralty tort jurisdiction depended solely upon the locality of the wrong--"[i]f the wrong occurred on navigable waters, the action [was] within admiralty jurisdiction; if the wrong occurred on land, it [was] not." Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253, 93 S.Ct. 493, 497, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court retreated from the "purely mechanical application of the locality test," and held that "the wrong [must also] bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity"--the nexus test. Id. at 261, 268, 93 S.Ct. at 501, 504. 5 Thus, we must consider the situs of the fire (locality test) as well as the relationship between a fire on a vessel in dry dock undergoing routine repairs and traditional maritime activity (situs test) in order to determine whether this case is cognizable in admiralty. 6

A. THE LOCALITY TEST

As we navigate through this jurisdictional fog, we must first determine whether the SEA LION V was on navigable waters at the time of the fire. In its complaint, Sea Vessel simply alleges that the SEA LION V was in dry dock at the time of the fire. (R.1-1 at 1). Reyes takes that bare allegation, that the SEA LION V was in dry dock, and reads it to conclude "that the fire on the Sea Lion V did not occur on navigable waters." (R.1-16 at 3). Reyes's conclusion begs the question. And, we address that very question: Whether a vessel in dry dock on a navigable waterway is in or on navigable waters for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has said that a vessel in dry dock is on water, not on land, for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. In The Robert W. Parsons, the Supreme Court stated:

All injuries suffered by the hulls of vessels below the water line, by collision or stranding, must necessarily be repaired in a dry dock, to prevent the inflow of water, but it has never been supposed, and it is believed the proposition is now for the first time made, that such repairs were made on land. Had the vessel been hauled up by ways upon the land and...

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