Hancock v. Yaden
| Decision Date | 07 January 1890 |
| Docket Number | 15,037 |
| Citation | 23 N.E. 253,121 Ind. 366 |
| Parties | Hancock et al. v. Yaden |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Sullivan Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
J. T Beasley, A. B. Williams and G. A. Knight, for appellants.
E. S Holliday and G. A. Byrd, for appellee.
It is alleged in the complaint that the appellee was employed by the appellants to render service for them as a miner in a coal mine of which they were the owners; that, under this employment, he did render service for them in mining coal; that his services were reasonably worth five dollars per day; that he demanded payment for his services in lawful money of the United States, and that payment was refused. The appellants answered the complaint in two paragraphs, but, as the only difference between the paragraphs is that one pleads a verbal contract and the other a written one, it is only necessary to give a summary of one, as the questions which arise are substantially the same as to both of the paragraphs. The answer admits the employment, and admits, also, the allegation that the appellee rendered the services for which he sues, but it sets forth a written contract, alleges that the services were performed under the contract and avers that the appellants sold and delivered to the plaintiff in payment of his claim and to the full amount of the wages earned by him divers articles of goods, wares and merchandise. The provisions of the contract, in so far as they are material to the questions argued, are these: "The said William P. Yaden further agrees to accept his pay, or any part thereof, at the option of said Hancock and Conkle, in goods and merchandise at their store, near their said coal mine, and the said William P. Yaden hereby expressly waives his right to demand and receive his wages and pay for mining coal every two weeks in lawful money of the United States, as now provided by law he shall be paid." The court sustained a demurrer to the answer, the appellants stood by their answer and judgment was rendered against them.
To clear the case from embarrassments and make the way plain to a consideration of the controlling question, we preface our discussion by remarking that the answer is not a plea of accord and satisfaction, nor a plea of set-off, but a plea of payment, and the ultimate conclusion to be reached depends upon the answer to the question whether it is sufficient as such a plea. That it is not a plea of accord and satisfaction is clear, but, if it were to be so regarded, it would be bad because it does not aver a delivery and an acceptance of the goods in satisfaction of the debt. Another prefatory matter deserves passing thought, and that is this: The plea is a plea of payment, founded on a contract made before the performance of the services and professing to bar the action, if, therefore, the plea does not state facts in bar of the action it is bad. Whether it does state facts in bar of the action depends upon the validity of the antecedent contract which is the principal support of the plea, and as that contract is indivisible, if part is illegal, the whole must fall. The sufficiency of the answer must, it is clear, depend entirely upon the validity of the contract on which it is founded, since if that contract is invalid there is no agreement to accept payment in goods or merchandise, and where there is no such agreement payment can not be made in property. Another thing may be added by way of preface, and that is this: We are not here concerned with the question of what parties may do after services have been performed, for here the question is, what contract may they make before the relation of employer and employee begins?
It is sufficiently evident from what we have said that the only question which we can properly consider or decide is, whether the antecedent contract was valid in so far as it assumes to waive the right of the appellee to be paid his wages in lawful money of the United States, and to this question we confine our discussion and give judgment upon it and no other. Our judgment is that the antecedent contract is entirely void in so far as it assumes to waive the appellee's right to receive his wages in money. If there were no valid statute prohibiting such a contract it would be competent for the parties to make it, so that the ultimate judgment of the court hinges upon the question whether there is a valid statute prohibiting such contracts. There is a statute which, in terms, prohibits such contracts, and if it does not violate some provision of the Constitution it totally destroys the contract upon which the defence is founded. Elliott's Supp., sections 1599, 1610. Our judgment is, that the provision of the statute forbidding the execution of contracts waiving a right to payment in money, is one that the Legislature had power to enact.
It is a fundamental principle that every member of society surrenders something of his absolute and natural rights in all organized States. Without some yielding of absolute rights, civil government would be impossible. "But every man," says Blackstone, "when he enters into society gives up a part of his natural liberty." "Property and law," as Bentham says, "are born and must die together." The right to dispose of property or labor is a right not wholly surrendered by the citizen, nor yet entirely beyond control by the Legislature of the State. The right to contract is an incident of this jus disponendi. But the right to contract is not, and never has been, in any country where, as in ours, the common law prevails and constitutes the source of all civil law, entirely beyond legislative control. The statute of frauds enables contracting parties to avoid contracts not in writing. The law declares that payment in part of an ascertained debt shall not extinguish it, although the parties agree that it shall do so. Ogborn v. Hoffman, 52 Ind. 439; Smith v. Tyler, 51 Ind. 512; Markel v. Spitler, 28 Ind. 488. A party will not be allowed to contract to waive the benefit of homestead or exemption laws. Maloney v. Newton, 85 Ind. 565; Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249; Curtis v. O'Brien, 20 Iowa 376; Moxley v. Ragan, 73 Ky. 156, 10 Bush 156 (19 Am. Rep. 61). A debtor can not waive stay of execution by contract. McLane v. Elmer, 4 Ind. 239; Develin v. Wood, 2 Ind. 102. By the English law a seaman can not, by contract, waive his right to wages. Kay Shipmaster and Seamen, 626. Parties can not, by contract, bind themselves in advance not to resort to the courts for the redress of wrongs. Bauer v. Samson Lodge, 102 Ind. 262, 1 N.E. 571; Dugan v. Thomas, 79 Me. 221, 9 A. 354. A contract providing that a party shall not remove a cause to the federal court is void. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 20 Wall. 445, 22 L.Ed. 365; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 24 L.Ed. 148. A party will not be allowed to contract without limitation that he will not engage in a particular business. Taylor v. Saurman, 110 Pa. 3, 1 A. 40. A statute may require parties to insert in a promissory note the words, "given for a patent." Herdic v. Roessler, 109 N.Y. 127, 16 N.E. 198; New v. Walker, 108 Ind. 365, 9 N.E. 386. Priority in the allowance and payment of claims may be regulated by legislation. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 2 Cranch 358, 2 L.Ed. 304. A lien for miner's wages may be made superior to the royalty due to the owners of mine from the lessees or operators. Warren v. Sohn, 112 Ind. 213, 13 N.E. 863. Much beyond the doctrine declared in the cases to which we have referred is the ruling in Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 380, wherein it was held that a statute prohibiting parties from contracting to pay attorney's fees is constitutional. The truth is, that without law as one of its factors, there is really no such thing as a contract. The law is a silent, but a ruling, factor in every contract. Long v. Straus, 107 Ind. 94, 6 N.E. 123; Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 75 U.S. 276, 8 Wall. 276, 19 L.Ed. 349, vide p. 288. The case before us affords an example, for where a man, upon request, performs services for another, the law implies that he shall be paid for them and paid in money. It needs no positive agreement to pay in money to entitle a creditor to demand money, for the law decrees that the payment shall be in money. The statutory provision under discussion does no more than enforce this legal right by commanding that men shall not make a contract dispensing with the lawful mode and medium of payment.
The authorities to which we have referred, and to which it would be no great task to add others, prove that the law-making power of the State does have authority over the right to contract. That this legislative authority is limited no one doubts; but it is limited only by the Constitution. In that instrument are found the only limitations upon the law-making power of the State. Hedderich v. State, 101 Ind. 564; McComas v. Krug, 81 Ind. 327; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299. But no limitation in that instrument so operates as to prevent the law-making power from prohibiting classes of citizens from contracting in advance that the wages of miners shall not be paid in lawful money of the United States. It would be not only unnecessary but improper to enter upon the work of ascertaining to what extent the Constitution restrains the Legislature from regulating or restricting the right to contract; for all that can with propriety be here decided is, that it does not restrain the...
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