Scott v. Fishblate

• Decision Date: 17 December 1895
• Citation: 23 S.E. 436,117 N.C. 265
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: SCOTT v. FISHBLATE.

23 S.E. 436

117 N.C. 265

SCOTT

v.FISHBLATE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 17, 1895.

Courts—Civil Liability for Judicial Acts.

A mayor is not civilly liable for ordering the imprisonment of a person for contempt, while acting as judge of the mayor's court, though the order was erroneous, and made through malice.

Appeal from superior court, New Hanover county; Hoke, Judge.

Action by Beverly Scott against S. H. Fishblate. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

T. W. Strange for appellant

W. R. Allen and Ricaud & Weill, for appellee.

FURCHES, J. This Is an action of false imprisonment. At the time of the act complained of, the defendant was mayor of the city of Wilmington, and plaintiff was under arrest, upon a warrant issued by defendant, upon a charge of "burying night soil" within the limits of the city. The gravamen, the act complained of, is an order for contempt of court, made by defendant, under which plaintiff was imprisoned in the common jail of New Hanover county for a number of days. Sufficient appears in the history of this case, as contained in the record, to satisfy us that defendant acted badly on the occasion of making this order, and that he was lacking in that respect for the position he occupied that is usually found in those occupying such positions, and as should have governed his conduct on that occasion, and it seems to us that the testimony of De Rosset and others strongly tended to establish plaintiff's contention that defendant's court was not in session when this order was made; that it was made hastily, and in bad temper; that defendant resumed the chair, and took control of plaintiff's case; that he had just before made an order to remove, for the purpose of carrying Into effect an order he had no right to make, when he did make it; and that the claim of defendant, as a reason why he told Clowes (who seems to occupy the convenient positions of justice of the peace, chief of the city police, and clerk of the mayor's court) to fine plaintiff for contempt of court, was that his order given to Clowes, as his clerk, was an afterthought. But this was defendant's testimony, and he introduced other testimony tending to sustain his contention that his court was in session at the time the order was made. But this case presents for our consideration a very grave proposition of law, in which the suffering and damage of plaintiff, and the bad conduct of defendant, must be subordinated, for the present, to a discussion of the individual rights of the citizen and the independence of the judiciary. All courts exercising judicial powers have the inherent right to punish for contempt This power is necessary to their existence, and, where it is for conduct in the presence of the court, it is final, and cannot be reviewed by this or any other court. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 63; Cooke v. Bangs, 31 Fed. 640; State v. Mott, 4 Jones, 451; In re Deaton, 105 N. C. 59, 11 S. E. 244. As we have said, this power exists in all courts having and exercising judicial functions, —mayor's courts and justice's courts, as well as higher courts, having and exercising greater jurisdiction.' Cooke v. Bangs and In re Deaton, supra. The defendant then had the right—the power—to make the order of contempt, if he was sitting, and his court was open for the transaction of business when he made the order; and, if it was made then, it was in the exercise of a judicial power, and was a judicial act, —a judgment of the court, —and a civil action cannot be maintained by the plaintiff against the defendant for damages, though the order complained of was erroneous, and made through malice. Pratt v. Gardner, Cooke v. Bangs, and Bradley v. Fisher, supra. This seems to be a wrong without a remedy, which is said to be contrary to the spirit of our institutions "that where...