23 S.W. 886 (Mo. 1893), The State v. Reed

Citation:23 S.W. 886, 117 Mo. 604
Opinion Judge:Gantt, P. J.
Party Name:The State v. Reed, Appellant
Attorney:J. D. Wendorff for appellant. R. F. Walker, Attorney General, Morton Jourdan, assistant, and M. K. Brown, Prosecuting Attorney, for the state.
Case Date:November 09, 1893
Court:Supreme Court of Missouri

Page 886

23 S.W. 886 (Mo. 1893)

117 Mo. 604

The State


Reed, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

November 9, 1893

Appeal from Jackson Criminal Court. -- Hon. J. W. Wofford, Judge.


J. D. Wendorff for appellant.

(1) The court erred in refusing the fifth instruction asked by the defendant. The burden is upon the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all essential ingredients of the offense charged in the indictment. United States v, McGlue, 1 Curtis, C. C. 1; State v. Wingo, 66 Mo. 181; State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654; Commonwealth v. McKie, 1 Gray, 61; Wharton on Criminal Evidence [9 Ed.], sec. 329; Greenleaf on Evidence [15 Ed.], sec. 49, note, and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 131 Mass. 224; People v. Millard, 53 Mich. 63. (2) The court erred in giving the eighth instruction asked by the state, because it did not require the state to prove premeditation. Premeditation is a necessary element of murder in the first degree. Revised Statutes, 1889, sec. 3459; State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594; State v. Foster, 61 Mo. 549; State v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 191; State v. Lane, 64 Mo. 319; State v. Talbot, 73 Mo. 347; State v. Hennell, 97 Mo. 105; State v. O'Hara, 92 Mo. 59; State v. Sharp, 71 Mo. 218. (3) The court erred in declaring the law in the seventh instruction asked by the state to be that there was "no evidence tending to show the existence of any such passion or provocation." (4) The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to murder in the second degree.

R. F. Walker, Attorney General, Morton Jourdan, assistant, and M. K. Brown, Prosecuting Attorney, for the state.

(1) The instructions given for the state correctly declared the law. The words "malice aforethought" are equivalent to the words with "malice" and "premeditation." State v. Dale, 108 Mo. loc. cit. 207; State v. Lowe, 93 Mo. loc. cit. 574; State v. Katovsky, 74 Mo. 249; State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 598; State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. loc. cit. 553; People v. Vance, 21 Cal. 400. The term "deliberately" contains in itself all that is meant by the term "premeditatedly." State v. Dale, 108 Mo. loc. cit. 207. (2) Where the evidence proves a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and the court correctly instructed upon that degree of murder in one instruction, a second instruction authorizing a conviction of murder in the first degree, which leaves out all the elements of willfulness, deliberation, premeditation and malice aforethought, is harmless, even if erroneous. State v. Bulling, 105 Mo. loc. cit. 219; State v. Anderson, 98 Mo. loc. cit. 473; State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. loc. cit. 713; State v. Holme, 54 Mo. loc. cit. 164; State v. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425; State v. Talbott, 73 Mo. 347; State v. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207; State v. McGinnis, 76 Mo. 326; State v. Snell, 78 Mo. 240; State v. Nelson, 88 Mo. 126; State v. Anderson, 89 Mo. 312; State v. Butterfield, 75 Mo. 305. Instructions need not be as technical as the indictment. State v. Pullens, 81 Mo. 387. In criminal, as in civil cases, the instructions must all be read and considered together, and when, if so considered, they properly declare the law, and are not misleading, they are not objectionable. State v. Noeninger, 108 Mo. 166; State v. Matthews, 98 Mo. loc. cit. 130; State v. Butterfield, 75 Mo. loc. cit. 305; Dougherty v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 647; Muelhausen v. Railroad, 91 Mo. 332; Noble v. Blount, 77 Mo. 239. The court properly instructed only on murder in the first degree and accidental homicide. State v. Jones, 79 Mo. 441; State v. Nugent, 71 Mo. 139; State v. Sneed, 91 Mo. 559; State v. Rider, 95 Mo. loc. cit. 484; State v. Wilson, 88 Mo. 13; State v. Bulling, 105 Mo. 220. The threats of the defendant against the deceased were admissible; the nearness or remoteness of threats to the date of the commission of the crime does not affect their admissibility or competency. State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. loc. cit. 689; State v. McNally, 87 Mo. 644; State v. Adams, 76 Mo. 355; State v. Grant, 79 Mo. loc. cit. 137; Carver v. Huskey, 79 Mo. 509; State v. Crawford, 99 Mo. 74.


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