Callwood v. Enos

• Decision Date: 14 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-7501,98-7501
• Citation: 230 F.3d 627
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2000) JAMES CALLWOOD, APPELLANT V. JERRY ENOS <A HREF="#fr1-*" name="fn1-*">* , DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTION; CHESLEY ROEBUCK, CHAIRMAN OF V.I. PAROLE BOARD Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 627

230 F.3d 627 (3rd Cir. 2000)

JAMES CALLWOOD, APPELLANT

V.

JERRY ENOS^*, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTION; CHESLEY ROEBUCK, CHAIRMAN OF V.I. PAROLE BOARD

No. 98-7501

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 14, 2000

Flied October 13, 2000

On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands, D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-00167, District Judge: Hon. Raymond L. Finch, Chief Judge

James Callwood Appellant Pro Se

Attorneys for Appellees: Iver A. Stridiron Frederick Handleman Robert W. Bornholt Office of Attorney General of Virgin Islands Department of Justice Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, U.S. V.I. 00802

Before: Sloviter, Roth and Stapleton, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

Sloviter, Circuit Judge

This case, along with two others recently presented to the court, raises important issues concerning the jurisdiction of the courts in the Virgin Islands over habeas corpus petitions. Here, James Callwood appeals the order of the District Court of the Virgin Islands denying his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he challenges the failure of the Virgin Islands Director of Corrections to recommend him to the Virgin Islands Board of Parole for an early parole eligibility date to which he claims he is entitled by statute.

I. Background

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on August 21, 1983, Callwood and his accomplice, Irvin Smith, broke into the home of John Bruggeman. Callwood was armed with a sawed-off shotgun and Smith with a machete. Bruggeman was asleep in the bedroom, and when he woke up and reached for the table, Callwood shot and killed him.¹ On September 28, 1983, Callwood pled guilty in the District Court of the Virgin Islands to second degree murder in violation of territorial law, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, S 922. He was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment. In 1984, he was sentenced to an additional 5 years for an earlier escape from custody. Since 1984, Callwood has been serving his sentence as a contractual-boarder in the United States federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and more recently in Edgefield, South Carolina.²

Callwood filed a petition in the District Court of the Virgin Islands pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255 in 1984 and again in 1989 in which he challenged the imposition of his sentence, seeking an order setting aside the sentence. He also filed a motion seeking to amend his S 2255 petitions. The two petitions, as well as the proposed amended petition, were denied on the merits by the District Court. We affirmed the denial on appeal by memorandum opinion dated January 2, 1991.

On November 6, 1997, Callwood filed the pro se petition that is the subject of this appeal. In this petition, he alleges that he is in custody in violation of his rights under a Virgin Islands statute and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the Virgin Islands by 48 U.S.C. S 1561, because the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections has failed to recommend him for early parole eligibility under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 4601. That section of the Virgin Islands Code provides:

Except for a prisoner sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, every prisoner confined in any penitentiary, jail or prison for a violation of the Virgin Islands law for a definite term or terms of over 180 days or for the term of his natural life, whose record of conduct shows that he has observed the rules of the institution in which he is confined, upon recommendation of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections supported by the recommendation of a psychiatrist and/or psychologist, may be released on parole after serving one-half of such term or terms or after serving 15 years of a life sentence or of a sentence of 30 years or more or after serving the minimum sentence required by law, whichever is greater; Provided, however, That the Board of Parole, in its discretion by at least a two-thirds affirmative vote of all its members, upon recommendation by the Directors of the Bureau of Corrections, supported by the recommendation of a psychiatrist and/or psychologist, is authorized to fix an earlier eligibility date for the release of a prisoner on parole after serving one-third of his term or terms or after serving 10 years of a life sentence or of a sentence of 30 years or more.

V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 4601 (emphasis added).

Callwood has served over 10 years of his 45-year sentence, and, as we construe his petition, he now seeks a recommendation by the Directors of the Bureau of Corrections to the Board of Parole so that the Board of Parole can exercise its discretion in fixing a date for his release on parole.

By letter dated June 23, 1997, the warden at the Lewisburg penitentiary, where Callwood was housed at the time he filed his petition, informed the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections of Callwood's desire for parole consideration. In the letter, the warden stated that Callwood has completed 10 years of his sentence and that "[a] psychological evaluation completed on May 2, 1997, indicates Inmate Callwood is an individual capable of maintaining responsible and regulation abiding behavior." The letter was accompanied by Callwood's Progress Report, issued by the United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons. By letter dated July 8, 1997, another warden of the Lewisburg penitentiary informed the Virgin Islands Board of Parole of the same. Callwood has heard no response from either the Virgin Islands Directors of Corrections or Board of Parole. In his petition, Callwood requests that the court "[o]rder that the Bureau of Correction fix an earlier parole eligibility date under 5 V.I.C. 4601, thereby ordering the V.I. Parole Board to grant [Callwood] a hearing to consider his release on parole." Pet. filed Nov. 6, 1997, at 10.

The District Court transferred the petition to this court to be treated as an application to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244 (requiring an order of the court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive petition under S 2255). On March 31, 1998, we issued an order stating the following:

The foregoing application to file a successive 28 U.S.C. S 2255 motion is denied as unnecessary. Because petitioner wishes to challenge parole processes, he must proceed under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, SS 1301-1325. Bennett v. Soto, 850 F.2d 161, 163 (3d Cir. 1988). The clerk is directed to transfer the petition to the District Court of the Virgin Islands. The district court shall hear the petition in accordance with V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, SS 1301-1325.

By order dated May 19, 1998, the District Court denied Callwood's petition on the merits. Callwood timely appealed.

II. Discussion

A.

We begin our discussion with an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the District Court of the Virgin Islands over Callwood's petition, an inquiry that is also relevant to our own jurisdiction over the appeal.

Article IV, S 3 of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to establish "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States," including the Virgin Islands. U.S. Const. art. IV, S 3, cl.2; see also Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993). Pursuant to that authority, Congress enacted the Revised Organic Act of 1954, 48 U.S.C. SS 1541-1645, which serves as the Constitution of the Virgin Islands and establishes the jurisdiction of its courts.³ The Revised Organic Act originally vested the District Court of the Virgin Islands with the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States "in all causes arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States...." Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, S 22, 68 Stat. 497. The Act also vested the District Court of the Virgin Islands with general original jurisdiction over all other matters in the Virgin Islands, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the local courts over civil actions in which the amount in controversy was less than $500 and over criminal actions for local offenses in which the maximum punishment did not exceed six months in prison or a $100 fine. Under this jurisdictional framework, the District Court of the Virgin Islands heard the majority of cases brought in the Virgin Islands, whether those cases were brought under federal law or local law, civil law or criminal law. See Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 1982) (explaining jurisdiction of the District Court of the Virgin Islands under the Revised Organic Act of 1954 as "more like a state court of general jurisdiction than a United States district court").

In 1984, Congress rewrote the jurisdictional provisions of the Revised Organic Act, which set in motion a restructuring of the Virgin Islands judicial system. As we explain in today's decision in Walker v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 230 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. Oct. 2000), in enacting the 1984 amendments to the Revised Organic Act, Congress "affirmatively bestow[ed] on the District Court of the Virgin Islands the entire jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States...." Id. at ___, *2; see 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a). Moreover, in enacting the 1984 amendments, Congress gave the Virgin Islands legislature the power to vest jurisdiction over local actions exclusively in the local courts. See 48 U.S.C. S 1612(b); 48 U.S.C. S 1611(b); Estate Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Court of Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1991) [caption of case amended 4/19/95].

On September 5, 1990, the Virgin Islands legislature exercised that power, enacting legislation, effective October 1, 1991, that vests original jurisdiction over all local civil actions in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, S 76(a). Since October 1, 1991, therefore, all civil actions that are based on local law and that do not satisfy diversity...