Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 April 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 27700.,27700. |
| Citation | 180 Minn. 52,230 N.W. 457 |
| Parties | BORIGHT v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Steele County; Fred W. Senn, Judge.
Action by H. N. Boright against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Davis, Michel & Yaeger, of Minneapolis, and Leach & Leach, of Owatonna, for appellant.
O'Brien, Horn & Stringer, of St. Paul, and F. A. Alexander, of Owatonna, for respondent.
Tom. J. McGrath, of Cleveland, Ohio, for Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen; Thomas Stevenson, of Cleveland, Ohio, for Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen; Oscar J. Horn, of Cleveland, Ohio, for Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; Grimm, Wheeler, Elliott & Shuttleworth, of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for Order of Railway Conductors of America; Frederick M. Miner and Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, all of Minneapolis, amici curiæ, filed briefs in support of the contention of appellant.
Samuel H. Cady, of Chicago, Ill., for Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.; Walter H. Jacobs, of Chicago, Ill., for Chicago Great Western Ry. Co.; J. C. James, of Chicago, Ill., and Denegre, McDermott, Stearns, Stone & Mackey, of St. Paul, for Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co; Edward C. Craig, of Chicago, Ill., Chas. A. Helsell of Ft. Dodge, Iowa, and Edwin C. Brown, of Minneapolis, for Illinois Cent. R. Co.; F. W. Root, C. O. Newcomb, and A. C. Erdall, all of Minneapolis, and Sawyer, Lord & Munck, of Owatonna, for Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co.; Harold S. Nelson, Co. Atty., of Owatonna, amici curiæ, filed briefs in support of the contention of respondent.
Action in the district court of Rice county in the fifth judicial district to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in Kansas while employed by the defendant railway company in interstate commerce. By stipulation the venue was changed to Steele county in the same district. The railway company moved that the action be dismissed upon the ground that a trial of it in Steele county would unreasonably burden interstate commerce, and so violate the commerce clause of the Constitution; and further it alleged that the ends of convenience would be served if the case were dismissed and the trial were not had in Minnesota; and that it was within the power and discretion of the Minnesota courts to refuse jurisdiction and dismiss the case.
The motion was granted, and formal judgment of dismissal was entered. The plaintiff sought to review the judgment upon mandamus issued from this court. Upon hearing it was held that mandamus was not the proper remedy, and the writ was quashed and judgment of dismissal was entered. State ex rel. Boright v. Dist. Ct., 178 Minn. 236, 226 N. W. 569. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment. In discussing the matters presented, it is convenient to consider (1) whether the court had jurisdiction; (2) whether, if so, it should refuse to try the action in Minnesota because such trial would unreasonably burden interstate commerce; (3) whether jurisdiction should be refused because thereby the ends of convenience would be served; and (4) the effect of the Federal Employers' Liability Act assuming to give concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts. There are no other questions.
1. The plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Kansas. The defendant is organized under the law of Illinois and Iowa. It has a line of railway and does a general interstate and intrastate railway business in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, Missouri, Kansas, and other states. Summons was served on the defendant's ticket agent in Rice county, through which its line runs, pursuant to G. S. 1923, § 8009, 9231 and 9233. The defendant appeared and answered. It denied liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59), and alleged that the plaintiff's injury occurred in intrastate commerce, and that it and the plaintiff were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act of Kansas.
The district court had jurisdiction of the parties. It could proceed to judgment, unless because of the claimed unreasonable burden imposed upon interstate commerce; and it should do so unless it ought to refuse to entertain jurisdiction for reasons of convenience and leave it to the plaintiff to bring suit elsewhere.
2. The cases upon which the defendant mainly relies in support of its claim that a trial in Minnesota will unreasonably burden interstate commerce are Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996, and Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101, 44 S. Ct. 469, 68 L. Ed. 928. In neither of these cases did the defendant have a line of railway or do a railway business in the state where suit was brought, except that in the Davis Case it solicited freight; nor did the cause of action upon which suit was brought arise in such state; nor was the plaintiff a resident there; nor, while unimportant here but mentioned because of what is said in paragraph 4, was the action uder the Federal Liability Act. In each of them the facts stated in support of the claim of unreasonably burdening interstate commerce were more persuasive than here, for in this case the affidavit on which the motion for a dismissal is based merely states that a burden will result. To these cases may now be added Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, 49 S. Ct. 207, 73 L. Ed. 470. There an accident resulting in death occurred in Michigan, where the deceased resided and was employed by the defendant in interstate commerce and under the laws of which the defendant was incorporated. The widow of the deceased employee moved to Missouri, where suit was brought. The defendant had no line of railway in Missouri and did no business there except as it solicited freight. The maintenance of the action in Missouri was held to impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce within the Davis Case, 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996.
The defendant railway company has 280 miles of railroad in Minnesota. It runs through trains from the Twin Cities to Kansas City and farther to the Southwest. It runs through trains to Chicago from the Twin Cities. It has a branch or two in Minnesota, and a line extends from Iowa through the southwest of Minnesota northwesterly into South Dakota, connecting that region with its lines in Iowa and other places. It travels a fertile and prosperous region of Minnesota. There are no waste places. It is one of the large railway systems of the country, and the portion in Minnesota is an important part of it.
We have many times held that the trial of a cause of action against a railroad company which is so definitely and materially a part of the railroad business of the state, under conditions comparable with those shown in this case, does not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. State v. District Court, 156 Minn. 380, 194 N. W. 780; Erving v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 171 Minn. 87, 214 N. W. 12: Kobbe v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 173 Minn. 79, 216 N. W. 543; Gegere v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 175 Minn. 96, 220 N. W. 429; Winders v. I. C. R. Co., 177 Minn. 1, 223 N. W. 291, 226 N. W. 213; Phillips v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 177 Minn. 233, 225 N. W. 106; Witort v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 178 Minn. 261, 226 N. W. 934.
That the interstate carrier has a considerable mileage and is active in the railroad business of the state is a factor in determining whether an unreasonable burden is imposed upon interstate commerce. This is noted in a number of the cases cited. The case of Hoffman v. State of Missouri, 274 U. S. 21, 47 S. Ct. 485, 71 L. Ed. 905, supports our view that under the facts of the case it should not be held that there is an unreasonable burden cast upon interstate commerce. There the action involved was under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59). It was brought by a citizen and resident of Kansas for the death of an employee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company occurring in Kansas. The deceased was a citizen and resident of Kansas. The railroad was a Missouri corporation. The action was brought in Missouri in a county traversed by the railroad, in which it had an office and an agent for the transaction of business, and, under the state statute, service could be made upon him. Distinguishing the Davis and the Atchison Cases, the Supreme Court held that there was no such interference with Interstate commerce as justified a refusal of jurisdiction. The claim that there was a burden upon interstate commerce was substantially that set forth in detail in the Davis Case. The court said:
"The railroad contends that, as it could have been sued in Kansas, where the accident occurred and the plaintiff resided, the statute as applied, was void, under the doctrine of Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996, and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101, 44 S. Ct. 469, 68 L. Ed. 928, because a suit in Missouri would burden interstate commerce."
And, after referring to the claim made of a burden upon interstate commerce, continued:
The only distinction favorable to the defendant noted between the Hoffman Case and the one at bar is that the defendant there was a domestic corporation while here it is a foreign corporation doing business in Minnesota. About one-half of the railways in Minnesota are wholly foreign. A few less are wholly domestic. Perhaps two are organized in...
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