Krone v. Snapout Forms Co.
Decision Date | 13 June 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 41522,41522,1 |
Citation | 230 S.W.2d 865,360 Mo. 821 |
Parties | KRONE et al. v. SNAPOUT FORMS CO |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Francis R. Stout, Richard M. Stout, St. Louis, for appellants.
William H. Armstrong, Henry C. M. Lamkin, St. Louis, for respondent. Cobbs, Logan, Armstrong, Teasdale & Roos, St. Louis, of counsel.
Clarence F. Krone and Norman Brice, partners, plaintiffs below and appellants here, sued The Snapout Forms Company, defendant below and respondent here, for libel and prayed for $25,000 actual and $50,000 punitive damages. The verdict of the jury was for the defendant. From the adverse judgment plaintiffs appealed. We refer to the parties as plaintiffs and defendant.
Plaintiffs were engaged in selling printed business forms in St. Louis and vicinity. Defendant was a manufacturer in Ohio of printed business forms. The petition alleged that plaintiffs conducted 'an independent jobbing business'; that defendant was the agent of plaintiffs to manufacture the business forms which plaintiffs sold; that defendant sent to certain of plaintiffs' customers in St. Louis a letter stating therein that in their relationship with defendant, plaintiffs had committed a 'breach of good faith'; and that defendant had discontinued plaintiffs' alleged relationship as dealer because plaintiffs had sold some business forms not manufactured by defendant. As a defense, the answer affirmatively alleged that the statements in the letters 'were true due to the plaintiffs' conduct' in selling forms not manufactured by defendant.
The alleged libelous letter was dated September 18, 1939, and was as follows:
Plaintiffs first contend that the court erred in giving defendant's instruction 9, which was as follows: 'The Court instructs the jury that, although one may publish of another defamatory and malicious matter, yet the truth of the matter published forms a complete defense to any action for damage for such publication; and in this case, even if the jury should believe from the evidence that Defendant published of the Plaintiffs any or all of the matters charged as libelous, yet if they further find from the evidence that the matters so published were true as published, then the defense has been made complete, and in that case it is immaterial whether the Defendant Snapout Forms Co., in writing and publishing the letter, was or was not actuated by malice against Plaintiffs, and you must find for the Defendants.' Plaintiffs' only contention is that that instruction is without factual support 'because there was no evidence or reasonable inference of truth in the record.'
As a basis for their position as to instruction 9, it is insisted by plaintiffs that, 'Truth in this case could only have been shown by proving an exclusive agency contract.' While defendant's answer also alleged that it granted plaintiffs the exclusive right to sell Snapout Forms in the St. Louis area and that plaintiffs agreed to refrain from selling similar and competitive business forms put out by other manufacturers, we conclude that the propriety of instruction 9 does not depend upon the then relationship of plaintiffs and defendant (whether dealer and manufacturer, or principal and agent), nor does it depend upon whether there was an exclusive agency contract. The evidence does not establish that there was a contract between the parties. It does establish a course of dealing and doing business under conditions and circumstances hereinafter appearing.
While plaintiffs contend the relationship of the parties was that of principal and agent, and further contend that they (plaintiffs) did not agree to sell only the forms manufactured by defendant, the letter (if libelous) was such not because it stated plaintiffs were dealers but because it was untrue and libelous that plaintiffs had committed a 'breach of good faith' in their business dealings. Plaintiffs submitted their case to the jury on their instruction 1. As a basis for their recovery plaintiffs therein required the jury to find that in the letters (published) defendant used the words, 'these dealers of ours committed this breach of good faith', and that those words were libelous and untrue. Much of the evidence before us is upon the question of the then relationship of plaintiffs and defendant but that evidence and the then legal relationship of the parties cannot be determinative of the issues upon this appeal.
The pertinent portion of instruction 9 predicated a verdict for defendant if the jury 'further find from the evidence that the matters so published were true as published.' If (as stated in the letter) the evidence warrants a jury finding (1) that plaintiffs were dealers, and (2) that plaintiffs committed a breach of good faith, then plaintiffs' instant contention as to the above instruction is without merit and must be denied. In ruling this question we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant. If the evidence presents even so much as an allowable inference of (1) and (2) above, such an inference is legally sufficient.
The transcript before us is replete with testimony that plaintiffs were defendant's 'dealers' in the St. Louis area for the business forms manufactured by defendant. The plaintiffs were 'engaged in the business of making surveys in various (business) concerns, designing (business) forms and selling them.' When the demands of a business indicated a need for business forms of the Snapout type, if that business firm ordered such forms from plaintiffs, from 1935 to 1938, the order therefor was generally sent by plaintiffs to defendant and those forms were then manufactured by defendant and shipped direct to the user. Mr. Krone testified that plaintiffs started doing business with defendant in November, 1934; that plaintiffs were then the only dealers in the St. Louis area for Snapout forms made by defendant, and, that in 1935 and 1936, plaintiffs placed about $7,300 of business with defendant; that from 1935 until at least September, 1939 defendant had no direct salesman or other dealer on the St. Louis territory; and that in 1938 when other companies started manufacturing the Snapout type of forms, plaintiffs then began placing their business...
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