Schmucker v. Naugle

• Decision Date: 29 June 1967
• Citation: 231 A.2d 121,426 Pa. 203
• Parties: John SCHMUCKER, Appellant, v. John NAUGLE.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

231 A.2d 121

426 Pa. 203

John SCHMUCKER, Appellant, v. John NAUGLE.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 29, 1967.

Charles H. Weidner, Stevens & Lee, Reading, for appellant.

George R. Eves, Eves & Bear, Reading, for appellee.

Before BELL C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN Justice.

On July 7 1964, John Schmucker (appellant) instituted this action in trespass to recover compensation for personal injury suffered on March 9, 1958, through the alleged negligent operation of an automobile by the defendant, John Naugle, while on the business of the other defendant, the Daniel Boone Council Boy Scouts of America. In proper pleadings the defendants raised, inter alia, the statute of limitations as a defense. Subsequently, a voluntary nonsuit was suffered as to the Boy Scout Council, and the case proceeded to trial against the remaining defendant, Naugle, limited by agreement to the issue of whether or not the action was barred by the statute of limitations. At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. From the judgment entered on the verdict, Schmucker appeals.

At trial the appellant ^[1] testified without contradiction that at the time of the accident and injury he was fifteen years of age, having been born on July 28, 1942; that four days after the accident his claim for damages was settled for the sum of $835, and a draft in that sum payable to the appellant and his parents was delivered, endorsed by all parties and paid, but he personally received none of the proceeds; that simultaneously a release executed by appellant and his parents was delivered to the defendants; that on August 15, 1963, or after reaching his majority, he disaffirmed the settlement and release. No fraud, undue influence or overreaching was asserted.

Appellant contends that being a minor when the settlement agreement and release were effected, and plus the fact that he personally had not received any part of the consideration paid therefor or participated in its benefits, he had the right to disaffirm upon reaching his majority. This is correct. Under such circumstances, the settlement agreement and release would not be binding upon him. See, O'Leary Estate, 352 Pa. 254, 42 A.2d 624 (1945); Haines v Fitzgerald, 108 Pa.Super. 290, 165 A. 52 (1933); and, Hollinger v. York Railways, 225 Pa. 416, 74 A. 344 (1909). Appellant further contends that upon iis disaffirmance he was restored to the status existing before the settlement and release were consummated. In other words, he became possessed of the same cause of action he enjoyed before. Even if this is so, the settlement agreement, release and disaffirmance in no way tolled or stopped the statute of limitatiions from running against the claim from the date the cause of action accrued. The Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 236 § 2, 12 P.S. § 34, which is still extant requires that every action for personal injury must be brought within two years from the date of injury and minors are not exempt from this provision of the statute. See, Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445, 227 A.2d 833 (1967); Walker v. Mummert, 394 Pa. 146, 146 A.2d 289 (1958; and Von Colln v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 367 Pa. 232, 80 A.2d 83 (1951). Hence, the lower court was correct in ruling that the statute barred prosecution of this action commenced over six years after the cause arose. 'The defense of the statute of limitations is not a technical defense but substantial and meritorious. * * * Such statutes are not only statutes of repose, but they supply the place of evidence lost or impaired by lapse of time, by raising a presumption, which renders proof unnecessary. * * * 'Statutes of...