Cason v. Seckinger, 99-11125
| Citation | 231 F.3d 777 |
| Decision Date | 24 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 84-00313-5-CWH,No. 99-11125,99-11125 |
| Parties | (11th Cir. 2000) BUDDY CASON, IKKI CONTRERAS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees- Cross-Appellants, DAVID TONY NEISLER, GERALD WENDELL SPIVEY, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees, v. JIM SECKINGER, THOMAS JONES, et al., Defendants-Appellants- Cross-Appellees. D.C |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
Before CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK*, District Judge.
This appeal stems from a lawsuit that was filed sixteen years ago on behalf of a class consisting of all male and female inmates ("plaintiffs") presently or in the future housed by the Georgia Department of Corrections at the Middle Georgia Correctional Complex. The lawsuit was brought against the Georgia Department of Corrections and certain officials ("defendants"), and it sought injunctive relief to remedy numerous alleged Constitutional violations. The parties differences were resolved by entry of a series of consent decrees between May 10, 1990 and March 29, 1996.
On November 12, 1998, defendants filed a motion to vacate and terminate all remaining consent decrees pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 18 U.S.C. 3626. In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether there are current and ongoing violations of class members' federal rights, and they also urged the court to grant a motion they had filed in 1995 seeking leave to amend their complaint to add related claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The district court granted the defendants' motion to terminate only insofar as it pertained to the enforcement of the consent decrees within the present suit, but denied their motion to vacate the "substance" of the underlying decrees.1 The district court also denied the plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing as well as their motion to amend their complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate that portion of the district court's order pertaining to termination of the consent decrees and remand with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the requirements of the PLRA. We affirm that portion of the district court's order denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
The underlying civil action seeking injunctive relief from allegedly unconstitutional prison conditions that existed in the Middle Georgia Correctional Complex was originally filed in 1984.2 A class was certified consisting of all male and female inmates presently or in the future housed in the Middle Georgia Correctional Complex. The case was eventually resolved by the entry of a series of consent decrees designed to remedy the alleged institutional deficiencies. Of primary importance to the issues on appeal are fourteen consent decrees that were entered beginning in 1990 and ending in 1996. Of those fourteen orders, three contained provisions for automatic termination, and for that reason are not at issue in the present appeal.3 The remaining consent decrees did not contain any provision for automatic termination.4
In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 18 U.S.C. 3626. The PLRA altered the landscape of prison reform litigation in two primary respects. First, it prescribed limits on the scope of prospective relief that a court has the authority to enter, mandating that prospective relief will not be entered "unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary . . . and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1).
Second, the PLRA limits a court's authority to continue to enforce previously entered prospective relief in prison litigation reform cases. Section 3626(b)(1)(A) establishes specified time frames under which prospective relief is terminable upon motion of a party. Section 3626(b)(2) sets forth an additional ground for termination, providing that a defendant shall be entitled to immediate termination of any prospective relief that was entered without the required findings that "the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation . . .and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation ...." Id. Both subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) are limited by 3626(b)(3), which provides that prospective relief shall not terminate if the court determines that the relief remains necessary to "correct a current and ongoing violation of [federal rights], extends no further than necessary to correct the violation ... and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation." Id. 3636(b)(3).
In 1998, the defendants moved pursuant to 3626(b) of the PLRA for an order terminating and vacating all consent decrees that did not already contain provisions for automatic termination. The district court granted the motion in part, concluding that there was no "current and ongoing" constitutional violations sufficient to justify the continuation of the decrees under 3626(b)(3). In reaching that conclusion, the district court denied plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing. The court determined no evidentiary hearing was required on the issue of whether there were current and ongoing violations because the plaintiffs had not requested any additional injunctive relief in the two years preceding the defendants' motion, nor had they alleged any non-compliance with the existing decrees during that two-year period. According to the court, those two factors by themselves established that no current and ongoing violations existed, and for that reason no evidentiary hearing was necessary.
Acting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(1)(A)(iii),5 the district court granted the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decrees insofar as the motion called for the termination of the underlying lawsuit. Nonetheless, expressing its wish not "to destroy what it considers to be positive steps taken by the Department in ensuring that its charges are properly looked after in accordance with Constitutional requirements," the court denied the defendants' motion insofar as it requested that the court vacate the substantive provisions of the consent decrees. The court was motivated to leave the substantive provisions alone by its desire to allow courts in future cases involving these same defendants to be able to consider the substance of the prior consent decrees. Perhaps recognizing the problematic nature of what it was doing, the court attempted to explain that, "[t]he purpose of this order is simply to end this proceeding which has been pending in various forms since 1984, nearly fifteen years, keeping intact the substantive provisions of all orders and injunctions which have not expired by their own terms." (emphasis in original). The court emphasized that it did not intend to permit the continued enforcement of the consent decrees, and to that end vacated and terminated "all provisions in the various orders/injunctions entered herein dealing with enforcement by way of contempt or otherwise...." (emphasis in original).
The district court also denied plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Counsel for plaintiffs originally filed the motion in 1995, more than ten years after the lawsuit was initiated. The court delayed ruling on the motion until after the Supreme Court ruled on the application of the ADA to state prison facilities. See generally Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998). The district court subsequently denied the motion to amend on the grounds that adding a new sub-class to the litigation at such a late stage would only serve to prolong the already protracted litigation. The court observed that plaintiffs could present any ADA-related claims in a new lawsuit, and that requiring them to do so would in no way adversely impact their ability to prosecute such a claim.
The defendants appealed the denial of their motion to terminate the consent decrees in their entirety, and the plaintiffs cross- appealed the denial of their request for an evidentiary hearing and the denial of their motion to amend.
The provision of the PLRA pursuant to which the district court determined the decrees to be terminable mandates that, upon motion of a party, prospective relief that was ordered prior to the date of the PLRA's enactment shall be terminable two years after the effective date of the enactment, unless certain specific findings are made. See 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (b)(3). Here, there is no dispute that the relief embodied in the consent decrees was ordered prior to the effective date of the PLRA's enactment and that the defendants' motion was filed more than two years after that date. Thus, the relief is terminable unless the limiting provisions of 3626(b)(3) prohibit termination. Before we can determine whether the issues involving the extent of the district court's termination of the consent decrees are presented, we must decide if termination was prohibited under 3626(b)(3) (). We turn to that issue now, and to the plaintiffs' contention that they were wrongly denied an evidentiary hearing on it.
We review the district court's denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Loyd v. Alabama Dep't of Corrections, 176 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999).
Section 3626(b)(3) provides:
Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that...
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