231 F.Supp. 393 (N.D.Ga. 1964), Civ. A. 9017, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States
|Docket Nº:||Civ. A. 9017|
|Citation:||231 F.Supp. 393|
|Party Name:||Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States|
|Case Date:||July 22, 1964|
|Court:||United States District Courts, 11th Circuit, Northern District of Georgia|
Moreton F. Rolleston, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.
Charles L. Goodson, U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., and Burke Marshall and St.
John Barrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Washington, D.C., for defendants.
Before TUTTLE, Circuit Judge, and HOOPER and MORGAN, District Judges.
This is a complaint filed by Heart of Atlanta Motel, a large downtown motel in the city of Atlanta, regularly catering to out of state guests, praying for a declaratory judgment and injunction to prevent the Attorney General of the United States from exercising powers granted to him under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971, as amended. The suit also attempts to obtain recovery from the United States for substantial damages alleged to result from a partial taking of the complainant's property without just compensation.
Conceding, as it does, that it is regularly engaged in renting sleeping accommodations to out of town guests, seventy-five percent of whom come from without the state of Georgia, and that it 'has refused and intends to refuse to rent sleeping accommodations to persons desiring said accommodations, for several different reasons, one of which is based on the grounds of race, unless ordered by this Court to comply with the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the suit attacks the constitutionality of the public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights Act as applied to such a motel.
Since this is a suit seeking an injunction against the enforcement of a Federal statute on the alleged grounds that it is in violation of the United States Constitution, a three-judge court was convened as provided for in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2282.
The Attorney General filed a counterclaim seeking, on behalf of the United States, a temporary and permanent injunction against future violation of the Civil Rights Act by the plaintiff. The case was set down for hearing, and after the introduction of oral testimony on behalf of the United States, the signing of stipulations between the parties, and oral statement made by counsel for the plaintiff in open court, it appeared that no factual issues remained. The parties also conceded in open court that the matter might be treated as a hearing on the petition for the final permanent injunction.
In the first place, the claim of the plaintiff for damages against the United States on the alleged ground of deprivation of property without just compensation alleges no grounds for relief, entirely aside from the question whether such alleged...
To continue readingFREE SIGN UP