Knutsen v. Brown

Decision Date20 July 1967
Docket NumberA--553,Nos. A--532,s. A--532
Citation232 A.2d 833,96 N.J.Super. 229
PartiesJeffrey KNUTSEN, an infant, by his Guardian ad Litem, Harold Knutsen; Harold Knutsen, individually, and Rita Knutsen, Plaintiffs-Respondents and Cross- Appellants, v. Leonard BROWN, Matthew Feldman, Hackensack Hospital, Herman Grossman and Bernard Etra, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

H. Curtis Meanor, Jersey City, and Daniel K. Van Dorn, Newark, for appellants and cross-respondents (Mead, Gleeson, Hansen & Pantages, Newark, attorneys for Leonard Brown, Lamb, Blake, Hutchinson & Dunne, Jersey City, and Braun & Braun, Newark, attorneys for Matthew Feldman, Herman Grossman and Bernard Etra, Winne & Banta, Hackensack, attorneys for Hackensack Hospital).

Donald G. Collester, Jr. Montclair, for respondents and cross-appellants (William O. Barnes, Jr., Newark, attorney).

Before Judges SULLIVAN, KOLOVSKY and CARTON.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KOLOVSKY, J.A.D.

On January 25, 1959 plaintiff Rita Knutsen (Rita), then seven months pregnant, was sitting in the front seat of an automobile being driven by her husband Harold when it was involved in a collision with automobiles driven by one Salamon and one Weindorf. Rita was thrown forward, injured her shin and was struck in the abdomen by her three-year old son who had been sitting on her lap.

On February 7, 1959 Rita gave premature birth to a child, plaintiff Jeffrey Knutsen.

Separate personal injury negligence actions instituted on behalf of the infant Jeffrey and the parents against Salamon and Weindorf were consolidated for trial. The consolidated cases, tried in February 1963, resulted in jury verdicts of $17,000 for the infant Jeffrey, $1700 for Rita and a verdict of no cause for action as to the father and husband Harold.

A motion to set aside the verdicts as inadequate was denied. No appeal was taken. On June 14, 1963 Rita was appointed guardian of the person and property of Jeffrey. On June 18, 1963, having received payment of the amounts due on the judgment entered on the jury verdicts, Rita, both individually and as Jeffrey's general guardian, executed and delivered a for injuries allegedly sustained by Jeffrey

Some 13 months later, on July 10, 1964, the present action was instituted to recover for injuries allegedly sustained by Jefrey as the result of defendants' alleged negligence and medical malpractice, Jeffrey's parents suing Per quod. Joined as parties defendants were the hospital in which Jeffrey was born, Dr. Brown, the attending obstetrician, and three pediatricians who at various times up to August 1959 had treated Jeffrey.

Following the pretrial conference defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that the parents' Per quod claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the infant's claim had been fully satisfied by reason of the payment and satisfaction of the judgment entered in the automobile accident case.

The trial court denied summary judgment as to the infant's claim; it granted summary judgment dismissing the parents' derivative claim. Upon leave granted, defendants appeal from the denial of the motion as to the infant's claim; plaintiff-parents appeal from the dismissal of their action.

We affirm, for the reasons expressed in the trial court's opinion, its determination that at the time this action was instituted on July 10, 1964 the parents' derivative claim was barred by the statute of limitations, N.J.S. 2A:14--2, N.J.S.A. That cause of action was not and could not be revived by the subsequent enactment of N.J.S. 2A:14--2.1, N.J.S.A., which became effective on October 28, 1964.

The issue presented with respect to the infant's claim is whether the satisfaction of the judgment entered in the automobile accident case establishes, as defendants contend, that the infant has already received satisfaction for the injuries alleged to have resulted from the malpractice charged against defendants, so that prosecution of the malpractice action is barred.

The rationale controlling this case is to be found in Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676, 69 A.L.R.2d 1024 (1958), where, as here, plaintiff instituted successive actions against the driver and owner (Dealer's) of the automobile which injured him and against the treating physicians whose negligence allegedly caused plaintiff's injuries to become worse.

But in Daily the action against the original tortfeasor, Dealer's, was not tried to judgment. It was settled and plaintiff gave Dealer's a general release. In reversing a summary judgment for defendant doctors the court said:

'If the release of Dealer's Transport Company was actually intended to release the doctors, or if the amount paid by Dealer's actually constituted full compensation for the plaintiff's claims against Dealer's and the doctors or was accepted as such, then the plaintiff may not fairly or equitably seek further recovery. But these issues of intent and full compensation are factual in nature and could not properly be determined by the trial court on the showing made on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Breen v. Peck, supra (28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665, 73 A.L.R.2d 390). The release to Dealer's did not on its face suggest that there was any intent to release the doctors nor did it suggest that the plaintiff received full compensation for his injuries.' (at p. 384, 146 A.2d at p. 683)

In the instant case there was no release; there was satisfaction of a judgment entered after a contested trial against the original tortfeasors. In such a case the first alternative question posed in Daily, did plaintiff intend to release the doctors, is not pertinent. But the second, whether the amount paid actually constituted full compensation for the total loss suffered by plaintiff as the result of the negligence of the original tortfeasors and the negligence of the doctors, is pertinent and the answer to it dispositive of plaintiff's right to prosecute the malpractice action.

Unlike the situation in the case of a release, the issue of whether a plaintiff who has received full satisfaction of a judgment entered against the original tortfeasors following a contested trial has received full compensation is not to be resolved by oral testimony. Rather, it is to be resolved from an examination of the record of the action against the original tortfeasors and a determination therefrom whether the judgment entered therein represented an award to the plaintiff for all the loss he sustained from the original injury, including that now alleged to have resulted from the alleged malpractice, or whether the recovery represented only the injury which resulted immediately from the automobile accident, independent of the additional harm caused him by the alleged negligence, mistake or lack of skill of defendant doctors and hospital. Cf. Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 A. 602, 603 (Sup.Ct.1919), cited in Daily v. Somberg, supra, 28 N.J. at p. 384, 146 A.2d 676.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative and the judgment in the first action found to encompass an award for all the injuries sustained by plaintiff, including those now alleged to be attributable to defendants' malpractice, then the satisfaction of that judgment bars the maintenance by plaintiff of the present action to recover for a portion of the total injuries. Theobald v. Kenney's Suburban...

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25 cases
  • Berman v. Allan
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • June 26, 1979
    ...31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Knutsen v. Brown, et al., 93 N.J.Super. 522, 226 A.2d 460 (Law Div.1966), aff'd 96 N.J.Super. 229, 232 A.2d 833 (App.Div.1967); see also, Graf v. Taggert, supra. Their negligence consists of the failure to render proper advice to Mrs. Berman as an Expectant......
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    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • July 21, 1997
    ...natural and proximate injuries that flow from initial tort, including the consequences of medical treatment); Knutsen v. Brown, 96 N.J.Super. 229, 235, 232 A.2d 833 (App.Div.1967) (stating that where a person has suffered personal injury by reason of another's negligence, the tortfeasor is ......
  • Glassman v. Friedel
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • December 3, 2020
    ...the initial tort, including the consequences of medical treatment ... caused by his wrong." Ibid. (citing Knutsen v. Brown, 96 N.J. Super. 229, 235, 232 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1967) ). However, we noted that "questions of liability may make [the] plaintiff's recovery from either tortfeasor unc......
  • City of Hackensack v. Winner
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • July 31, 1978
    ...... Cf. Knutsen v. Brown, 96 N.J.Super. 229, 234-237, 232 A.2d 833 (App.Div.1967). .         In the Civil Service hearing there was no statement or hint at ......
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