232 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2000), 99-1331, Fields v. Romer

Docket Nº:99-1331.
Citation:232 F.3d 901
Party Name:Troy Lamonte FIELDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roy ROMER, Governor; Aristedes W. Zavaras; Colorado Department of Corrections, Employees Known and Unknown; State of Colorado; Bowie County Correctional Facility, also known as Bowie County Detention Center, Bowie County Detention Facility, Bowie County Sheriff Department, and Bowie County Jail, Employee
Case Date:October 30, 2000
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Page 901

232 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2000)

Troy Lamonte FIELDS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Roy ROMER, Governor; Aristedes W. Zavaras; Colorado Department of Corrections, Employees Known and Unknown; State of Colorado; Bowie County Correctional Facility, also known as Bowie County Detention Center, Bowie County Detention Facility, Bowie County Sheriff Department, and Bowie County Jail, Employees Known and Unknown; Mary Choate; Tony Richardson, Colorado Correctional Employees Known and Unknown; Bowie County Correctional Employees Known and Unknown; BRG Holding, Inc., a Texas corporation, Defendants-Appellees,and

Karnes County, Texas, a political subdivision of the State of Texas; Rod Ellis, Warden of the Karnes County Correctional Center, Defendants.

No. 99-1331.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

October 30, 2000

Editorial Note:

This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA10 Rule 36.3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)

2000 CJ C.A.R. 6054

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT [*]

SEYMOUR.

Mr. Fields is a state prisoner under the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC). Following his transfer, along with other prisoners, to the Bowie County Correctional Facility (BCCF) in Bowie County, Texas, Mr. Fields filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging he was being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. His action for damages was severed from a pending class action filed on behalf of all Colordo inmates who had been transferred to the BCCF due to overcrowding. As a result of the class action, the inmates, including Mr. Fields, were transferred back to Colorado. In the present damage action, the district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss.

Mr. Fields alleges that the conditions at the Bowie County Correctional Facility (BCCF) were generally inhumane. He also describes three macing incidents which occurred while he was housed there. Mr. Fields' complaint names as defendants, inter alia, the Governor of Colorado, Roy Romer; the Executive Director of the CDOC, Aristedes Zavaras; the CDOC itself; the Sheriff of Bowie County, Mary Choate; and the warden of the Bowie County Correctional Center, Tony Richardson. 1

The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice against all defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the court dismissed the complaint against Mr. Richardson because he was not served with process, and against the CDOC on the basis of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. It dismissed the suit against all other defendants for Mr. Fields' failure to allege their personal participation in his treatment while at the BCCF.

Before proceeding to the merits, we address our jurisdiction over this appeal. The district court's final judgment was filed on April 19, 1999, giving Mr. Fields sixty days from that date in which to timely file a notice of appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B). Mr. Fields then filed a motion for extension of his time to file a notice of appeal. The district court granted this motion on June 24, allowing Mr. Fields an extension to file his notice of appeal until July 23, thirty days later. Mr. Fields filed his notice of appeal on July 21, within that time period.

Unfortunately, the court did not have the authority to grant Mr. Fields an extension to that date. Under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(C), an extension cannot exceed sixty days after the final judgment, or "10 days after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later." Because the sixty day period had passed, the district court could only grant Mr. Fields an extension for up to ten days after the June 24th order. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Evans, 896 F.2d 1255, 1256-57 (10th Cir.1990). Mr. Fields' notice of...

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