232 S.W. 1091 (Mo.App. 1921), The National Cash Register Co., a Corp. v. Layton

Citation:232 S.W. 1091, 207 Mo.App. 454
Opinion Judge:COX, P. J.
Party Name:THE NATIONAL CASH REGISTER CO., a Corporation, Appellant, v. G. W. LAYTON and JAMES R. JOYCE, a Co-partnership, doing Business as the VAN DUSER SUPPLY COMPANY, Respondents
Attorney:Gresham & Blanton for appellant. Ward & Reeves for respondents.
Judge Panel:COX, P. J. Farrington and Bradley, JJ., concur. Farrington and Bradley, JJ., concur.
Case Date:June 18, 1921
Court:Court of Appeals of Missouri
 
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Page 1091

232 S.W. 1091 (Mo.App. 1921)

207 Mo.App. 454

THE NATIONAL CASH REGISTER CO., a Corporation, Appellant,

v.

G. W. LAYTON and JAMES R. JOYCE, a Co-partnership, doing Business as the VAN DUSER SUPPLY COMPANY, Respondents

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Springfield

June 18, 1921

Appeal from Scott County Circuit Court.--Hon. Frank Kelly, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Judgment affirmed.

Gresham & Blanton for appellant.

(1) Where there is an express warranty in the sale of personalty there is no implied warranty as to same matter. Fairbanks Co. v. Basket, 71 S.W. 1113, 98 Mo.App. 53; International Co. v. Smith et al., 17 Mo.App. 264; Advance Co. v. Briggs Company, 206 S.W. 587, 588 (not off. rept.) (2) Where a contract shows on its face that it composes the entire contract between the parties, it cannot be varied to show an implied warranty. Boulware v. Victor Auto Mfg. Co., 134 S.W. 7, 152 Mo.App. 567; Iron Co. v. Holbeck, 82 S.W. 1128, 109 Mo.App. 179; Fairbanks v. Baskett, 71 S.W. 1113, 98 Mo.App. 53; Wood Co. v. Bobbst, 56 Mo.App. 433; Boyer v. Neel, 50 Mo.App. 26; 17 Cyc., p. 716, par. "C." (3) Where parties by their contract incorporate therein a conditional warranty, before the vendee can rescind for its breach he must comply with the condition precedent. Jenkins Sons v. Kindle, 180 S.W. 557; Kirk v. Seeley, 63 Mo.App. 262. (4) A vendee can exercise the right of rescission only when the right is exercised immediately and by immediately is meant a reasonable time--not to consider whether to rescind or not--but to do those things necessary to rescind, and must be accompanied by a tender. Sinclair Co. v. McGuire Co., 221 S.W. 378; Emery v. Boehmer Co., 151 S.W. 174, 167 Mo.App. 703; Sterling Silver Co. v. Worrell, 154 S.W. 866, 172 Mo.App. 90; Long v. International Co., 139 S.W. 819, 158 Mo.App. 662; Metropolitan Co. v. Monarch Co., 74 Mo.App. 266; Johnson v. Whitman Co., 20 Mo.App. 102; Steam Heating Co. v. Gas Fixture Co., 60 Mo.App. 153; Kirk v. Seeley, 63 Mo.App. 262; Marth v. Wiskerchen, 172 S.W. 410, 186 Mo.App. 515; St. Louis Co. v. Loevenhart, 190 S.W. 627; Harper v. Wilson, 191 S.W. 1024; Manley v. Crescent Co., 77 S.W. 489, 103 Mo.App. 135. (5) A vendee undertaking to rescind a purchase on the ground that the article is worthless, and who does not plead damages by way of offset, cannot prevail either if he does not sustain his plea of rescission, or if the article, while less valuable than warranted, yet is not worthless, and in either case the vendor is entitled to a directed verdict. Outcault Co. v. Schierbaum, 209 S.W. 982; Riverside Co. v. Bendict Co., 201 S.W. 584; Allaire Co. v. Cole, 187 S.W. 816; Emery Co. v. Boehmer Co., 151 S.W. 174, 167 Mo.App. 703; Dayton Box Co. v. Danciger, 143 S.W. 855, 161 Mo.App. 640; Sinnamon v. Moore, 142 S.W. 494, 161 Mo.App. 168. (6) Where the facts are undisputed and lapse of time is such that fair minded men will not differ, it becomes the duty of the court to declare such as a matter of law, if the delay in rescinding has been so unreasonable as to deprive the vendee of that right. Emery v. Boehmer Co., 151 S.W. 174, 167 Mo.App. 703; Metropolitan Co. v. Monarch Co., 74. Mo.App. 266; Sterling Silver Co. v. Worrell, 154 S.W. 866, 172 Mo.App. 90; Riverside Co. v. Benedict Co., 201 S.W. 584, 588; Boyer Co. v. City of Milan, 199 S.W. 712; Johnson v. Whitman Co., 20 Mo.App. 102; Steam Heating Co. v. Gas Co., 60 Mo.App. 154; Sinclair Oil v. McGuire Co., 221 S.W. 378. (7) Where vendee claims the absolute right of rescission, but instead of standing on that right and either has the vendor repair the defects, or undertakes to use the machine after attempting to rescind, the vendee loses his right to rescind, and cannot then later undertake to exercise it. Lawson v. Williams Co., 122 Mo.App. 484; Sturgis v. Whisler, 130 S.W. 113, 145 Mo.App. 148; Faust v. Koers, 86 S.W. 279, 111 Mo.App. 560; Riverside Co. v. Benedict Co., 201 S.W. 584; Block v. Martin, 129 S.W. 715, 150 Mo.App. 82. (8) An instruction on the whole case must be so framed as to justify a recovery on the hypothetical facts therein stated, without excluding from the consideration of the jury the evidence or theory offered by the adverse party. Wood Machine Co. v. Bobbst, 56 Mo.App. 433; St. Louis Carbon Co. v. Loevenhart, 190 S.W. 627; Stepham v. C. B. & Q. Ry., 199 S.W. 273, 274; Daso v. Jefferson City, 189 S.W. 400. (9) Instructions must not change the issues as made by the pleadings, nor widen their scope. Sinnamon v. Moore, 142 S.W. 494, 161 Mo.App. 168; Scrivner v. Mo. P. Ry., 169 S.W. 83, 260 Mo. 421; Rawlings v. Frisco Ry., 175 S.W. 935; Moss v. Jacksonville Co., 226 S.W. 592. (10) Where vendor receives goods returned by vendor upon an attempted rescission, but holds them subject to the order and at the risk of the vendee, he does not accept them in satisfaction of the purchase price, but may recover that price. Brown v. Gilpin, 96 S.W. 669, 120 Mo.App. 130; Sturgis v. Whisler, 130 S.W. 111; 145 Mo.App. 148. (11) Instruction must be within both the proof and the pleadings, and must not be broader than the proof, though the pleadings would justify...

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